Brand Trump and the US Presidency

Being President can be very good (and honest) business

Donald Trump likes to remind us what a great businessman he is (or rather was). He may be right and perhaps his best business decision was to run for US President. It has greatly enhanced the value of his brand. As they like to say in Hollywood, there is no such thing as bad publicity.

Moreover he did not apparently have to spend much of his own wealth on his triumphant publicity campaign. A generally hostile media provided him with all the exposure he needed and did not have to pay much for. They thought, as did Hillary Clinton, that exposing his exceptionalism would be enough to put off potential voters. As we now know, they were wrong. The daily Trump tweets became the news events of the campaign (and, alas, continue to make the news) and were to his advantage at the polling booths. A tweeting President Trump, like much else of what he will now do and say, breaks the mold and we may well just have to get accustomed to his style (or lack of it).

What he does in office, with the help of his cabinet colleagues and many appointments, will matter more than his Tweets or intentions. The promise of a very different and more encouraging approach than that provided by the Obama administration to doing business in the US has resonated strongly with business – especially small business whose confidence levels are at record highs. Confidence in future income prospects is the most important ingredient in the recipe for more spending by households and firms that will raise US growth rates if it materialises.

Separation of US powers, between the House, the Senate, the states and the courts, is designed to complicate and constrain the realisation of any Presidential agenda or campaign promise. Tax reforms, of which much is expected, are initiated in Congress where much work has been done over the years by the Republican leaders in the House. We, as well as Trump, await with some anxiety the essential details. The implementation of a border tax, or rather a system where costs of imports may be disallowed as a deduction from taxable income, will deserve particular notice. The implications are vast – and not just in the US – and may well threaten the system of corporate taxing practiced everywhere else.

Taxing imports

This border or import tax will be intended to compensate the IRS for a lower corporate tax rate – given the excess of US imports over exports. The lower the corporate tax rate however, the less will any expenditure deduction matter for after-tax incomes. This includes the deduction for interest incurred or capital expenditure, both of which will be subject to debate and possible reform. It will be deemed protectionist by the World Trade Organisation and the US will argue otherwise but irrespectively. Net-net it may mean higher prices in the US but only if net-net taxes have risen for business enterprises in general. That will not be the intention though different businesses will be affected differently in ways that will be worth anticipating. It is effective after tax profits that influence the required returns on capital that have to be recovered in the prices that consumers or customers must pay if the firm is to succeed. Even income taxes find their way into prices.

Managing conflict

President Trump is not bound by the conflict of interest regulations that apply to all others responsible for government business. Trump however has elected to recuse himself fully from the Trump enterprise while President. His sons will run the business and manage the Trump brand. The cry from the anti-Trump brigade is that such arrangements, even should Trump stay fully uninvolved in the decisions made by Trump Enterprises, still represent a conflict of interest. In other words, the Trumps should abandon the Trump business and eliminate the brand, including presumably removing the Trump insignia that currently adorns buildings and merchandise – not a practical possibility. Selling the brand would not have eliminated the connection with the Presidency.

The Trump brand therefore lives on and understandably so given its value, calculated as the present value of the difference a Trump branding can make to rentals or prices that a Trump enterprise or franchisee can realise and pay royalties on. But this does not mean any conflict of interest. The better Trump does in discharging his responsibilities as President, the better his contributions will be appreciated by the public at large and the more valuable his brand will become. The economic interests in his brand and that of the US are well aligned, just as they were well aligned with the Obama brand. The lecture and consulting fees he will now be able to charge depend on the regard in which he is held.

The rand may be telling us something about SA politics

The rand weakened with the market rally and stronger dollar (and higher interest rates) that followed the US election result. Since then the rand has recovered, as some of the Trump impact on interest rates in the US and the US dollar moderated in mid-December. On a trade weighted basis, the rand has gained about 7% from its weakened immediate post Trump level.

The rand has also outperformed a basket of 11 equally weighted leading emerging market (EM) currencies after the Trump surprise. This basket includes the Turkish lira and the Mexican peso, which have been noticeably weak for their own specific reasons, such as the Trump threat to Mexican exports to the US. The rand moreover had gained strength relative to other EM currencies before the Trump election, relative strength that has continued since, as represented by the rand/EM exchange rate ratio.

The rand moreover has also strengthened against the developed market currencies as well as the US dollar after the initial Trump trade. It has also enjoyed a degree of strength vs the Aussie dollar, which can be regarded as a commodity currency.

It may be concluded that the rand has enjoyed a degree of strength for SA specific reasons. It is hard not to conclude that the rand has benefited from the assumption that President Jacob Zuma has become less likely to intervene in economic policy making. Perhaps this is the hopeful message to be read from the behaviour of the rand.

Trump and the SA economy – so far mostly good news

The Trump growth rally that began with his election success appeared to run out of steam in late December 2016. Real bond yields in the US, represented by the yield on a 10 year inflation-linked Treasury Bond reached a recent peak on about the 19 December. These real yields reflect the real cost of capital- the risk free required rate of return to which a premium must be added to compensate for investing in any asset or project with more risk to the expected return. Real rates have been exceptionally low in recent times as world-wide demand for capital to invest in extra capacity shrunk away and as global savings rose. The Trump-inspired increase in real rates portended faster economic growth in the US and the extra demands for capital that can be expected to accompany faster growth.

As may be seen in the figure below, real US rates for 10 year bonds have declined from 0.7% to the current 0.4% yield. This is still significantly higher than the negative real rates investors were accepting in early October. Thus the growth outlook for the US can be assumed to be more promising than it was in October but perhaps not as promising as it appeared in mid-December.

The Trump administration has to deliver on its promises to deregulate and lower taxes and also to bring jobs home. These are prospects that have received particular favour from small business in the US, whose confidence levels have reached record highs, as well as from the customers of the leading banks that apparently are now willing to borrow more. This was noted by bank CEOs reporting earnings on Friday – accompanying generally more favourable operating conditions.

It is this additional confidence of households and business that will influence their willingness to spend and borrow more. Balance sheets of US households have greatly strengthened in recent years, with more saved and more equity in their homes, while lower interest rates have reduced their interest expenses; similarly for business borrowers. It is not balance sheets that will stand in their way of increased spending, but the relative lack of confidence in income prospects.

It will also be of interest to note just how consistent has been the recent behaviour of the gold price in response to real interest rates. Real interest rates represent the opportunity cost of holding gold. The more expensive it is to own gold, the lower its price.

The difference between the lower yield on an inflation-linked bond and that of its vanilla equivalent bond of similar duration (that offers a higher running yield), represents the compensation to investors for taking on the risk that in inflation will prove higher than expected. By doing so it drive up interest rates to compensate for the now more inflation expected. In doing so it reduces the value of the conventional bond. In the figure below we show these recent yield differences, representing inflation expected, over the next 10 years in the US and SA bond markets. Inflation expected in the US has risen consistently before and after the Trump election to about 2% per annum. Real yields in the US have reversed course in the US recently. Inflation expected has continued to increase. The US Fed regards 2% inflation as one of its objectives for monetary policy.

The Trump election raised inflation expectations in SA to over 7%. Very recently, as the Trump rally faded, inflation expected in SA over the next 10 years, as revealed in the RSA bond market, has receded sharply to below 6.5%. This must be regarded as helpful for the SA economy. The Reserve Bank has a highly exaggerated view of the influence of inflation expectations on inflation itself. This retreat in inflation expectations as well as a much improved outlook for inflation itself may encourage the Reserve Bank to reverse the course of short term interest rates – an essential requirement if growth in SA is to pick up momentum.

The improved outlook for inflation in SA is also reflected in the declining SA risk premium, the difference in yields offered by a RSA 10 year bond and a 10 year US Treasury bond. This spread in 2017 has narrowed sharply, indicating that the rand is now expected to depreciate against the US dollar at a slower rate, close to 6.4% p.a. and thus consistent with less inflation priced into the bond market.

This better news about the outlook for the rand and so inflation in SA has come naturally enough with a stronger rand. The figure below indicates the trade weighted exchange rate since September. After initially weakening in response to the Trump election, the rand has benefitted from a strong recovery of about 7% since November. Clearly the extra growth and higher US interest rates associated with a Trump administration have neither raised long term rates in SA nor weakened the rand. Indeed the opposite has happened. This should encourage the Reserve Bank to focus on the downside risks to economic growth in SA rather than the upside risks to inflation. These surely have declined, both with the stronger rand and the prospects of lower food prices. The case for lower interest rates in SA has strengthened with the Trump election so that SA too can look forward to faster growth.

New vehicle sales: A closer look

What’s in a (growth) number? Vehicle sales volumes in December 2016 deserve a closer look.

Recently reported new vehicle sales of 41 639 units sold in in December 2016, some 15.35% fewer than sold a year ago, were greeted with general disappointment. The implication drawn was that the decline in sales volumes recorded in 2016 had accelerated.

But is this the right conclusion to be drawn about the most recent data release? A year can be a very long time in economic life and what has happened to vehicle sales in the months between December 2015 and December 2016 can tell a very different story about the underlying trends.

The data, when adjusted for predictable seasonal influences on monthly sales, indicate that while monthly sales volumes took a turn for the worse in the fourth quarter of 2015, by the fourth quarter of 2016, sales were in fact recovering from their lows of midyear 2016, when monthly sales are adjusted for seasonal influences, as we show below.

The important feature of the vehicle market is that unlike for other retailers, December is a typically well below average month for motor dealers. Holidays mean closed dealerships and so are not usually a good time to deal for an expensive new vehicle.

But a year ago in December 2015, with which sales comparisons are being made, was not a typical month for the motor dealers. The rand, it will be remembered, collapsed that month, portending higher vehicle prices, given their import content. And consequently buying ahead of the expected price increases seemed like a good enough idea to lift sales in December 2015 markedly, especially when seasonally adjusted. Actual sales in December 2015 were 49 158 units and had held up very well compared to November 2015 sales volumes of 51 338 – making December 2015 a very high base with which to compare sales a year later.

As we show in our table of seasonal factors below November is an average month for motor dealers, while December sales average about 13% below average monthly sales. By contrast for retailers generally, December sales volumes average as much as 36% above average monthly volumes.

Or in other words, to gain a full impression of trading trends in December 2016, retail volumes when recorded and reported should be scaled down (divided) by a factor of 1.36 while vehicle sales should be scaled up by a factor of approximately (0.87). Hence vehicle sales in December 2016 of 41639 units should be scaled up by (0.866476) to register the 48 055 sales seasonally adjusted indicated in the figures, and so well ahead of the much weaker, seasonally adjusted sales of 42 501 unit sales, recorded in July 2016.

In the figure below we compare growth rates in vehicle sales on an annual basis with growth calculated over consecutive 3 moth periods using seasonally adjusted monthly data. It may be seen that while annual growth rates are negative and in retreat, the quarterly numbers tell a more positive story.

Of interest is that the recent share price performance of two JSE listed motor dealers, Combined Motor Holdings (JSE code – CMH) and Imperial (IPL) seems to accord better with the more encouraging seasonally adjusted sales numbers than with the raw data (see below).

Lessons from the success of the Western Cape

The success the governments of the Western Cape have had in competing for resources with the rest of South Africa is highly evident in the building activity under way in the more expensive parts of the region. Any number of ordinarily valuable buildings are clearly worth more dead than alive – they are worth demolishing so that they can be replaced by more valuable structures, valuable enough to more than recover the costs of demolishing what stood before.

The demand for these expensive new residential structures has come mostly from migrants from other parts of South Africa where local government has proved much less competent in delivering services so essential to the quality of life, such waste removal, water and electricity supplies, easy access to homes, work and recreation as well as protection against fire, noise and criminals.

The more valuable the stock of buildings, the larger the tax base upon which the local authority can draw to fund service delivery, including in the more deprived parts of town. Moreover current revenues can be used to justify the raising of debt to fund a large capital expenditure programme in order to sustain and enhance the infrastructure that supports effective service delivery. This includes funding the additional roads and bridges and sewage works that support and make viable green field housing developments.

The extra tax these developments will generate over time can more than fund and repay the additional debt incurred. Bridges and new roads that improve access to undeveloped (often wastefully used land owned by government authorities) can prove highly profitable investments. They can be funded with tolls that can then pay off debt incurred in the building – no more or less than a user charge – rather than used to tax users as has wrongly been the case with most toll roads in the country, giving them their well-deserved notoriety.

A criticism one can make of the management of City of Cape Town is its reluctance to raise more debt to fund capital expenditure, that is to put its financial strength supported by ever rising values in the buildings and especially the land it services, to better and more immediate use.

Clearly regional economic development can become a highly virtuous circle of increased revenues and financial strength that leads to useful additional expenditure on improved service delivery that helps attract migrants to the region, rich and poor, that reinforces the growth under way.

It should however be fully appreciated (as perhaps it is appreciated in Cape Town), that the resource critical for faster growth and for which the competition is most intense (not only nationally but also internationally) are the skills, enterprise and wealth embodied in the high income earners of any community. Their contribution to economic development is indispensable for the incomes and the prospects of their poor neighbours. Moreover, providing this mobile resource with a globally competitive quality of local government service at a reasonable charge is essential to the purpose of economic growth. It is also essential to the incomes of the poor who will wish to migrate to the regions that promise better income opportunities.

Hence the relationship between the expensive real estate in a city that is demanded by the affluent and economically successful and the less expensive real estate, that is consistent with much lower earnings and less affordability, is a mutually supportive one. Improved competitive local government service delivery is very encouraging to the high income earners who deliver so much to an economy – including tax revenues – and so symbiotically also very valuable to the poor, who can expect improved services as well as improved income prospects.
If South Africa or any region of it is to succeed in the global competition for the all-important scarce resources that high income earners provide an economy, it will need to continue to offer them competitively priced and efficient services that local governments deliver. South Africa will also need to provide them and their children with competitively priced educational services and also competitive and competitively priced medical services. The role played in education by private suppliers of education and medical service is an obviously important one in these regards. Such quality service delivery will need to be nurtured and encouraged if South Africa is to succeed in overcoming poverty.

Will a national minimum wage help the poor? We beg to disagree with the expert panel

The National Minimum Wage for South Africa (NMW) – will it be helpful or harmful to the poor of SA? We beg to disagree with the expert panel.

A reality check

It is always salutary to be reminded just how dire are the economic circumstances of the average South African and how slowly their economic conditions have been improving. Over 51%, some 29,733,210 of our people, live on less than R1,036.07 per month. These and many other shocking statistics are reported by the Panel of Experts appointed to recommend the level of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) and on a process for its effective implementation (“Recommendations on policy and Implementation; National Minimum Wage Panel report to the Deputy President”).

The table calculated by the panel, included below, provides helpful detail about the lack of income and the associated unemployment.

The panel has no doubts about the helpfulness of an NMW in principle – only reservations about practice

The panel seems to have no doubts that a NMW would be a very helpful policy intervention in principle. To quote selectively from its substantial report of 128 pages”

“On its own it will not solve all of the challenges we face, but it is an implementable policy which is designed to have a measurable and concrete benefit on the poor. The minimum wage is therefore seen as one of the tools to close the wage gap, including between the genders, and thereby to overcome poverty.

“Furthermore, under the correct conditions and at the correct wage level, it is possible for minimum wage policies to contribute to improving economic growth. ……Given that the national minimum wage is essentially a policy to help the poor, it is generally accepted that exemptions and exclusions should be kept to an absolute minimum.”

Striking a balance – recognising employment dangers in scenario exercises

The panel was required by the social partners in Nedlac, who agreed to an NMW, to recommend an appropriate level for the NMW. Since it recognised a relationship between wages and employment the MNW had to strike a balance between the effects of increasing wages to a higher prescribed minimum level and its consequences for additional unemployment of which SA already has a great abundance. Some 26% of the labour force, those in work or looking for work, are currently unemployed, while many more potential workers have been discouraged from looking for work and have fallen out of the labour force. Adding them to the work force would imply a more broadly defined national unemployment rate well into the 30% plus range.

The panel recommended a NMW of R3500 per month or R20 per hour to be phased in by 2020 with 90% of the NMW to be applied in agriculture and 70% in Domestic Service provided to Private Homes. It also recommended annual reviews of the NMW and a gradual move to uniformity across all sectors of the economy. Using a so-called Computable General Equilibrium model of the SA labour market (as described and developed by Professor Harron Bhorat of UCT) that included assumptions (not predictions based on past performance) about the trade-offs between percentage increases in minimum wages and percentage reductions in employment (the relevant employment elasticities in economic speak) .

The aggregate employment losses were estimated as between 100,000 and 900,000 jobs lost in exchange for the recommended NMW. Clearly in the view of the Panel, the NMW had to be set high enough to make its contribution to poverty relief and yet low enough to be able to treat the extra unemployment as the acceptable price to the panel members of them doing such good for society. Another argument for breaking eggs to make omelettes from those unlikely to be harmed by the action and who might even benefit from helping to give effect to a new dispensation.

However the panel did qualify its judgment. It noted correctly:

“…..that there is no research or data that can accurately predict the outcome of any policy intervention. It is for this reason that strong emphasis has been placed on the need for good solid research to support the work of the NMW institution into the future. Any future changes to the level of R3,500/R20 per hour should be based on solid evidence of the impact of the national minimum wage.”

Would it be unkind to recognise that this would also be more grist for the economist’s mill?

The relationship between minimum wages and employment – what may be self-evident to the panel is not so to the society at large

It would have been helpful had the panel used the report to explain more fully why employment offers are negatively related to the wages or rather employment benefits provided by employers in exchange for hours worked. The relationship is much less self-evident than the panel may have presumed it to be – especially by members and leaders of trade unions who are inclined to attribute wage differences much more to political forces and bargaining power and even to race – than to the differences in skills and therefore of the contributions to output made by the well and poorly paid. And they are very inclined to believe that the wage gaps can be easily closed, with little consequence for economic growth by taking more from the well paid and giving to the poor. And so for ever higher NMW.

The relationship between skills, incomes and employment

The panel is well aware of an obviously important and highly consistent relationship to be observed of the SA labour market between measures of skills and wages earned. And as statistically significant is the relationship between incomes and employment. The lowest income South Africans have the highest rates of unemployment. The full income and employment details are shown in the table below (Table 5 Household Indicators of the Panel Report). Other reports from Stats SA have demonstrated the links between educational attainments and income and employment.

It may be seen in the Table, that of the 16,306,000 people in Quintile 1, 31.2% of the population with the lowest share of income, only 15,9% are employed, 25% strictly unemployed and the broad unemployment rate of this group is estimated as 65.8%. The average wage of those employed in quintile 1 is only R1017 per month. The second poorest quintile counts for a further 24.6% of the population, has a lower unemployment rate, a much higher participation rate in the economy and average wage incomes of R1707 per month. A large improvement but still a very low average wage.

The top income quintiles present very differently. Unemployment rates are much lower and participation rates and average incomes from work of the employed are much higher and well above the recommended NMW. Though it should be noted that the average wage income of those employed who fall into Quintile 3 of R2651 per month, is still well below the R3500 per month recommended NMW.

The implications of a NMW set so far above average wages- is there precedent that can help us predict the employment effects with any confidence?

This begs the question – is there any precedent for a NMW or a sectoral minimum wage determination –be set so far above average earnings – and if so what have been the consequences for employment? Or put in another way is there reason given the facts of the labour market to think that the employment elasticities in SA are a lot more negative than the range of assumptions considered by the models. Time will tell much more about the consequences of the recommended NMW as the Panel complacently assumes and adjustments can then made to the model and the recommendations. But who will care for the unemployed and their dependents in the meanwhile?

How can an NMW help the poor – who are now mostly not employed?

It is very difficult to understand why the Panel should believe that the NMW can be helpful to the poor of South Africa or reduce inequality. Because fundamentally the poorest South Africans those in first and second quintiles, are mostly not employed. And when employed they are able to only command wages far below those of the recommended NMW that still leave them objectively poor.

The recommended NMW will surely make it even more difficult for them to find work that might for some, especially young workers, prove a path out of poverty. Thus the NMW is very likely to increase further the unemployment of low skilled potential workers in SA and to widen the gap between the average incomes of the high earners and the low earners, mostly no earners of the population. The poor of SA deserve better opportunities to work and more so the opportunity for their children to acquire the education and skills that would help them qualify for and find well paid work. They do not need further interference in their search for work.

Employers will make the adjustments that will confuse the observers

Though to complicate the numerical outcomes to be observed in due course, structural adjustments to employment practice will be made by employers in response to higher minimum wages. The adjustments will include more reliance on mechanisation and automation- requiring more carefully selected and skilled employees, forces that substitute capital for labour, especially less skilled labour, that are already well at work in the economy.

Other adjustments employers will make will be to offer fewer hours of work and significantly less by way of other important employment benefits, food and accommodation and contributions to pension and medical aid for example, the cost to employers and value to employees the panel refuses to recognise in its money wage only determination. Evidence of such reactions so unhelpful to low income workers comes from previous minimum wage adjudications in the agricultural sector. Fewer workers were employed permanently – less accommodation was offered on the farm – and higher transport costs was incurred byr workers busing in from informal settlements. And there is also bound to be less compliance with the law given the availability of cheaper labour and additional employment offered to illegal immigrants.

Why does the labour market only work well for the higher income earners? Is it because they are much less encumbered by regulations and collective bargaining?

A further observation of the inconvenient and uncomfortable truths of the SA labour market is that the supply and demand for labour are very well matched for the well paid and very poorly matched for the low paid. A very high unemployment rate – a large number of potential workers unemployed at current wages – is surely evidence of wage levels that are too high rather than too low to the important purpose of providing work for those who would wish to work- at prevailing wage rates.

These are not considerations that receive much attention from the panel. Other than a presumption of “structural imbalances” or why these structural forces that discourage employment do not apply to the most expensive of workers in SA who are so readily employed?

It is to be conceded that employment at low wages for those with limited skills cannot overcome the poverty of the working poor. But then what can – other than them acquiring the valuable skills that are in short supply and well worth hiring. Wishful thinking- waving magic wands in the form of un-affordable to potential employers of high minimum wages will not solve their problem.

But unemployment makes their condition more onerous and denies them the employment and low wage benefits that they would be willing to accept. A willingness demonstrated by their seeking work. And being unemployed prevents the potential worker from acquiring skills on the job and the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities that add to their employment credentials. These opportunities are particularly important to young, unskilled entry level workers whose unemployment rates are regrettably but understandably well above average unemployment rates as is well recognised by the panel.

The panel might have sought an explanation of the high rates of unemployment of low income South Africans in the structural impediments to their employment in South Africa. Barriers to employment offered or accepted in the existing highly pervasive regulations of their employment contracts. It is not as if minimum wages have not been tried in SA. They are widely practiced and have surely had their effect on the employment of the lowest paid and least skilled.

The current regulatory barriers to employment in SA

There are in fact 124 separate such sectoral minimum wage determinations. They cover approximately 5m workers and 33% of those employed leaving only 35% of workers uncovered including presumably many of the better paid also without Union representation. The lowest such monthly determinations in 2015 ranged from R1813 for Domestic Workers to R2844 per month per Contract Cleaner in the lowest grades. The highest sectoral minimum determinations – for more skilled work- were R6155 for workers in private security and R6506 per month in Retail and Wholesale businesses.

The newly fashioned NMW is intended to remove all this administrative complexity – and presumably also the possibility of recognising very different labour market conditions – supply and demand – that may apply in the different sectors and regions of the economy. Conditions that participants in specific labour markets, unencumbered by regulations would be much better informed about than even diligent officials to the advantage of workers and their employers.

The case for best leaving the determination of an employment contract to willing buyers and sellers of labour does not get any hearing from the panel. While the collective bargaining process in SA that can easily be shown to protect the established interests of employees and their employers – the insiders – at the expense of the employment opportunities of the outsiders – receives nothing but uncritical approval from the panel- and with an appeal for the wider application of collective bargaining arrangements.

The influence of welfare on employment

Nor did the influence of SA’s extensive welfare system on poverty and employment receive much more than perfunctory and rather condescending attention from the Panel as follows.

5.43. “While wages are low relative to living levels, there are arguably some offsetting effects from the social wage spending by Government. About 35% of South Africa’s budget is spent on programmes targeted at the poor, including free basic education, health care, water and electricity, and income support grants for children and the elderly”.

They may, as did the Davis Committee on Tax Reforms, have referred to a report of the World Bank on the influence on incomes and their distribution of SA of its welfare system. To quote this study:

“But while incomes earned in South Africa may well be the most unequally distributed in the world – the distribution of expenditure is much less unequal. The World Bank shows, in a recent study, that South Africa does more to redistribute income in cash and kind to the poor than its developing economy peers with similar average incomes , Armenia, Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay (South Africa Economic Update Fiscal Policy and Redistribution in an Unequal Society, World Bank, November 2014).”

As this World Bank study also reports:

“South Africa ranks as one of the most unequal countries of CEQ (Commitment to Equality Methodologies applied by official statisticians in income measurement) participant countries, if not among all middle-income countries, given its Gini coefficient of 0.69. The proportion of the population living in poverty at 33.4 percent measured by the international benchmark of $2.50 a day(purchasing power parity, PPP, adjusted) — is also higher than in many other middle income countries with similar levels of GNI per capita. For example, the poverty rate is 11 percent in Brazil and 4 percent in Costa Rica”

To quote further from the World Bank report:

“Briefly, this Update has two main findings. First, the burden of taxes falls on the richest in South Africa, and social spending results in sizable increases in the incomes of the poor. In other words, the tax and social spending system is overall progressive. Second, fiscal policy in South Africa achieves appreciable reductions in poverty and income inequality, and these reductions are in fact the largest achieved in the emerging market countries that have so far been included in the CEQ. Yet despite fiscal policy being both progressive and equalizing, the levels of poverty and inequality that remain are unacceptably high. South Africa is currently grappling with slowing economic growth, a high fiscal deficit, and a rising debt burden. In this context, addressing the twin challenges of poverty and inequality will require not only much-improved quality and efficiency of public services but also higher and more-inclusive economic growth to help create jobs and lift incomes.” (p22)

These income transfers and benefits in kind may moreover, influence the willingness to supply labour services at prevailing wages – especially when wages on offer are very low. By providing an alternative source of benefits welfare raises the reservation wage – the wage at which it makes good sense to work or to seek work, work that may well be physically demanding and less than enjoyable for its own sake. The panel might have paid much more attention to the supply side of the SA to help explain low rates of labour force participation. Also to help explain why immigrants from Africa are much more likely to be employed – at market related wages.

Economic growth and employment – ignoring the evidence

The panel remarks somewhat self-evidently that:

“An additional problem faced by the country is that there is evidence that the growth in the demand for labour in South Africa has not been sufficient to keep up with the much larger growth in labour supply.”

The panel quotes with seeming approval a study that apparently shows growth and job creation are not well correlated. To quote the Panel:

“Recent empirical work by Mkhize (2016) finds that the economy’s capital intensity undermines its ability to generate jobs in times of economic growth. He finds that, in the long run, growth and job creation are not correlated, although there is some sectoral variation. This points to the broader economic policy challenge facing South Africa, which is that there are structural barriers that exacerbate unemployment, the solutions to which require more than economic growth”.

A surprising conclusion it would be thought, given the fact that in the developed world incomes (GDP), population and the size of the labour force have grown together, as indeed it did in SA until the 1980s – as our own work has shown (see below), though such work on the relationship in SA between GDP and numbers employed is complicated by the absence of an official continuous long time series of numbers employed. Though the structural break in the relationship in the 1980s is easy to recognise and to be self-evidently explained by the increasing degree to which the SA labour market came to be regulated and the increasing bargaining power conceded to trade unions in the 1980s.

The recommended NMW represents more of the same lack of faith in market forces that encourage regulation, rather than regulatory interventions to generate growth and employment.

Another case I would suggest of economists as are the governments they usually serve, being part of the economic problem rather than the solution. 28 November 2016

 

 

The SA economy: The view from the rear view mirror is not encouraging

The SA economy: The view from the rear view mirror is not encouraging. Can we look down the road more happily?

The pace of the SA economy appears to be slowing down rather than picking up momentum – judged by the very latest data releases for October 2016. New vehicle sales and cash in circulation indicate that a trough in the business cycle, that is when economic conditions have begun to improve rather than deteriorate, has not been registered though may possibly be in sight.

New vehicle sales are nevertheless somewhat more encouraging than the latest money supply data. While new vehicle sales are well down on a year ago, sales volumes in October represented a modest improvement over sales made in August and September 2016, especially when viewed in seasonally adjusted terms, as we show below. When current vehicle sales are extrapolated, using a time series forecasting process, a cyclical trough, is indicated for early 2017. As noticed in figure 2 negative, year on year growth rates, may also have reached a low point.

By contrast the demand for and supply of cash still indicates weaker propensities of households to spend more. The demand for cash, as may be seen, is not keeping pace with inflation. Though, as may also be seen, the forecast is that the real demand for cash is about to turn marginally positive, indicating more rather than less spending to come.

When these two series are combined to form our Hard Number Index (HNI), its direction has turned lower after moving sideways for much of the year, indicating declining levels of economic activity. Extrapolating the HNI however also suggests an improvement in activity levels in 2017. As may be seen, the HNI based on two very up to date hard numbers – rather than based upon sample surveys – is a good predictor of the Business Cycle that is calculated by the Reserve Bank, for which the latest data point is for July 2017 (of somewhat distant memory given all that has happened to society and the economy).

The broader measures of money supply and of bank credit and retail sales volumes, updated to September 2016, indicate a similarly weak backdrop for the SA economy, as we show below. The growth in M3 (to September month end) has become negative in real terms while bank credit supplied to the private sector is somewhat more robust. Perhaps bank credit is being used to a degree, to fund offshore rather than domestic growth. As we also show in retail sales volumes shows a declining growth trend that is forecast to continue in 2017.

The hope for a cyclical recovery in 2017 must rest upon the inflation trends. A Reserve Bank forecast of lower inflation would allow for lower interest rates, which are essential to the purpose of a cyclical recovery. As may be seen in figure 6, the time series forecast of the CPI, using the latest data, is for less inflation to come. Recent data releases for the CPI (the latest being for September), do indicate a much shallower trajectory for the CPI. Between July and September 2016, the CPI was largely unchanged as we show below. A degree of exchange rate strength has helped restrain inflation. A normal harvest in 2017 would do more of the same. South Africans, under severe economic pressure, would be justified in praying for more rain combined with strength in emerging market currencies, including the rand.

The SA economy needs a level playing field

A key role in a growing economy is played by the start-up enterprise. They introduce new ways of doing business- supply new products and services – that challenge established business practices and so help make the economy a more productive one. They can start small but if they get it right, and execute  well they can become large and successful.

They do so by serving their customers better than the competition did or sometimes could not have imagined. They also have to satisfy the interests of their employees who could work elsewhere and they also have to meet the interests of other suppliers of services or goods to them, including those of the suppliers of capital, for which they have to compete with all other firms. Most important is that by by attracting custom and covering their costs they can provide their owner-managers with benefits and returns on their savings (capital) far superior to those they might have realised working for somebody else.

But their chances of such success are not good ones. The owner-managers of most start-ups, even most small businesses, do not realise well above average returns for their founders- ahead of what they might have earned elsewhere or from their savings plans. This means judged by past performance these true entrepreneurs are not deterred by the prospect of low average rewards but are inspired by the (small) chance of realising exceptional rewards. This makes them risk lovers rather than risk averse and society has every good reason to encourage their unusual appetite for taking on risk. And so not to impose regulations that favour the large firm. Those large enough to afford specialised human resource and legal departments that keep key managers out of the time consuming mediation procedures – and able to employ skilled accountants that can complete complicated tax and other returns.  Should it however be easy for new entrants into the market place to succeed? Easy pickings would reflect an undesirable lack of market efficiency. If the market is working well it should be difficult to beat the market.

Better than promoting or discouraging small over large or large and established firms over smaller rivals would be to ensure that all firms can contend freely and openly in the market place. The proverbial level playing feel serves the interests of all the consumers, workers and taxpayers who will always be far more numerous than the owners or senior managers or professionals who engage with them.  .

But such freedoms to compete will always be threatened by the established producers who have a large and easily measured economic interest in limiting the competition through laws and regulations favourable to them. In the old SA a minority of suppliers of goods or services enjoyed such protections. Most others, as consumers and taxpayers and workers suffered from import and capital controls and maize and banana boards etc. that put some producers and some white workers and professionals first in line for jobs to the disadvantage of their potential competitors and the customers who stood to benefit.

It needs to be recognised that the producer interests that now tilt the playing feel against consumers and workers and taxpayers in SA and against the interests of perhaps more worthy beneficiaries of government spending, are those of the owners of black businesses and skilled black professionals. They are being favoured with higher prices and rewards by affirmative action. As before it is the economic interests of a minority of producers that are being served by regulation and law. As before, the politics of such actions are easier to understand than their economic consequences. Though the low growth trap that has now caught the SA economy should concentrate minds on the costs and benefits of interfering with competition.

Power Play

A power play unfolds before our eyes. Comedy as tragedy or farce?

Prospects for the SA economy early on Tuesday 11 October had improved significantly when we learned that SA’s first two independent privately owned coal-fired power stations (IPPs) had been given the go-ahead. Foreign interest in these projects, as suppliers of the equipment and technology and of the necessary capital, was welcomingly strong. Most important, the 863MW of additional electricity is to be delivered at an agreed wholesale price of 79 and 80 cents, plus inflation.

Alas later that morning a further very troubling scene in the opera buffo that has become SA’s fiscal affairs, was played out when Public Prosecutor Shaun Abrahams announced that he was charging Finance Minister Gordhan with fraud. The economic damage caused by a weaker rand, higher borrowing costs for the state and lower values for businesses that depend on the SA economy, was immediately registered, while firms with operations mostly outside SA gained rand value. The outlook for inflation deteriorated with the weaker rand and so the possibility of lower interest rates from the Reserve Bank has receded. The income and job prospects of SA households and their willingness to spend and borrow more, essential to any cyclical recovery in SA, has been undermined accordingly as has the willingness of SA business to invest more in meeting their demands and employment needs. Many billions, incalculable billions of lost economic opportunity, will have followed. Those responsible cannot possibly count the damage they cause.

The two announcements however are linked – perhaps in a way that can still produce a happy ending. Can we doubt that the fiscal power play has much to do with the prospect of nuclear power as opposed to power from coal or gas? The deal for nuclear energy, details of which are awaited and are to be reluctantly supplied, and about which the Treasury has had its serious reservations made well known, will be on a scale well beyond impressive sums now to be invested in additional coal fired capacity. Business Day referred to R40bn per private IPP. Capturing a chunk of this nuclear deal from the people of South Africa at the expense of their living standards is seemingly well worth fighting for.

The problem for advocates of nuclear power in SA, well intentioned or perhaps not, is the firm offer of 80 cents per kilo watt hour from the new IPPs. We have a strong recent indication of just how expensive nuclear power can be. Britain has just given the go ahead for the nuclear Hinkley Point Power Plant, that plans to deliver 3200MW of power at a “strike price” of, believe it or not, £95.5 per MW plus inflation after 2012, that is at current exchange rates only roughly, since these rates move around so much, the equivalent of R1660 per MW, or equally roughly twice the price tendered by the IPPs. The wholesale electricity price in the UK is now much lower, about £45 per MW leading the National Audit Office to estimate that electricity consumers in the UK having to spend an extra £29.7bn for the benefit. Similar calculations of cost per hour and extra spend that will have to be charged to pay for nuclear in SA cannot be denied. They have to inform the process.

There is a more important lesson to be learned about the business of capturing the state from the citizens who pay for the state and its failures – intentional or not. The opportunity for corrupting the state is only as big as the state itself. There is no good technical reason to place airlines, electricity or water production, ports and railways, toll roads, hospitals and schools in the hands of the state. The reason why the state as supplier, rather than private producers, is so strongly supported by the politicians, is because they can so easily be captured by the suppliers of all kinds to these organisations, at the cost of the consumers of the essential services and the taxpayers who pay for them. South Africans watching the stage unfold might wise up to these facts of life.

Help or hinder?

GDP grew in the second quarter, despite very weak spending. Without a recovery in spending the SA economy will continue to struggle. Will the Reserve Bank help or hinder a recovery?

The SA economy, measured by GDP (the real output of goods and services) grew in the second quarter (Q2), at a satisfactory (annual equivalent) rate of 3.3%. In the first quarter (Q1) output had declined at a -1.3% annual rate. Hence the economy avoided a recession – defined conventionally as two successive quarters of negative growth. However an examination of the expenditure side of the economy reveals a much less satisfactory state of economic affairs. Total spending, Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE) in real terms declined in Q2 by as much as GDP increased, at a -3.3% rate. The difference between GDP and GDE is by definition net exports: the difference between exports that add to domestic output and imports that substitute for domestic output. On a seasonally adjusted basis, export volumes grew very strongly in Q2, while import volumes declined enough to add a net 6.7% to the GDP growth rate.

Final demand makes up a large component of GDE. It aggregates the compensation spending by households and government and the expenditure by government agencies and the private sector on additional capital goods. This aggregate declined (by 0.1%) in Q2 – an improvement on the 2.8% decline estimated in Q1. The further component of GDE is inventories accumulated or run down. In Q2 inventories are estimated to have declined by a real R22.7bn, contributing a large negative (-3.2% p.a) to the GDP growth rate in Q2.

When the spending of households is aggregated with that of privately owned businesses on capital equipment, that is when government spending and investment in inventories are excluded from final demand, we find a similar reluctance of private households and firms to spend more. Private demand for goods and services has been growing at consistently slower rates in recent years appears and now appears to be in retreat, having declined marginally in Q2 2016, not quite keeping up with inflation, defined as the year on year increase in the GDP deflator. The supply of money and bank credit has been growing as slowly as private spending. This is clearly not co-incidental. The growth in spending and credit to fund spending tend to run together.

The performance of the economy in recent years indicates clearly that the increases in interest rates imposed on the economy since January 2014, while they have worked to reduce spending and so the growth in GDE and GDP, have not helped in any significant or predictable way to reduce inflation or inflation expected. Inflation in SA – that leads rather follows inflation expected – has been dominated by shocks in the form of a weaker exchange rate that has driven up the prices of imported goods and a drought that has reduced domestic supplies of food staples and increased dependence on imports. Higher regulated prices and taxes on expenditure have added to the supply side shocks that can drive prices higher – despite weak demand that only to a limited extent has helped to hold back prices. The exchange rate itself has taken its cue, not from interest rates set in Pretoria, but in Washington DC. It is not only the rand but all emerging market currencies that have depreciated as capital flowed to developed, rather than less developed markets, in recent years. Moreover wage rates and prices are determined simultaneously and interdependently in SA. Higher wages have come at the expense of employment opportunities as well as recent profit margins, when final demand is lacking and the firms lack a degree of pricing power.

The reality that the Reserve Bank finds so hard to recognize is that scope for an independent monetary policy to control inflation is very limited if the domestic authorities do not have any consistent influence over the exchange rate. This has been the case for South Africa as it is for most emerging market central banks with flexible exchange rates that respond to highly unpredictable capital flows. The figures below demonstrate that the common global rather than SA forces that have been responsible for almost all of the weak rand and the higher prices that have come with it. The EM Currency basket represents nine equally weighted emerging market currencies (The Russian ruble, Indian rupee, Hungarian forint, Mexican, Chilean and Philippine pesos, Turkish lira, Brazilian real and Malaysian ringgit). Though it must be added, the rand has been a distinct underperformer since 2012 – losing about 20% more than the EM basket Vs the US dollar. The current value of the rand is now (20 September) a little ahead of where it would be predicted to be – given the exchange value of the EM basket as its predictor – and so also taking into account the weaker bias against the rand.

The Reserve Bank, through its unhelpful interest rate and money supply actions, has significantly influenced the growth in spending. Higher interest rates may have reduced measured GDP growth by as much as 2% p.a. The limited feedback loop from interest rates to spending and so on to inflation has been dominated by the independence of SA interest rates and other highly unpredictable forces acting on the exchange rate and administered prices. The hope for a cyclical recovery of the SA economy and the lower interest rates that will be necessary to the purpose, rests on a degree of rand stability that will accompany a revival of capital flows into EM markets and currencies. A normal harvest will also help to hold down inflation in 2017.

It will take lower interest rates to encourage the demand for and supply of bank credit. It will take lower inflation and inflation expected to encourage the Reserve Bank to lower short term rates. It would seem self-evident, given the want of demand for goods and services and for the labour to help produce them, that the direction of SA interest rates should be downward rather than upward.

The highly competitive weak rand – now some 30% below its purchasing power equivalent value (see below) will continue to encourage exports (labour relations permitting) and discourage imports and may help sustain GDP, as it did in Q2 2016. However, given the importance of household spending for the economy, accounting as it does for over 60% of all spending and given also the further dependence of capital expenditure by private companies on the demands households make on their established capacity, any consistent recovery in the SA and the weak economy – will require the stimulus of lower interest rates. We can hope that a stable or better, a stronger rand and less inflation, makes this possible. We can also hope for a more realistic and helpful narrative from the Reserve Bank that recognises that interest rates influence growth much more than inflation and that maintaining growth rates is a highly appropriate objective for monetary policy – especially when controlling inflation is not within its control. 20 September 2016

 

Tough Love

National Minimum Wage Panel – do your duty and offer tough love and resist the arguments for economic miracles.

The government has (thankfully) decided to kick the National Minimum Wage (NMW) into touch. The hope must be that the panel come to advise that any NMW high enough to make a meaningful difference to the circumstances of the working poor, is a very bad idea. It’s a bad idea because it cannot offer much poverty relief (to those who keep their jobs) without destroying the opportunity for many more in SA, particularly the young and inexperienced and those outside the cities, to find work.

The problem is that even many of those who find work (mostly in the cities), at the lower end of the wage scales, remain poor. The working poor in SA have been defined as those who earn less than R4000 per month. Yet the problem is that most of those with jobs in SA earn much less than this, while a large number of potential workers are unemployed and earn no wage income at all.

According to a comprehensive recent study of the labour market in SA by Arden Finn for the University of the Witwatersrand, 48% of all wage incomes, representing 5m workers, fell below R4000 per month in 2015 and 40% earned  less than R3000 per month, about 2.7m workers out of a total employed of about 13m. The proportion of those employed who fall below R4000 are much higher in the rural areas, higher in agriculture (nearly 90%) and domestic services (95%). In mining, 22% of the work force earned less than R4000 per month in 2015, while in the comparatively well paid and skilled manufacturing sector, about 48% of the work force were estimated to earn less than R4000 per month.

How many would lose their jobs? And how many would hold on to them to receive the promised benefits of higher minimum wages? These are the numbers that would have to be estimated by the panel. They would have to allow for all the other independent forces at work, other than wages, that could favourably or unfavourably influence numbers employed. For those on the panel who believe that SA can repeal the laws of supply and demand for labour and that wages have little to do with what workers are expected to add to business revenues, and so higher minimums can happen without very unhelpful employment effects – there is a question they will have to answer.

If a higher NMW can make such a helpful difference to poverty without serious consequences for the unemployed and their poverty, why not set the NMW ever higher?  If an NMW of R4000 a month is not enough to escape poverty, why not double or treble these minimums? They must surely agree that the number of job losses would increase as the distance between current wages and the intended minimums widened. Agree, that is, that the only way to avoid extra unemployment would be to set the minimums very close to actual minimum wages in the very different locales where they are earned, a symbolic rather than a practical gesture.

The panel could turn to the well-known relationship between employment, employment benefits and output (measured as value added or contribution to GDP) in the formal sector of the SA for evidence that improved employment benefits, for those who keep their jobs, leads to less employment for the rest. GDP has grown consistently while employment has stagnated and the numbers unemployed have risen as the potential work force has grown. Yet the real wage bills have grown more or less in line with real GDP. In other words, the percentage decline in the numbers employed has been less than the percentage increase in employment benefits paid out. Nice work if you can get it and too many South African have not got it. And wages and profits have maintained their share of value added. Firms have adapted well to more expensive labour; the unemployed have not been able to do so. Their interests should be paramount in policy action.

An NMW set well above market related rewards will reinforce such trends. It will not be fair to the non-working poor nor promote economic growth, the only known way to truly relieve poverty and raise wages over time. It is the duty of economists to practice tough love – to recognise the inevitable trade-offs should a NMW be introduced. We can but hope the panel will do its duty and resist politically tempting actions that have predictably disastrous effects. After all, if we knew how to eliminate poverty with a wave of a wand (the NMW is such a wand) we would have done so a long while ago.

 

The rand is mostly well explained by global forces. Yet SA specific risks have also declined to add further value to the ZAR. Long may these trends persist.

 

The rand has enjoyed a strong recovery in recent weeks. We say enjoyed advisedly. A strong rand is very helpful to households and their spending. It means less inflation (even deflation of the prices of goods or services with high import content or of those that compete with imports) and so less inflation expected in the prices firms set for their customers. If rand strength or even rand stability can be maintained, lower interest rates will follow to further encourage spending. Households directly account for over 60% of all spending, while spending by firms that supply households on capital equipment and their wage bills will take their cue from household demands. Any hope of a cyclical recovery of the SA economy depends crucially on the now more helpful direction of the rand.

Exporters may see their profit margins contract with a stronger rand. However, crucial for them will be the reasons for rand strength or weakness as the case may be. If the rand appreciates because the global economy is gathering momentum, or is expected to do so, then rand strength may well be accompanied by higher US dollar prices for the metals and minerals they sell on world markets, and vice versa, rand weakness might well be accompanied by or even caused by lower commodity prices. In which case revenues gained via a depreciated rand may well be offset by weaker US dollar prices. As has been the case for much of the past few years. Falling dollar prices for metals and minerals for much of the past few years – other than gold- have accompanied the weaker rand. And to some extent can be held responsible for the weaker rand.

Fig 1; Commodity Price Index (CRB) in USD and in ZAR

fig1

It is therefore important to identify the sources of rand weakness or strength. It is important to recognise the difference between global forces and SA-specific events that have driven or can drive the rand weaker or stronger, even though the implications for the state of the SA economy of rand strength or weakness, from whatever cause, global or SA specific, will be similar. The more risky (uncertain) the outlook for the global and SA economies, the weaker the rand and vice versa whatever the sources of more or less risk- be they Global or South African.

However if the cause of rand weakness is SA in origin – attributable to economic policies or expectations of them – those responsible for currency weakness and a consequently weaker economy can be held accountable by the democratic process. Policy makers may lose support, enough to change the direction of policy direction that could add rand strength. The rand strength that has accompanied the local government elections and a politically damaged Presidency are pointing in this direction and have made disruptive interference in SA’s fiscal policy settings less likely. Hence an extra degree of ZAR strength for SA specific reasons.

We offer an analysis that clearly can identify the causes of rand weakness or strength as either global or SA specific. The simple method is to compare the behaviour of the USD/ZAR exchange rate with that of nine other emerging market (EM) currencies that can be expected to be similarly influenced as is the ZAR by global forces. We compare an Index of these USD/EM exchange rates with that of the USD/ZAR exchange rate below (The exchange rates included in the Index are all given the same weight. The Index is made up of the Turkish Lira, Russian Ruble, Hungarian Forint, Brazilian Real, the Mexican, Chilean, Philippine Pesos, Indian Rupee and the Malaysian Ringgit). It may be seen that the weakness of the rand since 2013 has been accompanied by EM currency weakness generally. Much of the rand depreciation of recent years may therefore be attributed to global not SA specific influences on capital flows and exchange rates. It has been an extended period of dollar strength as much as EM weakness. The US dollar has also gathered strength vs the euro and the yen over this period.

 

Fig.2; The USD/ZAR and the USD/EM Average, 2013-2016 (Daily Data)

fig2

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

However it has not been only a matter of USD strength. As may be seen below when we compare the performance of the ZAR to the EM basket there have been periods of rand weakness – from January 2013 to September 2014- followed by a period of relative rand strength that turned into significant weakness in late 2015 when president Zuma frightened the market for the rand and RSA’s with his surprise sacking of the then Minister of Finance Nene. As may also be seen the recovery of the rand dates from late May 2016 and has gained significant momentum recently with the outcomes, expected and realized in the Local Government elections of August 3rd 2016. Since the close of trade on Friday 5th August the ZAR has gained 2.6% vs the USD while the nine currency EM average exchange rate is about 0.90% stronger vs the USD.

Fig.3; Performance of the USD/ZAR Vs the USD EM average. (Daily Data; January 2013=1)

fig3

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

A similar picture emerges when we trace the Credit Default Swaps for RSA dollar denominated debt and high yield EM debt in Fig 4. The CDS spread is equivalent to the difference in the USD yield on an RSA or EM 5 year bond and that of a five year US Treasury Bond. The credit rating of RSA debt in a relative sense can be expressed as the difference between the cost of insuring RSA debt against default Vs the cost of insuring high yield EM debt. The larger the negative spread in favour of RSA’s, the more favourable SA’s credit rating compared to other EM borrowers. As may be seen the RSA rating deteriorated in 2015 and is now enjoying something of an improved rating. Though the credit spreads indicate that there is some way to go before RSA credit attained the relative and absolute standing it had in 2012.

Fig.4; SA and Emerging Market Credit Spreads.

 fig4

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

To take the analysis further we have run a regression equation that explains the USD/ZAR exchange using the USD/EM exchange rate as the single explanatory variable. The fit is a statistically good one as may be seen in figures 5 and 6.  The EM currency basket explains over 90% of the USD/ZAR daily rate on average over the three and a half years. But as may be seen in figure 4, the ZAR was significantly undervalued in late 2015. The predicted value of the USD/ZAR at 2015 year end, given the exchange value of the other EM currencies might have been R14.86 compared to actual exchange rate at that fraught time of R16.62. Or in other words SA specific risks had made the USD almost R2 more expensive than it might have been at the end of 2015.

Fig.5; Value of ZAR compared to EM Basket on 1/1/2016.

fig5

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

As we show in figure 5 this valuation gap had disappeared by August 5th 2016.  The USD/ZAR exchange rate is now almost exactly where it could have been predicted to be by global forces alone. That is to say the current exchange value of the ZAR is precisely in line with other EM exchange rates.

 

Fig.6; Value of ZAR compared to EM Basket on 8/8/2016 Daily Data (2013-2016 August)

fig6

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

The future of the ZAR will, as always, be determined by the mix of global and SA specific forces. At current exchange rates it may be concluded that there is no margin of safety in the exchange value accorded the ZAR. It will gain or lose value from this level with changes in SA risk or with the direction of global capital flows that determine the value of EM currencies, bonds and equities.

The global capital flows acting on the ZAR are well represented by the direction of the EM equity markets. The ZAR and other EM exchange rates will continue to take their cue from flows into and out of EM equity and bond markets. In figures 7 and 8 below we show how sensitive has been the relationship between daily moves in the ZAR and by implication other EM exchange rates, to daily moves in the value of EM equities – represented by the benchmark MSCI EM Index. We show a scatter plot of these daily percentage changes below. This relationship has been particularly close recently as may be seen in the figures below.

Fig 7. Daily % Moves in the MSCI EM Equity Index and the USD/ZAR,  June 1st 2016- August 8th 2016

fig7

R=0.75;   R squared =0.56[1]

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

Fig 8: Daily % Moves in the EM Currency Index and the USD/ZAR; January 1st 2013 – August 8th,2016

fig8

R= 0.72; R squared = 0.52

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

A further feature of global equity markets this year has been the highly correlated movements in the S&P Index and EM Indexes including the JSE- when valued in USD. (See figure 9 below) Also notable is the extent to which the JSE, when valued in USD has outperformed other EM equities as well as the S&P tis. This has come after years of EM and JSE underperformance of a similar scale- especially when measured in strong USD.

Fig.9;  Equity Market Trends; USD. Daily Data 2016 (January 2016=100)

fig9

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

Fig.10; Equity Market Trends. USD.  Daily Data 2013-2016 (January 2016=100)

fig10

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

These recent trends are a reflection of less rather than more global risk aversion- and so a search for value in equities rather than in the defensive qualities of global consumer facing companies paying predictable and growing dividends. For the sake of the SA economy we can only hope that such trends persist. If they do the opportunity may soon present itself to the Reserve Bank to lower interest rates. It should do so and immediately stop predicting higher interest rates to come. The Treasury moreover should resist the opportunity a rand aided lower petrol and diesel price will give it to raise fuel taxes. A much needed cyclical recovery will take less inflation and lower interest rates. The opportunity a stronger rand may give to lower interest rates and to avoid higher tax rates should not be wasted.

[1] R is the correlation co-efficient. The R squared is for a least squares equation  dLog(ZAR) = c+ dLog(EM) + e

Brexit so far – not so bad for the global economy

Having spent the first post Brexit week in London it is hard to exaggerate the disappointment, even foreboding, felt by our colleagues in the London office of Investec. A leap into a world where the known unknowns have multiplied exceedingly is naturally unwelcome to those whose vocation it is to manage risks to wealth in an as well-considered way as possible. Clearly risks to the outcomes in the real economy and the financial markets – particularly in the UK – have become greater than they were and volatility in markets is likely to be exaggerated until a clearer view of what the future may hold for Britain, Europe and the Global economy, of which the share of Britain and Europe is above 20%.

The most obvious unknown is the impact on the UK economy – though the description United Kingdom may well be an exaggeration – with the sharp regional and generational divides of the referendum revealed. The political unknowns seem unlikely to be resolved any time soon as the UK is understandably in no hurry to formally invoke the exit option. An accompanying unknown is who will lead the UK through these negotiations, the outcomes of which, to be decided in Westminster by the legislators not the voters, will surely lead to further appeals to voters by way of a general election or even a further referendum. However, under new rules the next general election will only be called in 2020 – unless a large majority of the MP’s determine otherwise. The Conservative government and no doubt the parliamentary Labour Party, in turmoil over its leader, are clearly not of any mind to go to the country any time soon.

The obvious issue for any updated economic forecast of the UK economy is the degree to which the prevailing uncertainties and the risks associated with them will undermine the confidence business and household decision makers have in their economic prospects. Less confidence will mean less spending, as investment and consumption plans are put on hold and as plan Bs are evolved. It will not take much of a deviation from trend to turn positive GDP growth into stagnation, or worse, recession. But neither the Bank of England under Governor Mark Carney nor the Treasury under George Osborne have waited for the dust to settle. They have reacted with promises of counter measures: lower interest rates and less onerous applications of the requirements of banks to reserve capital, at the expense of lending. But as Carney cautioned correctly – “there are limits to what the Bank of England can do” – if people are determined to tighten their belts in a more uncertain environment. Confidence in the future outlook for revenues and employment benefits is the all-important and fragile foundation of all forward looking economic actions. Decisions made today that are taken not only by firms, but more importantly by households, that account for 70% of all spending in the UK.

Though to be sure it is the revenue to be gained or lost from supplying financial services to Europe and the world (a particular strength of the UK economy) – despite, or is it because of, sterling rather than the euro – that is uppermost in the considerations of the City of London. A square mile that is currently in the throes of a most impressive building boom. It is very hard to count the cranes from my bedroom window overlooking much of the City.

George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was doing his best over the weekend to bolster confidence and enhance spending. The intention to balance the government’s budget by 2020 has been abandoned. Less rather than more austerity is in prospect – understandably so – given the encouragement provided by extraordinarily low borrowing costs. In the midst of a financial crisis the yield on 10 year Gilts dropped well below 1%. Gilts, like almost all other government bonds – including those issued by RSA – were regarded as safer, except by the rating agencies. It becomes much less of a crisis when government debt becomes still cheaper to issue rather, than as is more usually the case in a crisis, when government loans become ever more expensive to raise and austerity in a recession becomes impossible to resist.

Osborne moreover promised more than more government spending. He made the case for a sharply lower corporate tax rate of 15% – close to the 12.5% rate in Ireland – a matter of already deep anguish to Brussels who would much prefer less rather than more fiscal competition in Europe. The UK, with all its other advantages in the form of good commercial law and as a tax haven, could become an even more powerful competitor for corporate head offices.

Escaping the clutches of the Brussels bureaucrats may offer Britain many such opportunities to trade more freely with each other and with the rest of the world, while hopefully negotiating full access to trade with the European community, not only with mutually beneficial low tariffs but – more important – to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. This is particularly the case in services that have made the European community much less of a free trading zone than it appears to be on the surface.

Clearly the biggest threat to growth to incomes and profits of companies in the UK and everywhere, including in the US, is the rising populist threat to freer trade and globalisation generally that is considered to have left important constituencies behind. The leave vote was surely a protest vote as much as a vote for independence (independence to control the flow of immigrants to the UK, who in fact have proved generally to be a source of faster growth) as well as a response to the income earning opportunities that a fast growing UK economy has provided.

For a South African analyst in London with long experience analysing volatile exchange rates, the one most obvious conclusion to draw is how helpful weaker sterling has been to absorb some of the shocks caused by UK-specific uncertainties. Sterling devalued by about 10% on the Brexit news. The sterling value of the FTSE Index has largely held its own. Shares, particularly those of the global companies very well represented on the FTSE Index, have seen a weaker sterling translate into higher sterling values, particularly when their US dollar values improved with the strong recovery registered in New York last week.

Equities can perform as currency hedges when the currency weakness represents additional country specific rather than global risks. The sterling or rather the UK economy hedges on the FTSE came, as they do on the JSE, from global rather than local economy plays.

On this exchange rate note it is encouraging to note how well the rand, in company with most other emerging currencies and bonds, held up through the Brexit crisis (see below). Some stability in commodity and energy prices were consistent with these developments. The news about the global economy since Brexit has not reflected a state of crisis for the global economy, to which emerging markets are especially vulnerable. So far not so bad.

 

Now to turn a reprieve into a recovery

The markets have reacted favourably to the S&P rating decision – is there more favour to be shown?

The markets have reacted favourably to the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) decision to leave SA’s credit rating broadly unchanged that was announced after the SA markets had closed on Friday, 3 June. Clearly the danger of a formal derating of RSA debt was reflected in market yields before the S&P announcement. As we show in figure 1, RSA bond yields and risk spreads have narrowed. The current spread of about 285bp provided by a RSA five year bond over a US Treasury of the same duration now indicates a near investment grade status in the market place. The spread is shown below where it is compared to Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on high yield emerging market (EM) bonds and also on Mexican bonds of the same duration. These spreads represent the cost of insuring the debt against default.

In figure 2, we show how RSA debt has enjoyed something of a re-rating in recent days when compared, as it should be, to other EM debt yields. The yield gap between EM and RSA debt has widened, indicating an improved status for SA, while the extra yield provided by RSA debt compared to Mexican debt has also declined from about 140bp. A longer view of these relationships is also shown in figure 3, which shows that RSA debt has suffered a de-rating in the market place since early 2015, a de-rating magnified by the Zuma intervention in the Ministry of Finance in December 2015. While RSA yields have declined in a relative sense over recent days, SA’s credit rating in the market has not regained the status it enjoyed prior to the Zuma intervention.

A similar pattern of improved sentiment has been revealed in the foreign exchange markets. The rand has gained value vs the US dollar recently, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to other EM currencies that might be expected to be influenced by moves in the US dollar vs all currencies. In figure 4, we compare the USD/ZAR rate of exchange to that of an equally weighted basket of nine other EM currencies (Turkey, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Philippines, India and Malaysia). As Figure 4 shows, the rand and the average EM currencies have gained against the US dollar recently. However the ratio of the rand to the EM currencies (April 2012=1) has improved from 1.32 in late May to about 1.28 on 6 June, an improvement of about 3%. A longer term view of these relationships is shown in figure 5, where it may be seen that the rand, compared to other EM currencies, is still slightly weaker than it was before the Zuma actions in December.

In figure 6, we show the RSA 10 year bond yields since early 2015. We also show the difference between RSA yields in rands with US Treasury bond yields in US dollars. This risk spread may be regarded as the average rate at which the rand is expected to depreciate against the US dollar over the next 10 years. The higher yields compensate investors for the expected exchange rate losses. This risk spread has declined in recent days but remains well above the spreads offered prior to the Zuma shock to the bond and other markets.

The SA Treasury has been able to convince the rating agencies of its commitment to fiscal conservatism. The Treasury will need to be allowed to get on with the task without interference from the Presidency. The bond and currency markets, given but only a partial recovery, would still appear to regard such interference as a possibility. What the Treasury also needs, as much as it needs the authority to manage SA’s fiscal affairs, is a cyclical recovery and faster growth. Such a recovery would be greatly assisted by further strength in the rand and lower bond yields. US dollar weakness would further help promote such trends, as they have done recently. If such favourable trends were to materialise, the Reserve Bank would surely have to reverse its own damaging interest rate course. A loosening rather than a tightening interest rate cycle is urgently called for. Lower interest rates and lower interest rates expected will make a cyclical recovery all the more likely. SA has enjoyed something of an unexpected reprieve from the rating agencies. A strong follow up in the form of lower interest rates across the yield curve can turn a reprieve into a recovery.

Not so Moody after all

Moody’s Investors Service showed its softer side when confirming SA’s investment grade credit rating. The rating agency made it clear that to maintain this grade, SA would need to increase its GDP – that is, simply not fall into recession. A mere 0.5% increase in 2016 would meet Moody’s modest expectation, followed by 1.5% in 2017.

Growth, as Moody points out, not only makes government debt easier to manage. It helps the banks and the households meet their obligations and will also encourage firms to invest more in additional capacity.

To quote the preamble to the report:

“The confirmation of South Africa’s ratings reflects Moody’s view that the country is likely approaching a turning point after several years of falling growth; that the 2016/17 budget and medium term fiscal plan will likely stabilize and eventually reduce the general government debt metrics; and that recent political developments, while disruptive, testify to the underlying strength of South Africa’s institutions.

“The negative outlook speaks to the implementation risks associated with the structural and legislative reforms that the government, business and labor recently agreed in order to restore confidence and encourage private sector investment, upon which Moody’s expectations for growth and fiscal consolidation in coming years — and hence the Baa2 rating — rely.”

Moody’s identifies three drivers that inform its decision. The first, most critical, we would suggest, is that the economy will recover from a business cycle trough:

“..The first driver for the confirmation is Moody’s expectation that South Africa’s economic growth will gradually strengthen after reaching a trough this year, as the various supply-side shocks that have suppressed economic activity since 2014 recede. Specifically, the electricity supply is now more reliable, the drought is ending and the number of work days lost to strikes has shrunk significantly (a trend that planned rule changes are likely to embed further). In addition, the inflation outlook is more subdued, which would suggest fewer interest rate rises ahead than we expected when the South African Reserve Bank saw inflation heading towards 8% by year end. Less severe tightening of monetary policy would alleviate extra pressure on South Africa’s relatively highly-indebted household sector and support growth.

“Alongside the more competitive exchange rate, these improving trends are likely to strengthen growth in South Africa from the second half of this year and thereafter. While we expect the economy to expand by only 0.5% in 2016, we expect growth to rise to 1.5% in 2017. Moreover, ongoing structural reforms and diminished infrastructure bottlenecks offer upside potential for growth over the medium term. The recent rapprochement between the government, business and labor holds promise from the standpoint of identifying areas of mutual concern. A number of benchmark actions related to matters such as the rationalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the enactment of labor market reforms have been identified in the process. To the extent that implementation of such measures helps boost business confidence, investment and job creation, they would improve prospects for gradually reducing wide economic disparities and high levels of poverty, deprivation and unemployment.”

The second driver for the unchanged rating was “The Stabilization of government debt ratios likely to occur in 2016/17” and the third was “Recent political developments testify to the strength of South Africa’s institutions”.

The rating was placed on a negative watch because such hopeful predictions have still to materialise. Or, to put it bluntly, will the economy grow by 0.5% in 2016 and 1.5% in 2017? These are not demanding outcomes even by SA’s well below average growth performance in recent years. What then could cause SA to fall into recession?

The simple short answer would be a further slowdown in household spending. Since households account for over 60% of all spending, any further reluctance in their willingness or ability to spend more will drag the economy into recession. It will neither encourage firms to invest more in people or capacity nor encourage foreign savers to fund our savings deficit.

It is striking that Moody’s could look to lower rather than higher interest rates to improve the growth outlook and the ratings prospects. To repeat the observation made above from Moody’s:

“In addition, the inflation outlook is more subdued, which would suggest fewer interest rate rises ahead than we expected when the South African Reserve Bank saw inflation heading towards 8% by year end. Less severe tightening of monetary policy would alleviate extra pressure on South Africa’s relatively highly-indebted household sector and support growth.”

We have long questioned the Reserve Bank’s decisions to raise interest rates into higher inflation and a weaker economy. It seems to us that the higher rates can make no predictable impact on inflation or, it may be added, on inflation expected – that has also risen lately despite the weakness of the economy and despite interest rates that have been rising since early 2014. This proves only that inflation and expected inflation is dominated by forces well beyond the influence of higher short term interest rates. That is in particular by the behaviour of the rand, the behaviour of the weather, the behaviour of the President, the behaviour of global commodity and oil prices and Eskom and its regulators, to mention some of the supply side shocks that have driven inflation in SA higher.

Interest rate increases do nothing useful to contain inflation in a world where the supply side shocks are pushing prices higher and household spending lower. What they do is to reduce household spending further than would have been the case with stable or lower interest rates. For every one percent increase in the repo rate, the Reserve Bank forecasts a 0.4% reduction in GDP growth over two years.

This should be emphasised, in the light of the Moody’s report, since rate increases prejudice rather than enhance our credit rating. An independent central bank is one of SA’s institutional strengths. But such independence could have been much better managed than it has been. Lower, not higher interest rates, would have served the economy better (and still can) and helped preserve its growth rates. Moody’s would seem to agree.

Are there other forces at work that could help the economy grow a little faster? The weaker real and more competitive rand finally seems to be helping the manufacturers as well as the tourist business. The latest survey of manufacturing activity, the Barclays PMI, shows a very healthy recovery and positive growth. If the past strong statistical relationship between the PMI and GDP growth is to be relied upon (showed below), this improvement does suggest significantly faster growth to come. The PMI is well up and the GDP growth rates in Q2 can be expected to follow. We thank Chris Holdsworth of Investec Securities for drawing this relationship to our attention:

 

The other helpful influence at work is a much smaller foreign trade deficit recorded over the past two months. Less imported and more exported add to GDP growth rates. A decline in inventories held, especially inventories with import content, may offset these favourable forces on recorded GDP growth. But a combination of a more competitive rand and a more cautious Reserve Bank, more sensitive to the growth outlook, as well as the business cycle trough from which conditions improve rather than deteriorate, should deliver growth of 0.5% this year and 1.5% next; enough to satisfy Moody’s. Raising the growth rates to permanently higher rates of over 3% requires the structural reforms of the labour and other markets that Moody’s appears surprisingly optimistic about. One can only hope that their optimism is justified.

 

The wisdom in foreign exchange control reforms

A notable milestone in SA’s financial history was passed in the second half of 2015. For the very first time, the value of South Africans’ foreign assets has come to exceed the value of the South African assets and debt held by foreign investors. At year end, our holdings of foreign assets, worth over R6 trillion, exceeded our foreign liabilities by as much as R714bn.

 

The buildup in offshore assets legally owned and managed by South African businesses, pension and retirement funds as well as directly by wealthy individuals, began from very modest levels in 1994, when South Africans became acceptable participants in global financial markets.

The growth in foreign assets and liabilities has served South Africans particularly well in recent years as the SA economy has been severely buffeted by a damaging combination of weak growth and higher inflation. Stagflation has accompanied a collapse in the currency, higher charges for utilities a severe drought and, to top all these economic body blows, we have seen (avoidably) higher borrowing costs imposed by the Reserve Bank.

The increasingly large foreign component in SA portfolios of assets therefore has helped significantly to mitigate the shocks to their incomes and balance sheets caused by specifically negative South African events, both political and economic. The protection against their exposure to SA risks has come in large measure from the shares they own in JSE-listed industrial companies whose major sources of revenues and earnings (as well as the costs they incur) are generated outside SA.

The successful industrial companies that began life in SA and have prospered abroad include Naspers (NPN), SAB, British American Tobacco (BTI), Mediclinic (MEI), Richemont (CFR), MTN, Steinhoff (SNH), Brait (BAT) and Aspen (APN) . They have come to dominate the JSE when measured by market value. Up to 50% of the value of the JSE is accounted for by these large firms, that we can describe as Global Consumer Plays (GCPs). Before the rise of these now global companies, investors on the JSE would have been much more exposed to the highly variable fortunes of Resource companies that used to dominate the JSE. Without these opportunities to invest in these world class companies on the JSE, as well as the investments made abroad by these companies and other SA based companies outside of SA, the value of SA pensions and retirement plans might have looked very sad indeed.

An equally weighted Index of 14 of these GCPs on the JSE (including recent underperformers MTN, ASP and CFR) has performed as well as the leading global index, the S&P 500, over the past two years or so, adding about 30% to its rand value of January 2015.

Well-developed liquid capital markets not only provide companies and governments with access to capital. They provide wealth owners, and their fund and business managers, with the opportunity to diversify away firm or country specific risks. A well-diversified portfolio with a full variety of investment opportunities, none of which will dominate the balance sheet and whose individual returns are somewhat independent of each other, makes for a much less risky portfolio, that is a portfolio whose value, while expected to rise over time, will do so more predictably than most of its separate components (especially individual shares) included in the portfolio. The well diversified portfolio provides positive returns with significantly less risk – that is smaller value movements in both directions.

Less risk moreover translates into lower required returns of the investor or wealth owner. Lower required returns also mean lower costs of capital for the firms hoping to raise capital to expand their businesses. Lower required returns in turn will mean more capital invested, a larger capital stock and a stronger economy. This is one of the benefits of a well-developed capital market that can attract capital from savers everywhere and not only domestic ones- as has the SA capital market – where capital inflows have more or less matched capital outflows over the years – as we have shown in figure 1 above.

Human capital effect

But the less risky returns that the opportunity to invest globally provided to South Africans benefits not only the owners of tangible capital but also the owners of intangible human capital committed to the SA economy.

There is always a global shortage of skilled professionals, including managers of businesses, for which competition is intense. By enabling skilled South Africans to invest abroad and diversify away SA risk, their required returns from SA sources have also declined. That is, they are more willing to apply their skills in SA – and therefore are more willing to sacrifice returns, that is employment benefits – because their wealth is better insured against SA risks to their wealth. This now more favourable exchange of less risk for lower returns by owners of a crucial resource- the human capital of skilled professionals- helps to make the SA economy more globally competitive

It has been wise of the SA government to relax exchange control over the years – it has helped the economy retain its skills and so better ride out economic misfortunes.

Were the economy to grow faster over the next few years, the outward flow of capital would be more than matched by inward flows of fixed direct investment (FDI) and portfolio capital. Also, foreign controlled companies would be more inclined to reinvest profits than pay them out as dividends. Growth leads investment by companies in additional capacity and stimulates the flow of funds to support growth. Without faster growth, the flows through the net flows through the SA balance of payments will continue to be more out than in.

The economy would grow faster were global market forces to become more favourable to our emerging, metal price-dependent economy. The rand would then strengthen (as it has lately) and the inflation and interest rates would come down rather than rise to help the economy along. Faster growth over the longer term would respond to more business, employment and wealth friendly policy reforms, of which exchange control reform is a very good and helpful example.

Some details about capital flows

FDI is defined as an investment by a foreign company with a more than 10% shareholding. Portfolio investment is defined as a less than 10% share. As may be seen below, outward FDI has recently come to exceed inward FDI, while inward portfolio investments continue to exceed outward flows – that have become significantly larger.

As important for the SA balance of payments is the flow of dividend receipts and payments. The flows of dividends from portfolios has become a net positive for the SA economy while the flow of dividends from FDI remains strongly in the other direction.

The rand: A global opportunity

Global rather than SA forces have taken the rand and the JSE higher. There is still much scope for improved SA fundamentals to add further strength to the rand and the economy

The rand has regained all the ground lost since December 2015 when President Zuma shocked the markets. How much of this recovery can be attributed to South African specifics (better news about the political state of SA) and how much can be attributed to global forces (less risk priced into emerging market currencies bonds and equities of which SA is so much a part of)? The answer is that to date almost all of the improved outcomes registered on the JSE and in the exchange value of the rand is the result of less global, rather than SA, risk.

The positive conclusion to draw from this is that were SA itself to be better appreciated in the capital markets on its own improved merits, there would be further upside for the rand – and for the SA economy that can only escape its current malaise with a stronger rand and the lower inflation and interest rates that will follow.

We show below that the rand has recovered in line with emerging market equities, represented by the benchmark MSCI EM. This index and the JSE indices are now also more valuable than they were in early December 2015. The JSE All Share Index (ALSI) in rands is also now ahead of its December value. MSCI EM is up about 20% from its recent lows of mid-January 2016 while the rand has gained about 15% since then. The JSE, when valued in US dollars, has performed even better than the average emerging market equity market, having gained about 25% since its lows of 18 January.

 

The higher SA-specific risks attached to the value of the rand in December are shown by the performance of the rand against other emerging market currencies since. As may be seen below, the rand has yet to recover its value of early December when measured against the Brazilian and Turkish currencies that have also strengthened against the US dollar over the period. On a trade weighted basis, the rand has lost about 4% since December.

A model of the daily value of the USD/ZAR that uses the USD/AUD and the emerging market bond risk spreads as predictors, with a very good statistical fit since 2012, indicates that without the Zuma intervention, the USD/ZAR might now have cost closer to R13 than the R14.7 it traded at yesterday (18 April), given the recovery in commodity currencies and the narrowing emerging market spreads.

That the recovery of the rand and the JSE has more to do with emerging markets rather than SA forces is shown below. Risk spreads attached to emerging market bonds and RSA dollar-denominated bonds have declined in recent months. However the difference between higher emerging market spreads over US Treasury yields and RSA spreads has narrowed. The wider this difference, the better the relative rating of SA bonds: the SA rating was at its relative high in late 2014 and has deteriorated since, though it is little changed from its rating of early December 2015.

A comparison of risk spreads attached to Brazilian and SA debt made below, shows how Brazilian credit has benefitted both absolutely and relatively to SA from the prospect that its President will be forced out of office. It should also be recognised that both Brazilian and SA debt are currently trading as high yield bonds. Investment grade bonds offer up to about 2.7% p.a more than five year US Treasuries.

When we turn to the bond market itself, we see that the yield on RSA 10 year rand-denominated bonds has fallen below 9% p.a but is still above the yields offered in early December. The spread between 10 year RSA rand rates and US 10 year Treasury Bond yields however remain above 7% p.a. This is a further indication that SA-specific risks priced into the bond markets remain highly elevated. They reveal that the rand is still expected to weaken by about 7% p.a against the US dollar – implying consistently high rates of inflation in SA over the next 10 years.

There remains every opportunity for SA to prove that the markets are wrong about the inflation and exchange rate outlook, with policies that convince the world that we will not be printing money to fund government spending and that our policies will be investor friendly. Of more importance, a stronger rand and lower interest rates would help lift GDP growth rates, to the further surprise of the markets and the credit rating agencies.

 

The rand: A welcome question of specifics

Is the recovery of the rand for global or SA reasons? Whatever the explanation, it is surely very welcome.

A recovery of the SA economy needs a stronger rand. A stronger rand will mean less inflation to come and lower interest rates. Unfortunately a weaker rand leads interest rates in the opposite direction making it just about impossible for the business cycle to turn higher. A combination of higher prices on the shelves and the petrol station forecourts following rand weakness, depresses household spending. And the higher interest rates that follow add to the inability of households to spend more – and to borrow more. Household spending, which accounts for over 60% of all spending, leads the economy in both directions. Without a recovery in the propensity of households to spend more, the best the SA economy can hope to do over the next 24 months would be to avoid recession.

The foreign exchange value of the rand responds to both global forces – that is global risk appetites that drive emerging markets and currencies lower or higher (including the rand) – and SA-specific risks that encourage capital flows to and from SA.

An obvious example of SA-specific risks driving the rand weaker and interest rates higher was provided by President Jacob Zuma in December. The week of Zuma interventions in the Treasury saw the rand sharply weaken and sent long term interest sharply higher. These interventions added about R2 to the cost of a US dollar – according to our model of the rand – and about 100bps or more to the cost of raising long-dated government debt.

Our model of “fair value” for the USD/ZAR relies on two forces, the USD/AUD and the emerging market risk spread. Had Zuma not acted as he did, the US dollar might well have cost no more than R14 in early December 2015. With the recent recovery in the USD/AUD and emerging market bonds, the current fair value for the rand would be closer to R13 than R14. This suggests that the Zuma danger to the rand has not left the currency or bond markets. And that the welcome recovery of the rand is mostly attributable to global rather than SA forces. We attempt below to isolate the impact of global from SA-specific risks on the exchange value of the rand and show that the recovery of the rand is mostly global rather than SA specific.

If indeed the recovery of the rand is mostly attributable to global rather than SA forces, there is the possibility that a revived respect for SA’s fiscal conservatism – demonstrated in the Pravin Gordhan Budget for 2016-17 – can still prove more helpful to the SA bond market and the rand, global forces permitting.

In the figure below we compare the performance of the rand to other currencies including a basket of emerging market currencies. The rand weakened against all currencies in 2015 – including other emerging market currencies. Furthermore the significant recovery of the rand in 2016 is in line with that of other commodity and emerging market currencies. This suggests again that global rather than SA forces explain the recent rand recovery.

A similar impression of predominant global forces is provided by the bond market. The spread between RSA 10 year bond yields and US Treasury Bond Yields of similar duration have stabilised at more than 7% p.a. having widened dramatically in December 2015. These spreads are significantly wider than they were in early 2015. This spread may be regarded as a measure of SA specific risk, or more particularly as a measure of expected rand weakness. The rand has weakened – and is expected to weaken further. An alternative measure of SA specific risk is provided by the CDS spread paid to insure SA US dollar denominated debt against default. This spread has moved very much in in line with the interest rate spread.

The recent narrowing of this insurance premium has however also been accompanied by a narrowing of the more general emerging market CDS spread, reflecting global forces at work. The gap between the higher emerging market CDS spread and the lower RSA spread narrowed sharply in December 2015, indicating a deterioration in SA’s relative credit standing. This relative standing has not improved much in 2016, as may be seen by a difference in spreads of only about 120bps. Note that the wider this spread, the better SA’s relative standing in the global credit markets.

The spread between RSA rand yields and their US Treasury yields of similar duration are by definition also the average rate at which the rand is expected to depreciate over the next 10 years. The fact is that the rand has weakened and is expected to weaken further – despite the wider interest carry in favour of the rand.

Given these expectations of rand weakness it is not surprising and entirely consistent that inflation compensation provided by the RSA bond market being the difference between an inflation linked yield and a nominal yield. This is a very good measure of inflation expected and has also risen and remains above 7% p.a.

The Reserve Bank pays particular attention to inflationary expectations, believing that these expectations can drive inflation higher. But without an improvement in the outlook for the rand, it is hard to imagine any decline in inflation expected. It is also very hard to imagine how higher short term interest rates can have any predictable influence on the spot or expected value of the rand and therefore on inflation to come. As we have emphasised the risks that drive the rand are global events or SA political developments, for which short term interest rates in SA are largely irrelevant.

The only predictable influence of higher short term interest rates in SA is still slower growth in household spending. Less growth without any predictably less inflation is not a trade off the Reserve Bank should be imposing on the SA economy, even though but may well continue to do so. The only hope for a cyclical recovery is a stronger rand – whatever its cause, global or South African.

Point of View: The optimum competition policy

Is there a true public interest in employment retention, either at Optimum Coal Mine or anywhere else in the economy?

The controversy surrounding the purchase by Tegeta Exploration and Resources, a Gupta controlled company, of Optimum Coal Mine for R2.5bn from Glencore has been grabbing the headlines in the local media. Optimum Coal Mine supplies Eskom and enjoys a near 10% share of the Richards Bay coal export terminal.

Part of the controversy was about the alleged role of Mineral Resources Minister Mosebenzi Zwane. According to a report in Business Day by Natasha Marrion on 23 February: “Mr Zwane said his only interest in the deal was to ensure that no jobs were lost under the new owner.”

Business Day further reported “that the Competition Tribunal has cleared the way for the Gupta-controlled Tegeta Exploration and Resources to acquire Optimum Coal, on condition there are no merger-specific job losses. The approval comes as the Treasury is reviewing all of power utility Eskom’s coal and diesel contracts.”

There is heightened public interest in the terms of this deal, for many reasons. What is of interest in this instance though is that the Competition Commission and Tribunal however chose to interest themselves only in the employment implications of the deal, following their mandate to consider the public interest as well as the competition implications of any deal of this magnitude. As the Appeal Court indicated in its precedent making judgment in 2011 on the Massmart-Walmart merger, the task of Competition Policy is to determine:

1. Whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition;
2. If the result of this inquiry is in the affirmative, whether technological,
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains will trump the initial
conclusion so reached in stage 1 together, with the further
consideration based on substantial public interest grounds, which in
turn, could justify permitting or refusing the merger; and
3. Notwithstanding the outcome of the enquiries in 1 or 2, the
determination of whether the merger can or cannot be justified on
substantial public interest grounds.
The legislature sets out specific public interest grounds in s 12 A (3):
“(3) When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on
public interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the
Competition Tribunal must consider the effect that the merger will
have on –
(a) a particular industrial sector or region;
(b) employment;
(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive;
and
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international
markets.”
Clause 3d, “the ability of national industries to compete in international markets”, as well as clause 3b “employment” might well have also have been used to examine the contract. Clearly the competitive terms on which Eskom sources its coal will affect its costs and the prices it will ask the regulator to approve. The ability of all SA industry to compete effectively depends on the price and availability of electricity.

That the Treasury is apparently also investigating this Eskom contract, among other Eskom contracts, might be a reason for the competition authorities to have ignored this public interest in the terms of the contract. Be that as it may be, the Competition Commission’s determination of the mandated public interest as in 12a clause 3 of the Act, in employment retention, following that of the Competition Appeal Court judgment in the case of the Walmart Merger, and further pursued in the Tegeta case, needs to be seriously examined.

The case of the entry of WalMart to the SA economy. The welcome mat was not laid out.

An important case for competition law in SA, resolved in 2011 on Appeal to the Competition Appeal Court headed by Judge Dennis Davis, involved the purchase of a majority stake in a local JSE-listed retailer and wholesaler, Massmart, by the largest retailer in the world, Walmart. Approval of the deal was given by the Competition Tribunal because it was “common cause” – to quote the Judgment of the Competition Appeal Court, on the Tribunal – “that there was no threat to competition”. Indeed it was so conceded by the counsel for the parties contesting the approval of the merger in Court, to quote a report on the proceedings: “Paul McNally, who submitted closing arguments on behalf of the union… said his clients accepted that there would be lower prices as a result of the acquisition, but that these would come at the expense of local jobs.” 1

Surely this common cause should have been sufficient to approve the merger and to extend a warm welcome to Wal-Mart, especially from SA consumers, who were bound to benefit from more competition for their spending power. Given the importance of foreign capital for the economy and its growth prospects, a warm welcome too might have been extended in recognition of the confidence that the world’s largest retailer was expressing in the SA economy. This friendly response to an important investor in the SA economy might well have encouraged more direct foreign investment that is very obviously in the broad public interest.

The Competition Tribunal however surrounded its approval of the deal with a number of onerous and complicated conditions. Such conditions were highly sympathetic to the arguments made by the trade unions interested in the merger, but costly to Walmart and therefore its ability to compete in the market place with other retailers and wholesalers.

The conditions required of the merged entity by the Tribunal included restrictions on retrenchments, preferences for previously retrenched workers when employment opportunities presented themselves and R100m to be invested in a programme to support local business, combined with a requirement to train local South African suppliers on how to do business with the merged entity and with Wal-Mart with the programme and its administration to be “advised by a committee established by it and on which representatives of trade unions, business including SMMEs, and the government will be invited to serve”.

However the merger was taken on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court by the concerned unions and Ministers of State who sought to have the merger disallowed on public interest grounds. The Appeal Court agreed to allow the merger but decided to largely support the Tribunal by surrounding the deal with the conditions as had been recommended by the Tribunal (somewhat modified) but clearly not to the advantage of Wal-Mart as a competitor.

This seems a very unhelpful and unlikely course to take for a body designed to promote competition. Mergers and acquisitions, friendly and especially hostile ones, are among the more important ways in which businesses realise economies of scale that allow them to become more efficient more profitable and by definition more competitive in the interest of its customers of whom they wish to win more over. Any synergies to be realised in a larger, combined entity almost inevitably involve retrenchments of staff. Indeed, the ability to avoid duplication of personnel and systems and to reduce operating costs and improve margins is often the prime motivation for any merger or acquisition.

A vibrant economy is one where, over time, workers and managers are continuously being allocated and reallocated to more efficient purposes. This requires that some firms will be reducing their complements of workers while others are increasing theirs and net employment gains are registered for a growing potential labour force. Without job losses, there would be far fewer job gains made possible. A system that made it very difficult to retrench workers is one that discourages hiring in the first place. It makes for a stagnant economy, with a feudal style labour market that treats jobs as an entitlement, not at all easily discarded and highly discouraging to job creation.

A flexible labour market, by contrast, gives firms a high degree of freedom to hire and fire and allows workers to freely choose their employers and move easily from one job to another. The favourable outcomes of such freedoms enjoyed over time can be observed in the US or UK, with a highly productive and well paid labour force and a significant rate of turnover of jobs.

The South African labour market, or at least the labour employed in the formal sector of the economy that provides the much prized, so-called “decent jobs”, is highly inflexible. Job retention, rather than job growth, has become the primary objective of labour market regulations and it would appear also competition policy. The prospect of an extended period of unemployment is an unhappily realistic one for many of those threatened with retrenchment.

This is a weakness of the labour market that policies for competition should be addressing, not reinforcing. The competition authorities, by their rulings on job retention, have made the economy less efficient and competitive than it could be. By setting these precedents, it also makes efficiency enhancing investments and acquisitions less likely and so the efficient use of capital and labour less likely.

There is a public interest in a more competitive and efficient market for goods and services and for labour. There is only a private interest in avoiding particular retrenchments. Competition policy misuses the public interest in employment. The public interest is in employment growth and a more productive labour force to which mergers and acquisitions can make a very important contribution.

1 http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-31-walmartmassmart-deal-approved-with-conditions

The Hard Number Index: Hope rests with the rand

The SA Business Cycle, a call on interest rates – which is a call on the rand. Here’s hoping for lower interest rates

The release of new vehicle sales and the note issue for February 2016 allows us to update our Hard Number Index (HNI) of the current state of the SA economy. The HNI has proved to be an accurate leading indicator of the Reserve Bank Business Cycle Indicator that is now only updated to November 2015.

The HNI for February is little changed from the January reading and indicates that the currently slow pace of economic activity is being maintained. See the figures below, where the HNI is compared to the Reserve Bank Business Cycle and extrapolated to February 2017. As may be seen below, the forecast is for but marginally higher levels of activity this time next year. The good news is perhaps that no obvious further deceleration in the pace of economic activity was recorded in February 2016.

New unit vehicle sales continued to decline slowly last month. The time series forecast is for sales to decline from the current annual rate of 607 000 units to an annual rate 582 540 new units sold into the SA market in February 2017, a decline of 6.8%. This would represent a modest cyclical decline when compared with past downturns in the vehicle cycle. This atypical, low amplitude new vehicle sales cycle will have had much to do with the current, comparatively low amplitude uptick in the interest rate cycle.

The other component of the HNI, the cash cycle, adjusted for inflation, has also turned lower, mainly the result of higher inflation. As may be seen in the chart below, current growth rates are of the order of 2% per annum and are forecast to remain at this rate, consistent with the GDP growth outlook.

The cash cycle possibly captures the influence of the informal economy. The vehicle cycle reflects the spending on capital goods, the cycle of firms and the household’s demands for consumer durables. This includes motor vehicles as well as washing machines, furniture, appliances etc that are financed with credit. Very few new vehicles are now exchanged for cash. Therefore market interest rates are possibly the largest influence on the cost of leasing (renting) a new motor vehicle.

The other important influences on the cost of ownership will be the value of any used vehicle traded in, or the residual value agreed to. The higher the residual value or the longer the repayment schedule, the lower will be the monthly rental payment. And the monthly payment may well be offset by the separately itemised charge for the motor plan. It is the highly negotiable gross monthly payment that will be the key influence on demands for new vehicles, rather than the theoretical list price, as is also the case with many other large ticket items bought by households.

Unfortunately it is this mostly theoretical vehicle list price that will rise with rand weakness and be reflected in the CPI and to which the Reserve Bank may react with still higher interest rates.

It would be a much more accurate measure, of the possibly less inflated monthly cost of owning a vehicle, were it reflected in the CPI by this leasing charge, rather than by new vehicle prices, as is the case with the CPI treatment of the cost of owning a home. This is correctly reflected in the CPI as an implicit rental charge to the owner occupier, rather than by house prices themselves. And so, the key influence on vehicle sales and house prices will be short term interest rates – though monthly payments may well be held back by more intense competition to make sales and issue motor plans.

For the sake of the motor manufacturers and dealers, and for the sake of the economy generally, the hope must be for lower, not higher interest rates. Such hopes rest with the behaviour of the rand, over which, it may be added, short term interest rates will have very little influence, judged by past performance.

The hope for lower interest rates in SA and a cyclical upswing rest with the exchange value of the rand. The rand will take its cue from the attraction of interest rates at the long end of the yield curve. Any improved flow into emerging markets will also attract funds into the RSA bond and equity market and strengthen the rand, as will any diminution of SA specific risks.

The risks of presidential intervention in fiscal policy have not dissipated, though they have declined compared from levels first reached with the dismissal of Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015. The risk premiums attached to RSA debt remain elevated accordingly. Furthermore, emerging market risks more generally have declined both absolutely and relatively to the SA CDS spread, as we show below. The gap between more risky emerging market debt and RSA debt has narrowed, even as both spreads have declined. The wider this spread gap, the better the SA rating. So it may be concluded that much of the recent improvement in RSA credit ratings is attributable to global, rather than SA, specific events.

The upside is that these SA risks are overstated and that President Jacob Zuma will prove them so by allowing Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan the essential freedom and authority to manage fiscal policy in the conventional way. If this happens, then the rand can strengthen further. This would help to put downward pressure on the inflation rate as well as on long term RSA interest rates. Less inflation and less inflation expected may well bring lower interest rates. The next cyclical recovery, including a recovery in the vehicle market, depends upon a stronger rand and the lower interest rates that will accompany rand strength.