Parsing the increase in the Repo- and questioning its wisdom

There was no good reason for the Reserve Bank to have surprised with a 50 basis point increase in its repo rate. There is in fact no good reason at all to subject the beleaguered SA economy to any further increases in interest rates. Given the bank’s own assessment of the state of the economy. To quote the statement of the Monetary Policy Committee of the 30th March. “Turning to inflation prospects, our current growth forecasts leaves the output gap around zero, implying little positive or negative pressures on inflation from expected growth”. The output gap is the estimated difference between potential growth in the economy (the supply side) and the growth in demand expected. The expectations for both growth in demand and supply are depressingly slow- no more than 1% p.a. over the next two years.. But clearly there are no demand side pressures on the price level.

The Bank’s forecasting model indicates that every 1 per cent shock to the repo rate will reduce GDP growth by 0.17% on an annual basis with the peak impact two or three quarters after the interest rate shock. While inflation is predicted to decline by 0.12% two years after the shock. While these are the estimated impact of higher or lower interest rates, other things equal, other things are very likely to change in highly unpredictable ways. For example exchange rates, or food prices or electricity tariffs or export prices- supply side shocks – over which the Reserve Bank has no control, nor any superior ability to predict. And which are as likely to move higher or lower over the forecast period and therefore should be ignored when setting interest rates. The strong focus of policy attention should be on the demand side of the economy- on the potential output gap over which the Bank does exercise influence. And without excess demand price increases cannot continue in an ever-higher direction- irrespective of recent inflation. Why the Bank would risk even slower growth by imposing still higher short term interest rates is hard to appreciate.

Since its January meeting the Bank, by no means alone, has been surprised by global inflation, by food prices, by rand weakness etc, enough to have taken recent headline inflation rates above what was predicted at earlier meetings. Though the longer term expected trend in headline inflation remains as it was – pointing distinctly lower below the targeted band. Incidentally the core inflation rate that excludes energy and food prices – large supply side shocks – has behaved almost exactly as expected. All further reason to have stood pat.

SA Headline Inflation. Actual and forecast by the Reserve Bank

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

SA Core Inflation. Actual and forecast by the Reserve Bank

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

There is perhaps more to the decision to raise interest rates than the usual focus on prices. The MPC statement and the Q&A session after the meeting cast unusual concern about the foreign financing needs of the SA economy. To quote the MPC statement again – “South Africa’s external financing needs are expected to rise. With a sharply lower export commodity price index, stable oil prices and somewhat weaker growth in export volumes, the current account balance is forecast to deteriorate to a deficit of 2.7% of GDP for the next three years. Weaker commodity prices and higher sate-owned enterprise financing needs will put pressure on financing conditions for rand-denominated bonds. Ten-year bond yields currently trade at about 11.2%, despite the expected moderation of inflation over the forecast period”

It therefore appears to me that higher interest rates to attract foreign capital interest rates may have played a decisive role in the MPC decision. The rand and the long end of the bond market did benefit from a wider interest rate spread in a modest way.  But such experiments in exchange rate management are surely not to be recommended, given all else that can happen to exchange rates.  I thought we have learned (expensively) to leave exchange rates and long-term interest rates to sort out balance of payments flows – and yet still to learn to set interest rates with the domestic economy front of mind.

RSA 10 year bond yields and the USDZAR – before and after the decision to raise the repo rate by 50 b.p.

SVB – the importance of understanding the drivers of market value

The demise of Silicone Valley Bank (SVB) the 15th largest US bank, with an important systemic role in the roll out of US Tech happened quickly. In less than 24 hours it was all over for shareholders as the regulators took over to prevent banking contagion. By offering insurance not only on the deposits of all denominations of SVB, but effectively on all deposits with US banks, should it be needed.

It was not a run on the banking system – depositors were not lining up to cash in their deposits- as they might have done in primitive times before. They were acting online, transferring their deposits as quickly as they could to their accounts with the banking behemoths JP Morgan, and their like.  As the venture capitalists and their many subsidiary companies did with their deposits with SVB,

It was clear what caused the panic withdrawal of deposits from SVB. It was a sudden loss in the share market value of SVB to which the depositors acted as they did. They may not have known what was going on but they took fright. It is the market value of a company and its capital raising potential that protects creditors and this protection had fallen away. For reasons that had everything to do with decisions taken by SVB itself on surely very poor advice, that investors in SVB had recognized as destroying the market value of SVB.

The problem for SVB and other banks was that the fixed interest rate yield on their essentially sound  assets had been  rising steadily, causing their values to decline, even as the interest rates paid on deposits were edging higher in response to Fed tightening. Accordingly, the net interest income earned by the banks and their earnings per share were in decline.  A trend clearly uncomfortable to earnings conscious and presumably earnings growth incentivized managers of SVB.  

The advice was to mark the portfolio to market values, and recognize the capital losses on the balance sheet. To raise additional share capital in the market to restore required capital to asset ratios and to invest the capital in higher yielding government and other securities. By so doing improving net interest income and the earnings outlook and the share price.

There was no regulatory compulsion to recognize the losses on their portfolio. The alternative was to have let the assets run off as they became due and to accept the consequent decline in earnings for the next three years or so and the possibly negative reactions of the capital market to a well understood and unavoidable economic reality. There would then have been no need to raise additional capital.

The capital market would surely have been capable of seeing beyond the decline in earnings and focused on the inherent quality of the SVB balance sheet and its potentially durable business model. The problem for SVB was that the capital market clearly did not think that the proposed plans for the balance sheet made good sense and that two billion dollars of extra capital required could be raised on reasonable terms.  Doubts that put pressure on the share price that undermined the possibility of raising the additional capital.

The protection in the form of market value for depositors and shareholders in SVB and beyond fell away dramatically and the bank went down. All because of a false belief in managing earnings per share and the failure to recognize how companies are properly appreciated and valued on the share market. Concerns that extend well beyond the short-term prospects for accounting earnings. Adjusting wisely to Covid 19 and its aftermaths has proved difficult enough for the great growth companies with the strong balance sheets. It is even more difficult for banks, with high degrees of leverage, to wisely adjust their balance sheets in such unpredictable circumstances. SVB clearly failed to do so.

The misery of national debt

Published Business Day March 10th 2023

Makawber’s principles apply to National as well as household budgets. Expenditure less than revenue equals happiness. Expenditure that consistently exceeds income brings misery. Iin the form of ever rising and more expensive levels of debt, the service of which takes an ever-larger share of the revenue collected and of all expenditure.  Paying interest and repaying capital maintains your credit rating -more or less-  it does not buy votes.

South Africa has been on this spendthrift path, without pause, ever since the Global Financial Crisis. Since fiscal year 2008-09 to date real government expenditure has grown by an average 3.2% p.a. Government revenues have lagged, growing by an average 2% p.a. after inflation. This extra 1.2% of spending makes a large difference to debt levels over time. Real GDP has grown by an immiserating 1.2% p.a. average since 2009.

Government debt net of cash was a manageable R483.2b in 2007/8 and equivalent to 20% of GDP. The net debt this past financial year is nearly ten times higher at R4483b and equivalent to over 67% of GDP. Servicing this debt took 8.8% of all government revenue in 2008-09. This share of revenue grew consistently to 18.8% in Covid year 2021 as revenues collapsed with the lockdowns. This depressing ratio fell back to 17.1% in 2021/22 as the inflationary comeback from Covid brought hundreds of billions of extra unexpected taxes from SA mining companies. A mixed blessing as these companies remained reluctant to invest more in SA and so paid more tax.

Not only did the volume of debt incurred rise, but interest rates both paid by the government and by private borrowers also rose well ahead of inflation to compensate investors in SA government and private debt for the dangerous trajectory of our debt. Such trends could easily be extrapolated into a debt crisis and be expected to do so. That if not corrected could lead to a desperate eventual resort to the central bank as a lender of last resort and its money printing press. That is to a default by inflating away the real value of the debts incurred. A not uncommon event in monetary history of the world.

The 2023-04 Budget has made an essential, praiseworthy attempt to reverse the direction of spending and revenue. Over the next three years all government spending is planned to grow by 8.5%, and more slowly than government revenue which is expected to increase by 10.4%. The extra borrowing, the fiscal deficit would then decline from the current 4.2% of GDP to 3.2% by 2025/06 despite very modest expected growth in GDP. If the plans materialize, the debt to GDP ratio will stabilize in the low 70% range and the debt service ratio will be contained below 20% of all revenues. A path to fiscal sustainability has been opened.

The issue of how well or badly the government spends the money collected or borrowed and then allocated across the spending departments and state sponsored enterprises, and how onerous is the tax regime, clearly influence economic growth. Fiscal responsibility of the kind, hopefully to be demonstrated, almost balancing the books, is vitally necessary for economic stability but is not sufficient to the purpose of faster economic growth. It is the larger task for government to get value for taxpayers income it extracts.

The economic dust seldom settles in South Africa. The Budget was soon overtaken by De Ruyter’s last stand. Yet judged by the muted reactions in the financial markets the Budget did little to change what we pay to raise capital, public and private. RSA 5 year bonds still yield well over 9% p.a. or a very expensive real 5% p.a. after expected inflation of 5.5% p.a. Judged by the difference between RSA and USA Bonds, the rand is still expected to weaken – by a punishing 5% p.a. over the next five years and about 7% a year on average over the next 10 years.  SA dollar denominated, 5 year debt, now yields 6.56% p.a. representing a default risk premium of 2.3% p.a. and more than double investors in Mexican debt pay for the same insurance. Clearly the market and the economy need much more convincing that we have permanently changed our ways.

Measures of SA Risk; Daily Data 2022- 2023.

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

Should auld acquaintance be forgot,
and auld lang syne?

Nostalgia has its comforts. But looking ahead rather than behind
may be the better New Year resolution. Especially for those with
the responsibility for directing a business enterprise. It is best for
them to move on from the inevitable mistakes they have made in
business or in life. To not throw good money after bad to avoid
embarrassment. Not to not sell off the best divisions to sustain the
underperformers with capital they should better be starved of.
Do as Woolworths did with David Jones – but do it much faster.
And change the seriously erring CEO and the Board members
who supported them sooner rather than later. Furthermore, do not
encumber the strong operating managers with the capital that was
once wasted overpaying for acquisitions. The poor deals and the
waste of shareholders capital were not their mistakes.
Yet they may be doing very well operating the plant and
equipment handed to them and need recognition and
encouragement accordingly. Therefore, the firm should
accurately estimate the current market value of the plant and
equipment they are held responsible for. And reward them when
they achieve returns on this capital that exceeds required returns,
the opportunity cost of the capital employed. The investors who
value the business will, as managers should, look forward and
estimate expected returns based on current market values – and
will add or subtract based on expected not past performance.
The future is for every business and every individual to prepare
for. The technology for dramatically improving the productivity of

capital is available for you and your competitors. If only you or
they knew better how to serve your key stakeholder, the
customer, they will attempt to do so expecting to add market
value for their owners. The future will be theirs that succeed.
Frustrated South African customers of the state-owned
enterprises know that they operate to serve other stakeholders,
not their customers. Other KPI’s are much more important. Most
obviously to serve the interest of their employees or suppliers
without regard for the bottom line. What will the future bring for
this operating model that so clearly fails to deliver to customers?
The obvious solution is to introduce incentives for them based on
the same return on capital criteria that makes private business so
customer friendly. Is this politically possible?
The pace of technology may well be accelerating and its
outcomes ever more uncertain. And a source of ever greater
anxiety to the bosses and their teams. Ours seems a less happy
era. Maybe technology is to blame. Yet there is also a business
imperative to apply technology, 1 to improve the resilience and
reduce the dissonance of the workforce, so enhancing
productivity and competitiveness.
The evidence from working from home, made possible by
improved technology, is very suggestive about what the future of
work may hold. It suggests that the future will be one of fewer
hours worked, including fewer (highly unproductive) hours getting
to and from the workplace. Fewer hours worked because
improved technology enables more output produced and
therefore more income per (fewer) hours worked required to
satisfy the necessities of life and more time to play or bring up the
children. If collaboration at the work-place is valuable – because it

makes the firm more innovative and competitive – the
representative firm may therefore have to pay more, as well as
give more time off, to get key workers to come to the office. And
for those who much prefer to work from home and are therefore
less productive, may well accept lower hourly rewards to do so.
The challenge for all will be to find meaning in life. A strong sense
of vocation, of finding purpose and satisfaction in work for its own
sake, as well as for what it may buy, including time-off will remain
as helpful as ever.

The elusive notion of risk

Risk is an elusive concept to pin down and for investors to grapple with in practical,
measurable terms.


Investors who take a position on the stock market understand clearly what it means when they’re told their investment has produced a particular return over a particular period.

Most will also tell you they understand the notion of investment risk as an uncertainty of outcome; in particular, the higher the risk one is exposed to, the higher the chance that one loses one’s money. However, it is also accepted that in order to obtain good returns, one needs to take on extra risk. Then, in hindsight, risk is often used to explain why the realised return on an investment is high, on the one hand, or sometimes disastrously low on the other.


Underlying these perceptions of risk is the fundamental market tenet that one must expect to get rewarded for taking a position on an uncertain future. Therefore, markets must “price” risk into a share price, so that the higher the perceived risk of that investment, the higher the required future return on the investment. The problem is that neither this market-determined required return nor the associated risk is objectively measurable.


Still, plenty of people have tried. Quantitative financial analysts and the pioneering work of Nobel prize-winning economist Harry Markowitz use a statistical measure known as standard deviation (of return) as a proxy for risk. Typically, researchers in financial analysis will calculate an estimate of this standard deviation by using past values of share price returns.


In other words, to calculate the risk of a quoted company they would first compute the daily (or weekly) return of the share price over a certain period, and then compute the standard deviation of those returns. This measure, often termed volatility, is then taken as a measure of company risk. We will discuss below the flaws in this approach to measuring risk, but first consider some examples of situations where risk is much more precisely measurable.


In the game of roulette, played in casinos and assuming, of course, an unbiased wheel, we have constant probabilities of the ball landing on any of 36 numbers and zero at each spin of the wheel. It will be easily accepted that the risk involved in a bet on, say, red is much less than the risk of betting on the number 8-black, and one is rewarded accordingly.


If a red number comes up and you’ve bet R1 on red, you get R2 back. If you bet R1 on black and it comes up, you get R36 back.


Because the probabilities are fixed at each spin of the wheel, you could precisely
calculate the expected return of your bet and the associated standard deviation of that return, which proxies for risk.

When one plays a game with fixed probabilities, one always knows precisely what one’s expected return is. But in financial markets, event probabilities are not known precisely and change over time.


The key point is that when one plays a game with fixed and known probabilities, and
places a particular bet in that game, one always knows precisely what one’s expected
return is, and also the risk one is exposed to.


But in financial markets, event probabilities are not known precisely and, in fact, change continuously over time. What’s more, there is no possible repetition within an economic system as there is in roulette; the clock cannot be put back, and no process can ever be repeated in exactly the same way.


However, in the case of measuring risk and return in financial markets, we can make some headway in certain circumstances.

For example, assuming the SA government does not default on its contractual payment obligation, one can calculate the exact realised return on an RSA government bond held to maturity.


This required return must reflect the chance of a country default (if there is a default, the return is zero). Apart from its local rand borrowing, the SA government also borrows money on foreign markets denominated in dollars. These SA “Yankee bonds” are traded in New York, along with similar dollar-denominated bonds from other countries.


The required premium of the return (the spread) over and above the return an investor obtains on US government bonds of similar tenure is termed the sovereign risk. It is a measure of the probability of the bonds being paid out, according to contract, in dollars.


One can then calculate the spreads for the different countries which have issued dollar bonds. So, in this case, one can quite precisely compare the market’s perceived risk of default for different countries in paying these dollar-denominated bonds, and compare sovereign risk across different countries.

In the share market, there is no similarly definitive way to obtain the expected return or the risk of any company share on the basis of share market prices. Market analysts often use proxies for comparative value (and hence comparative risk) such as p:es and various measures of yield, such as dividend yield or earnings yield. The underlying principle is that a high-risk company should be reflected in a comparatively low market price, given the current earnings or the dividend payout.

Quantitative portfolio analysts are, however, given the even more challenging task of
combining different shares and instruments into a portfolio of assets expected to yield some overall return for some, often pre-mandated, risk.


They are thus faced with the problem of estimating portfolio (or share) risk in order to construct portfolios that fall within their given risk mandate. Given this problem, analysts almost always opt for using the estimated standard deviation of historical share price returns as a measure of volatility, which are then used as a proxy for risk.


There are plenty of problems associated with using past market data to measure risk or return But there are plenty of problems associated with using past market data to measure risk or return; the underlying issue is that markets are assumed to be efficient. This means the share price at any time can be assumed to reflect known information about the underlying company, but that price will continuously change as new information flows into the market.

Given that this new information is, by definition, unexpected and hence not predictable in any way, the resulting movement in share prices is, in turn, unpredictable. Therefore, past returns can give no indication of what future returns might be.

Risk, in contrast, may have some momentum in that a dramatic event, such as 9/11, will generally give rise to an extended period of return volatility, as markets grapple to understand and price in the impact of the event on share values.

However, though we may be able to anticipate volatility in the short term, the ability to do so over time is confounded by the statistical requirement of parameter stationarity.

In other words, if one wants to estimate a parameter using observations of that parameter over time, the parameter one is measuring cannot itself change over that period.


It’s a bit like locating a target when it’s moving, but your locating method must assume that the target is stationary. In the case of share price (or portfolio) volatility, this is an untenable assumption.

The conclusion is that any attempt to measure risk is problematic, especially in the
context of listed companies.


However, there is little acknowledgment of this fact by analysts. Analysts require
estimates of risk as a key input into almost any comparative share valuation or portfolio recommendation, but carefully avoid any interrogation of the validity of their estimates of risk. Individual investors may believe they understand risk, but their perceptions are often governed by whatever return they receive.

So: risk is an elusive concept to pin down and for investors to grapple with in practical, measurable terms. Fortunately, investors can usually take comfort in the one clear truth offered up by financial analysis. This is that the only sensible investment strategy is to carefully diversify one’s portfolio across as many asset classes as possible.


Then, assuming the world continues to advance technologically in the same innovative and productive ways it has in the past, irrespective of what unexpected challenges may arise, one’s investment will yield attractive returns over a long period.

Barr is emeritus professor of statistical sciences at the University of Cape Town (UCT);

Kantor chairs the Investec Wealth & Investment Research Institute and is emeritus
professor of economics at UCT

The dark side of the improved balance of payments

Brian Kantor

28th September 2022

The Covid lockdowns has quite dramatically altered the relationships between the South African economy and its global trading and financial partners. What followed Covid was a dramatic improvement in the balance of exports and imports. After 2020 exports, helped by higher prices, grew significantly faster than imports to take the balance of trade to a mammoth, nearly 10% of GDP by Q2 2021. As export prices have fallen off more recently the trade surplus has declined to a still impressive 4.8% of GDP in Q2 2022.

The difference between exports and imports is also the difference between GDP- output or equivalently incomes – earned producing that output – and Gross Domestic Expenditure –mostly on consumption by households and  partially on capital goods by firms – that can be funded with loans to supplement current incomes. The trade balance – when positive -represents an excess of local supply over local demands- a contributor to global supply chains- rather than a drawer or absorber of them.  The SA economy has thus helped dampen global inflation.

The closely watched current account of the balance of payments adds foreign mostly investment income to the trade balance. South African borrowers and capital raisers pay out interest and dividends at  higher rates and yields than they typically receive from their foreign investments. Even though South African’s foreign assets roughly match their foreign liabilities (thanks to Naspers and its Ten Cent investment) This force usually turns trade surpluses into current account deficits – being the sum of the trade balance and the net foreign income accounts.   

By definition of the balance of payments accounting system the current account deficits (or surpluses) are equal to foreign capital inflows or outflows. Instead of drawing on global capital markets to fund its capital expenditure budgets South African savers- almost all realized by its corporations to offset very marginal surpluses of the household sector and public sector deficits, became a significant source of savings for world capital markets. Instead of drawing on global capital markets to fund capital expenditure budgets we became a significant source of savings for world capital markets- some 300 billion rands worth since Covid. The current account is now in rough balance.

The trade balance, the current account and net foreign income. South African Balance of Payments Statistics. Quarterly Data

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Rather a lender than a borrower is conventionally good news for balance sheets and credit ratings- – provided all else remains the same.  Ideally raising capital even debt – to spend on capital goods with long productive lives that earn above the cost of debt- is good for any company or government and all its dependents. It means faster growth- and faster growth is the key to attract capital – especially equity capital – on favourable risk adjusted terms. Though the influence of removing one of the SA deficits, the capital account deficit – and improving the fiscal deficit, also with the help of the exporters, has not been conspicuous in the market for rands. The exchange rate of the ZAR with the USD, as for all other currencies, is being dominated  by the dollar and the actions of the US Fed.

There is a dark side to South Africa’s lesser dependence on foreign capital. The reason the SA trade balance has improved as much as it has is because the rate at which South African’s have saved since Covid disrupted incomes and output has held up much better than the rate at which the economy has added to its capital stock. The ratio of Capital Expenditure to GDP has very worryingly continued to decline – from the 20% of GDP range before 2016 to the current 14% of GDP rate. The savings rate appears to have stabilized at the 14% rate.

These capital expenditure trends portend very poorly for the economy. They imply persistently slow growth that will continue to threaten the ability of the SA government to raise revenues to fund its ambitious welfare programmes. Slow growth adds to the risk of investing in SA and the cost of raising capital from all sources domestic and foreign. It means less capital expenditure and slower growth. Ideally South Africa should be raising its capital expenditure rate and funding more of it by attracting foreign capital on favourable terms, growing faster by reducing the risk premium with appropriate actions. Current account deficits and capital inflows to fund growth would then be very welcome.

The trade balance and the difference between savings and capital expenditure. Quarterly Data

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Savings and Capital Expenditure. Ratio to GDP. Quarterly Data

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

How to improve the outlook for the rand

The rand has consistently declined by more than its purchasing power parity equivalent rate against leading currencies over the years. Strong action is needed to change this.

South Africans travelling abroad should not blame the rand for their lack of purchasing power, at least not lately. In mid-January 2016, a US dollar exchanged for R16.80, a British pound then cost R24. Observers of the gyrations of the foreign exchange value of the rand should know that its exchange rate has had very little to do with the differences in inflation between SA and its trading partners. The rand has consistently bought less abroad than it has at home.

The exchange value of the rand with the US dollar or sterling has been weaker than its purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalent rate of exchange ever since 1995, when SA’s capital market was opened up, though with varying degrees of weakness. Had the rand simply followed the ratio of the SA consumer price index (CPI) to the US CPI since 1995 a dollar would now cost a mere R8. Similarly, since 1995 the difference between SA and UK inflation has been an average of 3.3% a year while the pound on average has cost an average 8.2% extra a year in rands since 1995.

Rand exchange rates against the US dollar (1995-2022)

Rand exchange rates against the US dollar chart

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 17/08/2022
 

Yet not only has the rand depreciated by more than the differences in inflation over the past 27 years, it is also expected to carry on weakening by more than the expected differences in inflation. The rand is expected to lose its dollar value by an average rate of 7.6% a year over the next 10 years and at an average 6% rate a year over the next five years. This is known as the interest carry: the current differences between the market established rand yields on an RSA bond and the dollar yields on the US Treasury bonds of the same duration. While helpful to exporters and import replacers competing in the home and foreign markets (and to incoming tourists) this expectation of further consistent rand weakness has a damaging downside. It raises the cost of funding rand-denominated debt, increasing the required return on securities. Expected rand weakness sharply reduces the expected return from the RSA (government) 10-year bond to under 3% a year (10.4% nominal yield less 7.6%). This is less than the same return in US dollars offered by a US Treasury.

The expected rate of inflation can be accurately estimated or implied in the same bond markets. It can be measured as the difference between a vanilla government bond and an inflation-protected alternative of the same duration. The compensation to investors in the US accepting inflation risk is an extra 2.65% a year for a five-year bond and 5.91% a year extra for rand investors in RSA bonds. This difference in expected inflation of 3.2% a year is significantly less than the 6% rate at which the rand is expected to weaken against the dollar over the same five years. PPP does not only not hold, but it is not expected to hold in the future. Sadly therefore, even reducing expectations of inflation may not much improve the outlook for the rand – a major issue if the cost of raising foreign or domestic capital is to be reduced.

Inflation compensation in SA and US 10-year bond markets and differences in expected inflation

Inflation compensation in SA and US 10-year bond markets and differences in expected inflation chart

Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment, 17/08/2022


The interest carry (difference in nominal yields) and the difference in inflation expected (2010-2022)

The interest carry (difference in nominal yields) and the difference in inflation expected chart

Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment, 17/08/2022
 

The full explanation for the exchange value of the rand is thus not to be found in the PPP rate but much more in the varying flows of capital into or out of emerging markets generally and to or away from the dollar. SA-specific risks move the ratio of the rand to other emerging market currencies about this long-term one-to-one ratio. Both the rand and the other emerging market currencies respond similarly to the same degrees of global risk tolerances that drives the US dollar stronger or weaker.

The task for SA lies in promoting capex (and so economic growth) by improving the outlook for the rand. It could do so by adopting policies that would make SA a superior emerging market attracting a much lower risk premium. SA’s recent impressive successes in the competitive businesses of international rugby and cricket, provide the case study to be emulated widely.

The exchange value of the rand vs other emerging market currencies (1996-2022)
(Higher numbers indicate rand weakness)

The exchange value of the rand vs other emerging market currencies chart

Source: Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment, 17/08/2022

Reduce risk – improve growth – follow SA rugby

South Africans travelling abroad should not blame the rand for their lack of purchasing power- at least not lately. In mid-January 2016, a USD exchanged for 16.8 rands, the pound then cost R24. Observers of the gyrations of the foreign exchange value of the ZAR should know that the ZAR rate has had very little to do with differences in inflation between SA and its trading partners. The rand has consistently bought  less abroad than at home.

The exchange value of the ZAR with the US dollar or UK pound has been weaker than its purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalent rate of exchange ever since 1995 when the capital market was opened up. Though with varying degrees of weakness. Had the rand simply followed the ratio of the SA CPI to the US or UK CPI since 1995 a USD would now cost a mere R8. Since 1995 the difference between SA and UK inflation has been an average 3.3% p.a. while the pound on average has cost an average 8.2% p.a. extra in rands since 1995.   

Exchange rates with the US dollar. 1995-2022. Monthly Data

Source; Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, Bloomberg  and Investec Wealth and Investment

Yet it is not merely that the ZAR has depreciated by more than differences in inflation – it is expected to continue to weaken by more than the expected differences in inflation. The rand is expected to lose its dollar value by an average rate of 7.6% p.a. over the next 10 years and at an average 6% p.a. rate over the next five years. Known as the interest carry – these are the current differences between the market established rand yields on an RSA bond and the dollar yields on the US Treasury bonds of the same duration. While helpful to exporters and import replacers competing in the home and foreign markets – and to incoming tourists – this expectation of further consistent rand weakness has a damaging downside. It raises the cost of funding rand denominated debt, increasing the required return on securities that are expected to lose their dollar value at a rapid rate. Expected rand weakness sharply reduces the expected return from the RSA 10 year bond to under 3% p.a. (10.4 nominal yield less 7.6) Less than the same return in USD offered by a US Treasury.

The expected rate of inflation can be accurately estimated or implied in the same bond markets. It can be measured as the difference between a vanilla government bond and an inflation protected alternative of the same duration. The compensation to investors in the US accepting inflation risk is an extra 2.65% p.a. for a five-year bond and 5.91% p.a. extra for rand investors in RSA’s. This difference in inflation expected of 3.2% p.a. is significantly less than the 6% rate at which the USD/ZAR is expected to weaken over the same five years. PPP does not only not hold- it is not expected to hold in the future. Sadly therefore even reducing inflation expected may not much improve the outlook for the ZAR- essential if the cost of raising foreign or domestic capital is to be reduced.

Inflation compensation in SA and US bond markets and differences in inflation expected

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

The interest carry (difference in nominal yields) and the difference in inflation expected. Daily data- 2010-2022.

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

The full explanation for the exchange value of the ZAR is to be found not in PPP but much more in the varying flows of capital into or out of emerging markets generally and to or away from the dollar. SA specific risks move the ratio ZAR/EM about this long term one to one ratio. Both the ZAR and the other EM currencies respond very similarly to the same degrees of global risk tolerances that drives the USD stronger or weaker.

The task for South Africa hoping to promote capex and so economic growth by improving the outlook for the ZAR. It could do so by adopting policies that would make SA  a superior emerging market attracting a much lower risk premium. SA’s impressive success in the highly competitive business of international rugby, provides the case study – to be emulated widely.

The exchange value of the ZAR compared to other EM currencies. Higher numbers indicate rand weakness. Daily Data 1995-2022

Source; Bloomberg , Investec Wealth and Investment

The best companies to work for are those that perform best

Ask not what you can do for the boss. Ask what your boss can do for you

An earlier study of the returns from investing in the best companies (BCs) to work for, as revealed by their employees, has been replicated with very similar results – as reported in the recent Financial Analysts Journal. An index of US companies that best satisfy their employees, would have provided market beating returns over an extended period to 2020, on average a meaningful extra 2-3% p.a. over the long run. Incidentally a similar methodology applied to selected groups of companies with very good ESG qualifications revealed slightly inferior returns. It is understandable why investors might have paid up for companies to feel better about themselves. Less obvious is why investors have so conspicuously spurned the advantages of investing in companies that are so well appreciated by their employees.

A different relationship between the causes and effects of companies that best satisfy their employees may explain the observed outcomes. It is the economic and financial performance of the best companies surveyed that perhaps explains their superior status with employees more than the other way round. The better the economic performance of a company, the better the company will be able and willing to look after their managers and workers and win their trust.

The same many hours devoted with the same energy and skills to a struggling business, are very likely to provide very inferior rewards over a lifetime of work. Promotion and training opportunities will be more limited. Initiatives to encourage self-improvement of the workforce will be unaffordable and the job itself will be much less secure. Bonuses and share option schemes that come with success and that make climbing the slippery corporate ladders so attractive will be largely absent.

It turns out that the best companies to work for are also unusually successful when measured by the other criteria for performance. To quote the study, “Overall, the main takeaway from these statistics is that BCs are rarely tiny-cap stocks, they are typically large, and a few are extremely large companies…… , we also see that, on average, BCs have relatively high market-to-book ratios of 12.44 and gross-profit-to-total-assets ratios of 38%, and that BCs spend relatively little on capital expenditures (4% of revenue) and have relatively large amounts of intangibles in their balance sheet (22% of total assets)….. BCs are large companies, with an average (median) market capitalization of $55bn. This shows that BCs tend to be large companies and the size distribution is skewed to the right….”

Most large companies were small to begin with and size is a measure of their success- able to sustain better still to improve their returns on additional capital employed. Such achievements characterize the true growth companies well worth being an early investor or employee in. The ideal business to invest in or work for would be a start-up that grows rapidly and becomes large and consistently successful on all dimensions. Perhaps what the list of BC’s – that change significantly from year to year- about 20% enter and leave the lists annually – include a biased sample of surprisingly successful companies- revealed in part by their superior employment practice. The best run companies are priced for success and therefore returns realized may not beat the share market. The surprisingly improved companies will do so. Identifying surprising strength before other investors do is the holy grail of investors and indeed also of workers with choices to make.

The key success factor in any business are the capabilities of its senior managers and directors. The employed insiders are in a very good position to evaluate them. The transfer market can serve those with competitive and marketable skills as well as it does in football should they have reason to doubt their leaders. Moreover, as they do in football, they should not resent the high rewards received by the best executors, the true and rare superstars that create and preserve so much value for workers and shareholders and as important for their valued customers.

Inflation and or recession- that is the question

When will inflation in the US (9.1% in June) peak? My answer is about now. And the surveys of inflation and the state of the financial markets support this proposition. If month to month increases in the US CPI revert to something like the 20 year average, inflation in the US will be trending well below 7% by year end and fall back to 2% p.a. by late 2023. Bloomberg surveys conducted in July indicate in inflation in Europe- now over 8% p.a. to recede to 2% by year end. Inflation in SA, still to peak at over 7%, is expected decline to 5% by late 2023.

The supply side disruptions that ramped up oil, grains, shipping costs and metal prices (unfortunately for the South African economy) have abated. They are all well off their recent peaks. Industrial Commodity and Metal prices are 50% lower than their peak values of January 2022. These prices may remain at high levels, but they are no longer rising to force inflation higher.

Industrial Commodity Price Index. January 2022=100. Daily Data

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

Prices have their supply and demand causes as they have had in our post Covid, post Russian invasion world. They also have their intended effects. They have helped repress demand for goods, more than for services, in the developed world and South Africa. Inflation is properly defined as a continuous increase in the CPI. It takes more than essentially temporary supply side shocks for inflation to proceed at persistently higher levels. Inflation can only be sustained with continued stimulation of demand. Without additional demand, the higher prices perhaps planned in advance by suppliers with price setting powers, cannot be sustained. Without support from the demand side of the economy, from further injections of demand, stimulated by central banks and governments, the market-place will not t absorb higher prices.  In the absence of supportive demand, prices will, perhaps only gradually, adjust lower in response to help sustain sales revenues and bottom lines.

Prices are not what firms would like them to be, higher usually, but are conditioned by what their customers will bear. Expecting more inflation and setting higher prices accordingly regardless of the stae of demand cannot be a self-fulfilling prophecy.  It is not consistent with economic rationality. The clear evidence from the recent surveys and the bond markets is that economic actors are not naively extrapolating recent inflation into the distant future. They are wisely seeing beyond current inflation to the longer-term demand and supply forces that will act on prices- including the role expected to be played by fiscal and monetary policy. As with the surveys, inflation expected, as priced in the market for US Treasury Bonds, so called break-even rates, have receded in the past week-despite higher realized inflation.

The US bond market expects inflation to average 2.1% p.a.  over the next five years and 2.3% p.a. over the next ten years- very close to the 2% p.a. Fed target for inflation. The SA bond market is now offering still higher rewards for bearing inflation risk- despite the inflation-fighting zeal of our Reserve Bank. The money and bond markets in the US are priced for a reversal of the direction of interest rates next year, with the peak in short rates having been brought sharply forward to January 2023 at 3.25%. The SA money market predicts much higher interest rates for a much more extended period. One hopes wrongly given the absence of demand side pressures on prices and the state of the economy.

Inflation expectations revealed in the Treasury and RSA bond markets. Daily data.

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

The best reason to expect inflation to subside in the US, Europe and South Africa is that the demands for goods and many services are already well depressed, thanks to higher prices. Spending is no longer being supported by additional income subsidies or by rapid growth in the money supply and bank credit. The money supply in the US (M2) has ground to a halt. The essential question is still to be answered. Is the US and Europe heading for recession aided and abetted by central banks intent on raising interest rates too aggressively and indeed unnecessarily fighting the last war? Central banks should know better than to lead their economies into recession while inflation is moving in the right direction and their economies head in the wrong direction.

Working from home (WFH) will work out well

A growing number of employers have insisted that their employees must come back to their work- places. Elon Musk, has demanded that Tesla or Space Ex staff spend at least 40 hours in their offices and that those who do not want to do so “…. Should pretend to work somewhere else…” He also wrote “Tesla has and will create and actually manufacture the most exciting and meaningful products of any company on Earth, this will not happen by phoning it in.”  Many other firms, feel the same disillusionment.

WFH is an option – not a compulsion. But an option modern technology has now made possible in ways that were not possible before. Homework was hardly unknown before.  Writers, composers and artists as well as weavers and sewers, home bakers, worked from home long before the gig-workers who congregate at the internet café. You may you noticed how the coffee mavens all look up from their laptops to appraise the new arrivals? Seeking company no doubt that they could find at the water cooler.

Being able to measure accurately the relationship between how they reward their employees and how much they contribute to the output and profits of the firm is an essential responsibility of any business. It could not hope to survive without accurate calculations of the costs and benefits of alternative working arrangements. And the firms faced with WFH preferences have been learning by doing as they always do.

It can be assumed with great confidence that the great majority of employees will be paid no more or less than the value they will be expected to add for their employer – be it from the office or home. Furthermore, as clearly, nobody will be rewarded for the time they spend commuting. It is paid for in  income or leisure sacrificed by the commuter. Recent evidence that the revealed willingness to go back to the office in the US is inversely related to the time spent commuting is no surprise. The lucky winners from the enforced lockdowns have been those who to live far from the office – that they chose to do for – their own good reasons – pre the lockdowns.

Employers are not the only party with the right to choose where best to work. Workers will make their own choices. The ratio of job openings to work seekers in the US has never been higher and the opportunity to work from home has not been greater this century.  

The Tesla office worker who has remained in California, even though the Tesla office is now in Texas, may well tell Elon what to do with his job. They may even accept a lower salary to WFH – the cost of the commute is their bargaining chip. As is the saved rental and all other not at all insignificant costs of supplying an office desk that may improve their case to WFH. They may even be able to do two jobs from home- as many do- given the time freed up and the absence of supervision or whistle blowers. Elon and other collaboration mindful employers may have to offer a premium to get the preferred workers to the office- if they are more productive there.

The individual households who choose where and how they live will help determine how the world of work will look in ten years or more. The developers of offices and homes and retail space will respond rationally to the choices and ongoing experiments of all those who hire and supply labour of all kinds- billions of decisions will prove decisive. The world of work and production evolves continuously, usually in an imperceptible way, to the signals provided from the market for labour. There is no design – just efficient outcomes. Employers no longer requiring office workers to attend on Saturdays, or offering extended annual holidays, are not providing charity but are making a considered response to market forces- necessary to attract workers of the right kind and at the right price.  They will continue to respond accordingly.

The responses to the opportunity to work from home that technology has made possible- and made the lockdowns possible – will evolve sensibly and rationally. Provided freedom to choose is respected as the essential ingredient for a successful, highly adaptive economy.

Will a long-term bet on the stock market always be a sure bet?

Global stock markets have done well for investors over the years. We look at what will be required for them to continue to do so.

The compounding growth of the West is powered by business enterprises and savers share in the wealth created.

The economic history of Western economies is an admirable one. Their standard of living has been transformed over the past 200 years by consistently positive year-by-year growth in output and in incomes per head, despite the rapid growth in population over the same period. And all of this was achieved despite the destruction of life and capital, buildings and valuable infrastructure by periodic wars. The Russian war in Ukraine is an awful reminder of how destructive war is. It will take many years of sacrificing consumption – of saving and productive investment in capital equipment and infrastructure – to make up for these losses.

Privately owned businesses are responsible for much of the growth in incomes earned, and in the extra goods and services supplied to the western economies over time. Their most decisive stakeholder is the consumer of this growing cornucopia of goods and services that they produce. Their owners earn a surplus after all contracted-for costs of production have been met and revenues have been collected. There is the risk of a loss, though a growing economy makes losses less likely. More efficient businesses will also compete on the prices for and quality of goods and services they provide their customers, at the possible expense of the revenue line. Improvements in the productivity of capital will be widely shared.

A stock exchange enables the ownership rights in larger businesses to be widely and conveniently shared and traded. It provides the average saver the opportunity to plug into these surpluses and the wealth-creating machine of immense force that is business enterprise, mostly via their pension and mutual funds. These widely dispersed owners have realised much more wealth creation than they would have done by investing their savings in the money market, bank deposits or in the bonds and bills issued by governments. And they would have done even better had they further postponed consumption and reinvested the dividend income they received, as well as conserving their capital gains by staying in the stock market.

The JSE, very much part of a global capital market, has provided comparably excellent returns over the many years of its existence and has repeated the performance this century.  As illustrated below, the average annual total returns with dividends reinvested from the JSE since 2000 have been nearly twice as high as the interest earned on cash and paid out: 13.5% annually vs 7.6% annually. The compounding effect has been so powerful because the returns on extra capital invested by privately owned businesses have been so positive. Economists therefore go further, given past performance. They regard these high expected returns over the long run, as part of the cost of capital employed. They add these higher expected returns to the returns that should be required of any company contemplating an investment decision. It is called the (expected) equity risk premium. If the proposed project cannot promise to leap over this higher hurdle of required returns on capital, the advice is not to go ahead.

JSE All Share Index, with or without reinvesting dividends, and money market returns (three-month Johannesburg Inter Bank Rate) (2000 = 100)

JSE All Share Index, with or without reinvesting dividends, and money market returns chart

Source: Iress, Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 9 May 2022

JSE All Share Index total returns vs cash (three-month Johannesburg Inter Bank Rate) 2000 to 2021

JSE All Share Index total returns vs cash chart

Source; Iress, Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 9 May 2022

It is not only returns that matter – so does risk. Human nature says (expected) return and estimates of risk are positively related.

So, the obvious conclusion would seem to be to invest in the stock market, since, based on past experience it can be expected to perform well in the long-term, even if there are some short-term blips. It is these short-term blips however that discourage investment in the share market. Between 2000 and 2021 the annual total return on the JSE was 13.5% a year and that provided by the money market was a much less 7.6% a year return on average. However judged by the movement about this average return, the JSE was nearly seven times as risky, as measured by the standard deviation about these returns (see figure above) – the risk that your shares may be worth much less in a few days or months, when you might be forced by circumstances to liquidate your wealth. This can be a major deterrent to share ownership.

The greater the risk aversion, the less comfort wealth owners and potential share owners have in the outlook for assets, the less time they wish to spend in the stock market, the less valuable businesses become. And the greater will be the risk premium earned by those willing and able to stay in the stock market. Bearing extra risk will likely bring extra returns because the entry price to the share market is reduced by the risk aversion of other potential investors. It has been true of the share market over the long run and market volatility, or risk, is likely to continue to negatively influence the long-term value of shares, so improving realised rates of return for those with an extended time in the market.

Albert Einstein famously described the power of compounding interest or returns as the “eighth wonder of the world,” saying, “He who understands it, earns it; he who doesn’t, pays for it.” This powerful force of low-digit exponential growth, of growth compounding on growth, year on year, is well demonstrated by the long-term ability of the major stock exchanges to grow wealth for shareholders in a consistent way over the same long run.

It is the return on owners’ capital that is the source of all interest income

But where do these good compounding share market returns come from? From businesses who are entrusted with much of the accumulated savings or wealth, described as capital employed in any market-led economy. The owners and managers of businesses are incentivised to husband scarce capital, as best they know how. The rate of return they realise on the capital employed, the productivity of that capital, is the foundation upon which all rewards from saving and owning capital or wealth is built. Firms experiment continuously in improving the return on the capital they utilise. They aim to improve the relationship between the cash value of the resources they invest in, called operating costs and what comes out as revenues, and they apply their fixed and working capital to the purpose. The results of such efforts are measured, hopefully in a consistent and comparative way, as return on capital employed inside the firm. The rewards for savers who supply the firms with capital to invest, come not only in the form of dividends paid, but in offers of interest payments that firms are able and willing to make to attract capital, in competition with other firms for the same potentially productive capital.

The less risky interest income offered by all other borrowers, the banks and the government, is therefore strongly influenced by the same return on capital realised by the business enterprise that employs a large proportion of the capital available. The banks, the money market funds, or the government as a borrower, would not offer the interest they do, unless the firms were able to earn a positive rate of return on all the capital they utilise and have to compete for. This includes competing for the overdrafts and mortgage loans provided by banks and other financial intermediaries.  The higher the expected real returns from all the capital employed in businesses, the more competition from firms for additional capital to invest, the larger will be the real rewards for all saving. Be it named interest or dividends or lease payments or capital gains depending on the financial arrangements agreed to between suppliers and raisers of capital.

The internal return on capital is what is converted into market value and market returns

It is the positive internal rates of return on capital realised by the business enterprise, not share market returns, that reveals the productivity of the capital it employs. The share market in turn translates expected internal returns on capital into current share market values. The market value of the firm should be understood as the present value of future operating or cash surpluses over operating costs, expected from the firm, discounted by the required returns expected from likely alternative investments.  The most valuable firms in the market-place – measured as the ratio of its current market valuation to current earnings or better current cash flows – are those firms that are expected to consistently improve their internal returns on capital and to add more capital by doing so. In other words, they are expected to consistently improve the productivity of capital they utilise and are able and willing to attract more capital, both loan and equity capital, to realise the growth opportunity, and to successfully hold the competition at bay that always threatens prices and operating margins.

The two measures of performance (the internal and market returns) are likely to be highly correlated over the long run. But such present value calculations made by the buyers and sellers of shares in companies are subject to considerable uncertainty from day to day and week to week or quarter to quarter. There is uncertainty about flows of revenue, operating costs and returns from alternative investments that determine the discount rate. There are more than enough unknowns to make estimating the future value of a firm or a market of them, a risky business. Risky returns help to direct savings to the lower return, less risky alternatives, for example to cash or cash like assets.

Knowledge (technology) improves the productivity of capital. Will it continue to do so, and will shareholders receive as valuable a share of the surplus generated?

The force that has driven the extraordinary and consistently unpredicted improvements in income and wealth and in the supply of goods and services delivered, is the success of technology and its application by the business organisation in sustaining and improving the (internal) return on capital, year by year and decade by decade. From railroads to electricity to the motor car, computers and the internet, technology has provided the opportunity to improve returns on capital and increase incomes and wealth, of which a large part is held in the form of shares of companies. A further explanation for consistently good returns to capital over time is perhaps that technology has consistently delivered more than most investors thought technology would deliver over the last two centuries. Stock markets have done so well because the productivity improvements from innovative technology have been at least what the market hoped they might deliver, and consistently delivered at least the productivity enhancements that it is expected to deliver, and typically considerably more. We have had few technology disappointments and technology has overwhelmingly surprised on the upside.

Will technology continue to consistently surprise on the upside in future and benefit the owners of the representative business enterprise and its customers and employees (and government treasuries) in the same way it has done over the last 200 years? There are some caveats.

Productivity has been dramatically driven by improving and ever cheaper computer power. Moore’s law, which predicts that computer power per dollar invested in a chip will increase at an exponential rate, has been shown to be approximately true for around 50 years. But such increases in the power of computer chips must necessarily face physical limitations because of the finite nature of matter.

Similarly, can one assume that the efficiency of food production will continue to improve at the rates it has in the past? The finite resources of planet earth may put a brake on the pace of technological improvement (unless we extend ourselves by settling the planets and beyond, and investing in knowledge itself may defeat the law of diminishing returns). Moreover, will humanity attach as much importance to increasing further our command over goods and services through productive capital expenditure as much as we have in the past and tolerate the share of output going to owners of capital as we have in the past? Capital and its application may be given a lower priority and if so, growth rates will subside.

Why the SA economy performs so exceptionally poorly. The meta explanation

That the SA economy has performed quite as poorly as it has in recent years is not easily explained. The rate of growth of less than 2% a year represents a very poor outcome, with alas little prospect of any lift off, according to the economic forecasters in and outside government. Yet there are more corrupt economies with much less of an endowment of capital and skills that grow faster.

Fixed capital formation and employment offered by private businesses is at best in a holding pattern – capital formation being maintained at levels first reached in 2008. Capital formation by the public sector is in sharp decline- necessarily so – given past performance. The unwillingness of SA business to invest in future output and income generation and in their workforces – describes slow growth – but does not explain its causes. Such reluctance needs to be understood and addressed if the outlook for the economy is to improve.

Fixed Capital Formation Constant 2015 Prices

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Total Real Fixed Capital Formation (2000=100)

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

We need look no further for a large part of the explanation of unusually slow growth than to the disastrous failures of the SA public sector.   South Africa relies heavily on the State as a producer of essential services, including electricity, water, transport, ports and education. More heavily than is wise or necessary. The inability of Eskom to meet depressed demands for electricity clearly sets limits to growth as do the failures of Transnet to run the railways and ports anything like competently.

These operational failures have meant very large amounts of wasted, taxpayer and consumer provided capital and opportunity. The relationship between what has been spent on the large new electricity generating stations Medupi and Kusile and what has come out as additional electricity is especially egregious and damaging. As much as 1.1 trillion rands was invested in electricity, water and gas between 2000 and 2021. Much of it in electricity generation. Shockingly, almost unbelievably, the real output of electricity etc. has declined by 20% since 2000.

Electricity, gas and water. Capital Formation;  Constant (2015) and Current Prices

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Electricity, gas and water. Capital Formation and Valued Added 2000- 2020. Constant 2015 Prices

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

The abject failures of other government agencies – of the provinces and in particular municipalities – to maintain the quality of the essential services they are tasked to provide, water, roads, sewage, building plans, education training and health care etc. has become ever more destructive of the opportunities open to business and households. Such failures are also reflected in the declining real value of the homes South Africans own –a large percentage of the wealth of the average household – which has made them less able and willing to demand additional goods and services from SA business.

Hopefully the economy will not stay on these destructive paths. Restructuring the ownership and incentive structures facing the public sector is an obvious and urgent requirement for faster growth- for more capital formation of the human and physical kind. As is reducing the reliance on the public sector to deliver the essentials.

But we need a meta explanation and understanding of why the public sector has failed South Africans so particularly badly to move forward.   The key political objective on which the public sector leaders were evaluated was clearly not the efficient use of resources, with quality of delivery related rewards, within sensibly constrained budgets. The Scandinavian model, if you like, did not apply. The primary objective set the new leaders of the public sector – and for which they were presumably judged and rewarded – was the transformation of the racial character of the public sector workforce. 

It is an economic truism that you get from people (managers and workers) what you pay them for. This key performance indicator, transformation, has been achieved with huge waste, financial and in foregone opportunities. Losses that were exaggerated by the opportunities the lack of attention to the costs of operations, and their value to consumers, offered for theft, fraud and the patronage of the incompetent.

The continued enthusiasm for demanding that the private sector to transform further and faster seems uninhibited by any comparison of the cost and benefits of forcing transformation. There is perhaps one consolation in all this- the private sector cannot ignore the bottom line in the way the public sector was able to do for so long.

Size of the firm does not matter. It’s fit for profitable purpose does.

Much notice is being given to the disruption of supply chains by lockdowns and by war in Ukraine. With hindsight, producing more of the essential components in-house or holding larger inventories to avoid relying on just-in -time delivery would have been a superior, that is less costly choice to have made. But very few firms are fully integrated. The steel mills are likely to outsource their sources of coking coal and the gold mines their sources of power -for obvious reasons- outsourcing is expected to be cheaper. A continuous comparison will be made of the expected costs of in or outsourcing all the different operations that lead to the final delivery of any product or service supplied. Such decisions help to determine the optimum size and scope of any enterprise. Less can well be more for shareholders.

All firms are defined by some mixture of in-house activity and goods and services contracted for. Even the accounting and human resource function may be outsourced to specialist service providers as easily as the company canteen. Decisions to outsource may hopefully mean a better focus on what are properly understood to be the essential ingredients for any thriving business. The objective should be to be realistic and prescient about how best to release the key competencies that make the firm competitive and are its essential reason for being and surviving. Strategic decisions to insource that make the firm larger and less specialised – or outsourcing to other firms- that makes it smaller and more specialised – cannot be outsourced.

Technological change alters the optimum size of any firm. That the decision to outsource the IT function to the computer cloud is seen as the right decision now, would not have been feasible twenty years ago. Then firms with heavy demands on data collection and processing would have had no choice but to invest in mainframes and tinker with legacy systems with large in-house IT departments. That may be very difficult to abandon. The operators in the cloud can reduce the danger of excess or deficient computing capacity by attracting a well-diversified customer base.  The market share gains of one customer can offset the losses of another competing with it, so adding to the predictability of the demand for an outsourced service or component. Such a pooling of business risks can be a great driver of economies of scale and allow the concentrator to offer competitive terms to a more specialised operation.

A similar explanation fits the component manufacturers who supply a variety of competing assemblers of appliances or automobiles whose core capabilities may be in the design and marketing of their badges – not in in-house manufacture at which they may not excel. Every entrant into the burgeoning electric vehicle industry is having to answer the important question – how much of our production could or should we outsource? The answer Tesla provided- producing its own batteries in its own very large factories with very substantial and fixed overhead costs – may no longer best serve the purpose. The enhanced scale of the specialist provider may also facilitate R&D on a scale that any inhouse department could not justify and could leave the integrated firm behind in the development of intellectual property – that can be hired on reasonable terms from the inventors. Firms no longer have to run their own warehousing and distribution systems. The delivery of goods produced is increasingly outsourced to specialist logistic providers who can deliver more cheaply or more conveniently to a variety of customers than can a firm hope to do running its own trucks and warehouses.  They can fill the return legs. Sales online to a global market have been made possible not only by the internet but by outsourcing delivery to the specialised courier.

These opportunities to outsource essential inputs in production or service provision are a huge boon to the entrepreneurs whose barrier to entry was traditionally limited access to capital- understandably – given their unknown potential. By outsourcing – by staying lean and capital light and highly focused – the start-up’s plans to compete become more viable. Good for them their customers and very good for the economy that hosts them.

 

Making sense of employment and unemployment in SA

Brian Kantor March 30th 2022

The Quarterly Labour Force Survey released this week provides estimates of employment and unemployment that are way beyond the norm for developed economies for which employment surveys are designed. They come as no surprise. In Q4 2021, 262,000 more jobs were provided in SA  compared to the quarter before, while an additional 278000 more workers were declared unemployed, taking the unemployment rate marginally  higher to an extraordinary 35.03%. The SA labour force is estimated as 22.4 persons, of whom 14.5 million are working and 7.9 million are actively seeking work. The labour force represents but 57% of the working age population (ages 15-65)  which leaves 17 million adult South Africans not economically active

There is more to the depressed employment statistics in SA than slow growth. In 2000 there was 40% more persons employed per unit of GDP than there were in 2000. These latest estimates continue to show employment in SA lagging well behind GDP. Employment has flatlined at about 94% of their pre-lockdown levels.  GDP by contrast fell sharply to 84% of its pre-Covid levels by Q2 2020, but has since recovered to 98.3% of its pre-Covid level.

Employment and GDP (2019=100)

Screenshot 2022-04-22 120813

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

The ratio of employment to GDP (2019=1)

 

Screenshot 2022-04-22 120831

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

 

How are these employment statistics, particularly the unemployment estimatesto be interpreted and reconciled with estimates of income and expenditure in SA? Part of the problem with estimating unemployment, especially where the unemployed are not simply and conveniently measured when collecting unemployment benefits, is that the unemployed are largely self-defined in SA. One may be not working, yet very willing and able to work at short notice and indicate as such to a telephone enquiry from Stats SA and so be classified as unemployed. But such a respondent (perhaps in a rural area) may only be willing to work for rewards that are unavailable and unrealistic to expect.  Hence such a potential worker is not part of the labour force and more accurately should be regarded as not economically active, not as unemployed. South Africa may have an employment problem – not an unemployment problem on anything like the same scale.

The more the consumption power provided to households in kind and cash, other than via income from work, the higher will tend to be the wage that would makes it sensible for potential workers to supply and accept employment- what economists describe as the reservation wage below which it makes little sense to supply labour. Welfare benefits provided by the taxpayer, housing, medical care and cash grants, education, or help provided by an extended family, all help to raise the wage rates that employers have to offer when seeking a supply of workers. The tragedy is that so few South Africans qualify for the well-paid decent work offered by employers that would, if available, encourage many more of them to actively join the labour market. The excluded workers should blame the failures of the education system to qualify them for the decent work and accompanying benefits that formal employers mostly prefer to provide.

South Africa chose to address poverty with welfare rather than by encouraging employment. It was a humane response and SA was economically able to redistribute consumption power on a meaningful scale. But it has had consequences. The more generous the welfare system, the better the employment benefits that have to provided by firms seeking labour, the higher will be the level of wages and so the fewer workers employed. South Africa’s recent economic history of improved welfare and a smaller proportion of the population employed confirms this prediction. There is a negative relationship between the price of labour and the demand for it, even if denied by the economists (nogal) who advocate and regulate higher minimum wages.

Yet higher wages have also much encouraged the supply of and demand for immigrant labour who arrive in SA with lower reservation wages determined to support their families earning and transferring income to them. And who are more easily hired because that can be more easily fired. The unregulated, employment intensive sectors of the economy are heavily populated by migrants – perhaps unknown and un-estimated millions of them – many working illegally. And whose employment status will not be answered with a phone call. The employment problem is concentrated on South Africans with access to welfare benefits. How many are employed in South Africa is an unknown  

Responding to the Zondo Commission

Cadre deployment is to be expected everywhere. Incoming US administrations do it as a matter of course. But why have so many of the most influential of the SA cadres proved so very fallible, as revealed in full gory detail by Zondo.? It is the leaders after all who set the standard. That crime may be expected to pay, given kickbacks to the right places, is part of an explanation. Short-term horizons “ if I don’t take advantage then my insider competitors will do so” may help explain some of the observed behaviour. There has been no lack of competition for the material opportunities offered in the South Africa that have gone well beyond what could be regarded as decent salaries and other employment benefits. Including the generous rewards provided for serving on the boards or management teams of the semi-autonomous government boards responsible for regulating private conduct. Of which many became notorious for providing opportunity for shopping/conference trips abroad and for contrived multiple Board meetings, for which valuable hourly attendance fees are unnecessarily charged.

The key posts in SA government departments and agencies turnover very rapidly with changes in the direction of the political winds – so paranoia of those in office is not irrational. The large financial gains observed coming from BEE – without any obvious relationship between input and benefits realized – may be a further influence. That you become be fabulously rich when lucky in your partnerships –obtained through your political connections rather than your observable efforts or skills – and through doing business with government on highly favourable terms because of these connections – is morally debilitating. And indicates for wide notice that competence or dedication is not necessarily rewarded nor essential to the purpose of getting on in life.

Repeat business is the most valuable source of sales and profits for any business. It helps to keep their owners and workers honest and competitive striving to enhance valuable reputations for fair dealing. Governments departments or agencies however have monopoly power. A trust in their good practice is to be heavily relied upon. It is a trust demanded of those teaching a class, serving in a public hospital or in a police or border post enforcing the law. Yet we need them at more than they seem to need us. We wait in line or on-line patiently and smile obediently. We are not customers but supplicants of the government agencies with great influence over us. Imagine life without a passport, visa, vaccination certificate or a driving license, a good education, or a well-organized casualty ward? We would like to believe that the public servants are trying as hard as they know how, to please us. Because that is the right respectful way.

Unconstrained self-interest cannot fully explain what has gone on in SA. It calls for explanations made better by psychologists. philosophers or historians than economists. Do we understand the derivation of the values that determine the culture of the workplace? Can we explain how a sense of honour, honesty, patriotism or duty is developed to help set the reasonable and realistic expectations of the supplier and user of services of all kinds? Helpful attitudes and good performance are encouraged by a strong sense of vocation- a sense of a job worth doing well. For what are widely recognized as appropriate material rewards that can be well understood and accepted by all parties involved. How are they cultivated? They are part of the implicit employment, or what can be understood more broadly, as a social contract. The best standards do not emerge overnight and should be actively cultivated. Ethics has to be well taught.

When regimes change and the power structures change radically with it, a strong sense of life changing opportunities can become overwhelming and corrupting. The large gains achieved in SA via misgovernment have been highly very damaging to the incomes and prospects of most South Africans. It will take acknowledgement and understanding of it as the path to an agreed much improved moral order and stronger economy. It calls for a new social contract, the hope for a Zondo inspired devotion to doing your duty for fair reward and for obeying and enforcing laws justly made and deservedly respected. A community of those wanting to give service rather than take unfair advantage of their favoured status could become the new morality.

Making Empowerment work

September 2021

Affirmative action programmes get in the way of competition for resources and promote economic in-efficiency. They assist a minority of favoured participants in the economy, easily identified, and harm the many more, mostly of the same pigmentation, who pay higher prices or taxes and earn less and sacrifice potential employment opportunities. Costs and opportunities foregone that can only be inferred – because it is so difficult to isolate the influence of one force amongst the many forces – that determine economic outcomes.  BEE in SA can have a powerful influence on the direction of economic policy itself. The very valuable rights to participate as essential BEE partners in government initiatives drives the policy agenda itself.

The incentives that encourage previously disadvantaged South Africans to acquire ownership stakes in SA businesses on artificially favourable terms must reduce the expected returns on capital. It means less upside and no less downside for established businesses or start-ups and so fewer projects qualify for additional investment in plant or people. An important source of capital for SA start-ups will be foreign investors. Demanding they give up potential rewards for bearing SA risks is surely discouraging to them. Moreover, imposing such conditions on ownership cannot be regarded as a form of restitution for the past injuries imposed on previously disadvantaged black South Africans. That might be regarded as the moral case for taking very arbitrarily from some South Africans to give to others. The new foreign owners are surely very unlikely to have benefitted from apartheid.

The typical empowerment deal taken to widen the composition of owners on racial grounds is funded by the established owners. They provide loans to the new BEE qualified owners to enable them to take up the shares on offer. The interest and the debt repayment are facilitated by a flow of dividend payments. If all goes well the empowerment shares will, intime, be unencumbered by debts and will have acquired significant value that may cashed in. If the dividends did not flow sufficiently and the value of the company lagged interest rates, the debts would be written off and the empowerment stake would be worth very little. Upside without downside may however encourage more risk taking than desirable. An empowerment state of mind that can be dangerous to all shareholders.

The idea for a better less discouraging way to meet empowerment objectives came to me from Erik Stern of Stern Value Management. That is don’t sell the shares, rather give them to an empowerment trust established for employees. One employee – one share in the Trust -regardless of status. No loans raised or interest to be paid, or dividend policies to be driven by the empowerment interests. The trust however would be imputed with a cost for the capital allocated to it. Regarded as a non-interest bearing loan capital, the notional value of which would increase at a rate equivalent to the required returns on such risky capital in SA, say of the order of 15% per annum.

The initial capital plus the compounding required returns on it would then be subtracted from the Asset Value of the Trust. On any liquidation of the assets of the Trust, only its net asset value would be paid out to its beneficiaries and the loan capital returned to the company. Employment incentives and bonuses would be based on the difference between realised and required risk adjusted returns. Potential dividends would ideally be reinvested in the company and allocated to cost of capital beating projects, so adding further to the value of the company and the Trust.

The potential upside to be given up by the original shareholders would then be in proportion to the Economic Value Added (EVA) delivered by the firm. That is the difference between the actual returns and the required returns, or cost of capital, multiplied by the capital invested and reinvested in the company, that would determine the value of the company and the NAV of the Trust. In a return on capital focused company this could amount to a very large capital sum to be happily shared, equally, with all employees

More order – less law

The recent willingness of communities in South Africa to defend the property of others, their shopping malls, is of deep significance. At great danger to themselves they established a line that the looters and vandals feared to cross. They did so because what they were protecting was of great value to them. What was at stake was convenient access to the great variety of goods and services, necessities, and luxuries the shopping malls and their retail tenants supply them.

They were defending the market based economic system of which the last step in a supply chain is the well-stocked shop around the corner from which they benefit in a practical and important way, as they well understand.

hey are unlikely to be able to explain that the market delivers via a highly complicated well informed supply chain that reaches across the globe. One that is held together through the discipline of required returns on their owner’s capital put to risk in all the different enterprises that link producers and their customers. Or appreciate that the feed-back loops that keep the system going are not designed or directed by any leader issuing orders. That the process evolves continuously in response to the essential knowledge of how it works best that is highly diffused among many millions of decision makers. Who are required to respond to the preferences of their customers that are signalled when they make their selections at the malls. That it is indeed in large measure a consumer led system.

These are the abstractions used to make the case for free markets and privately held property. Abstractions that are not easily grasped and compete with the other, more easily grasped, abstraction of a centrally planned economy. One led by a presumably all-knowing and equality minded, selfless and highly competent bureaucracy.

But the market system delivers the goods in abundance as SA the communities know very well – and they do not need to know more than the practice. They should be aware that the alternative to the market-consumer led system, whenever tried, has failed to deliver, other than to its powerful elites, who maintain their power and very unequal living standards by their ability to brutally repress any opposition that might dare to challenge their interests.

While the mob was attacking our system, Cubans were also protesting politely on their streets. Protesting for more economic freedom, more access to the goods and services and higher incomes that they know a market system could provide them with. It was most unusual protest in Cuba because it will be severely punished as the protestors must expect to be. The well-heeled Cuban establishment has one of the most effective surveillance systems to keep their citizens in line.

The market system however does depend critically on the provision of law and order- to protect property and wealth. Without it the incentive to save and invest and to take risks with savings, that is capital, falls away and economic progress is stunted.

The priority for the SA government, is to not only restore order but to provide every confidence that it will be able to provide protection against disorder in the future. This is the essential reform agenda. South Africans and their ability to take full advantage of what the malls could offer them needs not so much more law and order, but rather more order itself. The economy could do with much less law, of fewer rules and regulations, and obstructions of freedoms to engage and contract freely and usefully with each other.

The signals from the financial markets indicate that the global investors have not changed their view of the SA economy this month. That all is by no means lost. The cost of insuring RSA dollar denominated debt this month has increased by 20 b.p. while the yield on a five-year RSA dollar bond is barely changed.

 

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Long term interest rates in SA are largely unchanged as are inflation expectations.

 

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The rand weakened against the dollar this month by 2.4% but so have most other EM exchange rates- on average by about a per cent. And EM equity markets have underperformed the JSE this month- in USD- by about 6%

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What remains very helpful to the SA are high metal prices. They have had a welcome pick-up since July 19th

 

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The investor opinion of SA remains un-flattering yet one of wait to see. Correctly so.

Of higher metals prices, inflation and (hopefully) better years to come

Higher metals prices in previous times have been good for the SA economy. There is little reason to believe this will not be the case again, even if global inflation rises.

Inflation is busting out all over the world. The US dollar prices of industrial metals traded in London are up 30% and commodity prices are up 20% this year. These higher prices are not a cause of inflation. They are inflation. Larger amounts of money have stimulated demand and supply is struggling to catch up. Too much money chasing too few goods is the obvious explanation of higher prices.

Rising prices and interest rates absorb excess holdings of cash and, sooner or later, will slow down demand and the pace of growth. Governments might respond to this slowdown with yet more money and spending. If that happens, a temporary phase of rising prices will morph into a much longer phase of continuously rising prices. The US jury is out on this and when they return, South Africans should hope for a guilty verdict – guilty of causing more inflation and the rising metal prices that come with it.

Metal and commodity prices in 2021 graph

Converting the SA mining sector price index (the mining deflator) into US dollars helps identify these important global forces at work on our economy. In the 1970s, the dollar prices of the metals we produced (then mostly gold), increased by 10 times. Metal prices then fell away sharply after 1981 and remained depressed until the early 2000s. Thereafter they exploded by nearly five times, in what was a super cycle, until rudely interrupted by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.  Hard times for SA followed the consistent downward pressure on metal prices after 2011. The recent modest recovery of SA metal prices, off what became a low base, is thus especially welcome.
The South African mining deflator in US dollars graph
Good times for the SA economy follow when metal prices rise much faster than prices in general – as they are doing now. The extra income earned by mining in SA, the profits earned, the dividends, wages and royalties and taxes paid, rise faster and (conversely) fall further with this cycle. In the 1970s, the real price of SA metals, the ratio of the metal price index over consumer prices, increased by nearly five times. Between 1981 and 1996, it then more than halved, damaging the economy severely in the process.

The one genuine recent SA boom between 2003 and 2008 followed a doubling of SA’s real metal prices.  Real national incomes grew on average by 5% a year over these six years, until interrupted by the GFC. Chinese stimulus helped hold up metal prices until 2011 but their decline until 2016 made for more difficult local economic conditions. A degree of relief came from a recovery in metal prices after 2016, a prospective recovery that was overtaken in turn by the lockdowns of 2020. The advances on the metal front make the outlook for the coming years promising for the SA economy.

Metals, consumer goods and services prices in SA and their relationship graph
Real growth in SA national income and the metal price cycle in US dollars graph
The exchange rate takes its cue from the global forces that drive metal prices. And the inflation rate in SA, with variable lags depending on global prices (especially the oil price), follows the exchange rate.  Interest rates follow inflation – in both directions. These forces strongly reinforce the metal price effects on the direction of the SA economy.
The SA mining price cycle (US dollars) and the rand cycle graph
The exchange rate cycle, interest rates and inflation in SA graph
Much of what drives the SA business cycle, metal prices, our international terms of foreign trade and the exchange rate is unpredictable and beyond our control. What matters is how we react to such circumstances. Our policies should be anti-cyclical and focus on moderating the direction of spending.

Exchange rate strength both stimulates domestic demand and dampens prices, led by the price of imports. Exchange rate weakness does the opposite. It weakens demand by pushing up prices.

Interest rates should not respond to exchange rate shocks on inflation in either direction: they work themselves out over a year or two. The stagnation of the economy post-2014, the depressing effect of lower metal prices and a weaker rand, was intensified by exchange rate weakness. This weaker rand led to higher prices and to higher interest rates, which in turn were kept consistently too high, given the weakness of demand.

The cause of higher prices was a weak rand and the effect was to depress spending and interest rates. This placed further pressure on demand. The economy paid a high price for countering an inflation rate that had nothing to do with the demand side of the price equation, in fighting so-called second round effects of inflation for which there is no evidence. Economic actors are more than capable of differentiating between temporary and permanent increases in inflation. The permanently higher rates of inflation come from too much demand, not too little supply. They are waiting to make that judgment about inflation in the US.

Hopefully the next phase will be one of faster growth with low inflation that will accompany a strong rand. The risk then may then be of interest rates being kept too low for too long. This was possibly a monetary policy error committed between 2005-2008, a case of too much rather than too little stimulus. It will however be a much higher-level problem to have to deal with in the years to come. Let us hope for such a challenge.

The rand is no tale of mystery

Movements in the exchange value of the dollar itself explains the direction of emerging market exchange rates.

South Africans are inclined to regard the highly variable foreign exchange value of the rand as a deep mystery. Yet there is nothing mysterious about the currency’s behaviour.

The daily dollar value of a rand has been closely tied to the value of other emerging market currencies ever since 1995, when SA opened up to global capital flows. When the ratio trends above or below the emerging market line the direction of the rand predictably reverts back to the average relationship of one to one. We have done no worse or better against the US dollar than the average emerging market economy.

Rand exchange value graph
The correlation between the daily rand-dollar exchange rate and a basket of other emerging market exchange rates — an equally weighted mix of the dollar exchange rates against the currencies of Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia and Turkey — has been close to one since 1995.

Changes in SA-specific risks can help explain temporary differences between the rand and the other emerging market exchange rates, but more important is the force that has moved all such currencies, including the rand, in the same direction. The movements in the exchange value of the dollar itself explain the direction of emerging market exchange rates.

Dollar comparison graph
Relative dollar strength vs the euro and other developed market currencies has brought emerging market weakness, and vice versa. And exchange rate weakness brings more inflation. Exchange rates lead inflation. It is not the other way round.

The greater difficulty is explaining the exchange value of the dollar. The problem for all businesses that trade globally is that the exchange value of the dollar itself is highly variable. However, it too has had a strong tendency to revert to square one relative to other developed market exchange rates, though the time taken varies.

The behaviour of the rand since March conforms well to these forces. The dollar weakened until very recently, emerging market currencies gained ground, and the rand did a little better than the average emerging market until late April, after which  it has moved back into line.

Compared with a year ago these exchange rate movements are dramatic. The US dollar index (DXY), a measure of the value of the dollar relative to a basket of other currencies, is down 8%; the rand has gained 23% against the dollar; and the average emerging market currency is now worth about 6% more than the dollar.

The rand appears to be a high beta exchange rate. It does worse than the average in more difficult times, as it did during the global financial crisis, and does relatively well after the crisis appears to have been resolved, as has been the case since the global lockdowns.

Exchange rates graph
These exchange rate patterns are likely to persist, though SA can help itself by adopting a set of policies that are more sympathetic to suppliers of capital. A reduction in still exceptionally high long-term interest rates would also be helpful — they continue to reflect a persistently large risk premium and the expectation of rapid inflation.

The SA government pays more than 2% more per annum to borrow dollars for five years than does the US, because of doubts about our fiscal responsibility. The accordingly high cost of capital discourages the capital expenditure by private business that is so necessary for faster growth.

Yet something is stirring to improve the outlook. Much higher metal prices are boosting SA incomes and tax revenues. Higher growth rates in nominal GDP and tax revenues will improve the critical debt-to-GDP ratio. Sticking firmly to government expenditure targets will further improve our fiscal reputation and help reduce the risk premium. The future is in our own hands (partly at least), not only written in the stars.