There is much anxiety about how much poor South Africans are paying in interest for the credit they receive. Newly shocking to observers is the fact that if a good is purchased on credit the monthly payments may amount to much more than the purchase price. For example, if a fridge had a face value of R10 000 to a buyer on credit, paying 25% p.a interest and repaying the capital sum over 10 years, the buyer would be making monthly payments of R227. And so over the life of the loan would have paid in interest and capital repayments an amount of R27 299 of which R17 299 would have been interest. Had the loan been a five year loan at the same 25% rate of interest, the monthly payments would have been higher, R294 per month, meaning lower total payments of R17 611 of which much less, R7 611 would have been the interest expense.
Why then would anyone borrow for a longer rather than a shorter period if it costs so much more? One could however ask an even more obvious question. Why would anyone buy on credit rather than pay cash, especially when the cash price is very likely to be a lower discounted one? The answer should be obvious. They buy on credit because they do not have the wherewithal to pay cash.
Without access to credit they would be denied the essential services of the fridge. Further saving the R294 minus R227 (R67) per month might mean a fridge fuller with essential food. The value of the fridge to the household borrower is in fact what they are willing to pay for it, the R227 or R294 per month. They are consuming the services of the fridge for which they are clearly willing to pay. For the lender, shorter repayment periods, higher monthly payments and less interest accrued becomes a less risky transaction, one they otherwise might wish to encourage. Borrowers however have to be judged as credit worthy enough to enjoy extended credit terms. The choice of extending the repayment period, paying more interest, may in fact be a limited one- unfortunately.
The cash buyer will not be paying interest, but nevertheless will be foregoing the opportunity to earn interest or dividends on the cash they have allocated to a particular asset. It might well be a good decision for them to rent or lease an asset rather than pay cash and put the cash to better use elsewhere. For example, to rent rather than buy a home and do something much more valuable with the cash invested, perhaps even to pay the deposit on a house bought to rent with a mortgage loan.
As with the fridge, somebody buying a home on credit pays out a lot more in interest and capital repayments than the purchase price of their home. A R1m home bought on mortgage credit at a low 10% per annum paid off over 20 years, will mean a monthly payment of R9 650 and will accumulate total payments of R2 316 052 – more than twice the purchase price paid. But the proud home owner would have saved rental payments over the period and the home will have a market value after 20 years, unlike some household appliance.
The house bought on credit will have provided a flow of services, accommodation services, similar in nature to the services provided by a fridge or TV – benefits that are received in exchange for interest and principal paid. Also, such leverage may prove to be a very good financial deal if the house more than maintains its after inflation value. Access to such credit provides a rare opportunity for salaried homeowners to add to their wealth through leverage. Such lending and borrowing on terms agreed to by borrowers and lenders surely deserves every encouragement, even if, as is bound to be the case, interest paid apparently means a more expensive house over time.
Household appliances do not provide the lender with anything like the same protection against losses should the borrower default – hence the higher charges required by lenders competing for the business. These charges reward the dealer who incurs the costs associated with the bundle of goods and services associated with any transaction concluded on credit. Charges that will be intended to cover the interest costs of supplying credit, the costs of goods supplied with the credit, and the services associated with the goods, for example the rent paid for trading space and the working capital invested in an inventory of goods from which customers can choose. This bundle of benefits – goods and services including credit services supplied to a customer – may come with a single charge, for example for a dress bought on credit at a given price to be paid off over time. Yet the price of the dress is very likely to incorporate a very high, but unknown to outsiders, profit margin intended to cover all the associated costs including the risks of non-payment. There is fortunately very little comment about regulating gross profit margins on goods supplied on credit.
There is much comment however about the apparent inequity when the terms of the transaction are in a mix of separately itemised charges – some combination of listed price, interest charges, delivery and insurance charges etc. may be specified. And complained about if one or other of the charges, considered alone, appears exorbitant. But what will matter to all buyers paying a single charge or multiple charges is how much they will be required to pay each month and whether or not it is worth making the monthly payment. And what will matter to the seller of the mix of credit and goods supplied, is whether the revenues they collect – perhaps is a variety of itemised charges – will cover their costs, including a return on capital invested appropriate to the risks incurred. If the returns exceed the required returns, more competition to supply goods and credit can be confidently expected. But if some of the charges made are controlled on an apparent cost-plus basis, such as insurance charges, any loss of revenue will have to be made up in one or other of the other charges (if the goods and credit are to be supplied in the same volume and variety). If the loss of revenue cannot be made up, less credit will be supplied.
The SA government has however decided not to leave the outcomes in credit markets to be determined by market forces. They have regulated the terms of the contracts by more than what willing lenders and equally willing borrowers might otherwise agree to. Loans, including mortgage loans, may be forced to be limited to some proportion of wage incomes and the terms of the loan, including the interest rate agreed to or charges for insurance arrangements, may be subject to regulation.
Treating borrowers in this way, as less than capable of looking after themselves, as adults managing their credit affairs, has consequences. So too has not trusting potential lenders to compete with each other with loan facilities that will compete away excess risk adjusted returns in providing credit. Such interventions in the credit market mean less credit supplied. It means fewer fridges, TVs, computers and furniture in homes, less clothing in the wardrobe, all understandably very important to the household. It also means fewer houses owned by the occupier.
Regulations of this kind may protect some less than responsible borrowers and lenders from borrowing and lending more than they should have. Yet by imposing regulations on the potentially credit worthy, as judged by willing lenders, they frustrate the plans of potentially worthy borrowers to gain access to credit that is valuable to them, credit that might be supplied to them on terms they would be willing to agree to. In the absence of credit from established businesses with reputations to protect and repeat business to encourage, desperate borrowers may well be forced into the clutches of the informal payday lenders and their ilk. Lenders who will charge much higher rates of interest for loans of typically very short duration, with repayment secured violently if necessary.
The regulators appear only aware of the costs of poor credit decisions, rather than the benefits of many more good ones made, under the discipline of market forces. Access to credit has played a very important role in improving the standard of living of many South Africans with improving income prospects but little wealth to draw upon. It is in reality a South African success story.
The self- regulatory capabilities of a market place, including those of a credit market, receive too little respect in South Africa. The costs – intended and unintended – of the flood of additional rules and regulations that prevent agreements between willing sellers and buyers, willing borrowers and lenders, are too easily ignored by an ambitious bureaucracy. These ever growing regulatory burdens on market participants are an important part of the reason why the SA economy is stagnating.