Acsa could put Eskom on the right path

This piece was published in the Business Day on 22 September 2014:

THE Treasury’s package of measures for dealing with Eskom is like the curate’s egg — it is good in parts. The Treasury has devised a package of measures to sustain Eskom. Some will be welcomed, others not. Unfortunately, the government, sole shareholder of this failing corporation, is not willing to recapitalise Eskom fully so it can complete its build programme without further harm to hard-pressed electricity users. Continue reading Acsa could put Eskom on the right path

National Treasury and Eskom: The curate’s egg

National Treasury’s package of measures for dealing with Eskom is another case of the curate’s egg – it is only good in parts.

The Treasury has come up with a package of measures to sustain Eskom. Some of these measures will be welcome, others less so. Unfortunately the government, the sole shareholder of this failing corporation, is not willing to fully recapitalise Eskom so that it can complete its current programme without further damage to the hardpressed users of electricity – firms and households. Continue reading National Treasury and Eskom: The curate’s egg

Developed or emerging markets? The JSE offers easy access to both

The JSE All Share Index, when converted into US dollars at current rates of exchange consistently tracks the benchmark MSCI Emerging Market (EM) Index, making the JSE a very good proxy for the average EM equity market.

This relationship, as we have often pointed out, is not co-incidental. It is the very similar earnings performance of the average JSE-listed company compared to that of the average EM company that presumably explains the closeness of the fit. We show below how closely the two earnings per index share series compare. Continue reading Developed or emerging markets? The JSE offers easy access to both

National income accounts: Demand side reality check

There is even less comfort than before from the demand side of the SA economy – calling urgently for an economic reality check

 

The national income accounts for Q2 2014 now include the aggregate expenditure estimates and these make for very uncomfortable reading. These estimates of expenditure make it clear that SA has a serious demand side as well as a supply side problem.

 

The Reserve Bank confirmed that growth in spending by households, firms and the government is slowing down and may shrink further in the quarters to come.  Estimates of expenditure for Q2 2014 reveal that final demands for goods and services, adjusted for higher prices, slowed to a 1.3% annual rate in Q2 2014, down from a still weak 2.9% rate in 2013. Spending by households slowed to a paltry 1.5% rate. Growth in spending on plant and equipment also slowed down, to a half a percent crawl as private businesses reduced rather than extended productive capacity. Private formal businesses not only reduced their capital stock, they also employed fewer workers in Q2 2014.

Continue reading National income accounts: Demand side reality check

Emerging markets: On the comeback trail?

Emerging and developed equity markets this year are tracking each other rather closely. As we show in the chart below, this has not always been the case.

Between 1990 and 1995, emerging market (EM) equities made their first significant bow on the global capital market stage and outperformed the US S&P 500, the leading developed market benchmark, by some 80%. After 1995 and until 2000, they lost all of this ground gained and much more in relative performance. EM was again the preferred flavour after 2000 until the Global Financial Crisis, an event that took even more out of EM valuations than the out of the S&P and other developed equity Indexes. EM, then in recovery from the global recession, outperformed the S&P 500 until 2010, but then became a decided outperformer until this year. Continue reading Emerging markets: On the comeback trail?

Woolworths: Why the share market did not react (much) to the rights issue

What really matters for shareholders is the decision to invest in David Jones – much more than the funding choices made.

The Woolworths (WHL) rights issue designed to finance its takeover of Australian Department Store David Jones has been in the wings for some time. Despite the prospect of more shares in issue and dilution to come, the share market correctly has not yet reduced the price of a WHL share. Continue reading Woolworths: Why the share market did not react (much) to the rights issue

Point of View: There’s not so much gold in them thar hills

The front page of the Wall Street Journal this week (25 August) carried a story about South Africa leading the world – in illegal gold digging. To quote the report “Dangerous Economy Thrives in South Africa’s Abandoned Gold Mines” by Devon Maylie:

“After years of watching its dominance over the gold industry shrink dramatically, South Africa has emerged as the world capital of illegal gold digging. In staggering numbers—easily into the tens of thousands—desperate former miners and gang members have created a subterranean subculture of abandoned mine-shaft wanderers. Armed with a few crude tools, they dig into blasted or cement-sealed mines, comb through tunnels, and spend days chiseling away at bedrock.
“Once the world’s biggest gold producer, South Africa accounted for 80% of the global supplies as recently as 1970. Today, that figure is less than 1%, in large part because China and other countries have sharply picked up their own production, forcing mine closures here that created an opening for freelancers. Today, some 4,400 abandoned mines dot the countryside, almost four times the number in operation, according to South Africa’s Council for Geoscience. And while there are still about 150,000 formally employed gold miners in South Africa, ‘we’re very close to the point where there will be more illegal miners than legal miners,’ says Anthony Turton, a South African mining consultant.”

The Journal continued:

“… taken together, the output of these swelling ranks are having a noticeable affect on the bottom-line of the country’s sagging mining industry and tax revenues. South Africa’s Chamber of Mines, a body that represents mining companies, estimates that the country loses about 5% of its potential annual mineral output to illegal mining activities, equivalent to around $2 billion. In 2010, the most recent year available, the government estimated losing $500 million in tax and export revenue from gold illegally mined and sold in the black market, compared with about $2 billion it raises annually in corporate taxes from all mining companies.”

A few caveats are perhaps in order here. In 2012 the the Chamber of Mines reported gold production of 167 metric tonnes, or 5.8% of world production that year, well down on output and share of global production in 2003, as illustrated below:

The member companies of the Chamber did much better in extracting gold bearing ore from their mines than in extracting gold as the second table shows. The tonnes of gold-bearing rock they milled actually increased in recent years. What has declined precipitously is the average amount of gold contained in each tonne of ore raised to the surface. Each tonne of rock extracted, expensively and dangerously, from the bowels of the earth now contain a miniscule average 2.9 grams per metric tonne. The loss of SA’s share in global mine production has much more to do with declining grades (from 4.56 grams per tonne in 2003) than it has to do with increased output elsewhere. Global gold output has increased by approximately 230 tones since 2003, while production from all SA mines fell by 208.6 tonnes over the same period. In other words, production outside SA has increased by a little more than SA production has declined.

An important further point worth making is that annual production of gold is a very small proportion of the gold ever produced. Almost all of this has survived and is held as a store of wealth. Therefore, as is surely apparent, the price of gold is little affected by current output – legal or illegal. The legitimate mines may lose potential output to thieves and the SA government is not able to collect income from illegal or informal miners, while the price is unaffected by illegal mining activity – equivalent to 5% to 10% of the legal production. Furthermore, if the gold has been extracted illegally from shafts that have been permanently abandoned, such output is incremental, not lost. The gold would have stayed in the ground and not helped produce any income at all. The costs of mining this otherwise abandoned gold is borne entirely by the workers themselves, including the risks of losing their lives to rock falls and their gold to gangsters preying on them.

Incidentally, the gold produced in SA in 2012 earned R73bn, well up from the R32.9bn realised in 2003 thanks to the higher rand gold price. 5% – 10% of this attributed to illegal gold miners is significantly more than the R2bn worth of illegal mining revenues reported by the WSJ and does not take account of other mining sales that altogether totaled R363.8bn in 2012. Such illegal mining activity, currently largely unrecorded, could add significantly to the SA GDP were it to be included in the national income accounts.

Yet while the recorded output of gold has declined and the numbers employed in gold mining has fallen from 198 465 employees in 2003 to 142 201 in 2012, average earnings of these workers have improved significantly over the same period. Total gold mining earnings amounted to R22.24bn in 2012 or R156 386 per employee, compared to approximately R63 900 earned by the average worker in 2003, or to R103 000 in 2012 (the equivalent when adjusted for CPI). In other words, the average employee in the gold mining industry, of whom there are now fewer, appears to be earning about 48% more in CPI adjusted terms in 2012 than they did in 2003.

These improved remuneration and employment trends are unlikely to be independent. The fewer surviving gold mine workers have become more productive, helped no doubt by more and better equipment per worker, judged by the volume of ore extracted rather than the gold produced. The industry would not have survived otherwise than by providing fewer jobs in exchange for what have become better paid and more productive workers. Operating margins for the Chamber member mines have improved rather than deteriorated over the years, as we show below, despite lower grades of gold mining ore.

The safety record of the industry, judged by fatality rates, has also improved as we show below. Thus the industry has provided better and safer jobs, but for regrettably fewer workers.

As the WSJ makes only too clear, the willingness of the illegal miners to undertake the hazardous and poorly remunerated work they engage in has much to do with the lack of alternative employment opportunities. To quote the article again:

”’If I could find a proper job, I would leave this,’” says Albert Khoza, 27, who says he started illegal prospecting eight years ago because he couldn’t find work and was desperate to send money to his family. On this day, outside an old mine about 60 miles from where Mr. Matjila mines, he has been handling mercury with his bare hands. His eyes are bloodshot and infected, as he stokes the fire with plastic containers”.

Or, as the other illegal miner interviewed, Mr. Matjila, is reported to have said: “’We’re not criminals, I don’t want to be doing this. But I need to make some money.’ Then he stood up to walk down the road to the hardware store to check on prices of new supplies. ‘We have to make a plan to find another hammer,’ he says.

The challenge to the SA economy is to resolve the inevitable trade-offs between better jobs for some workers and the very poor alternatives then open to those who are unable to gain access to what is described as ”decent jobs”. The formal SA labour market has not been allowed to match the supply of and demand for labour at anything like market-clearing employment benefits. And so we have the insiders, those with formal employment and willing to launch strike action to further improve their conditions of employment; and the outsiders who find it so difficult to gain entry to formal employment, of whom the illegal miners represent a numerically important group, as numerous, so we are told, as those formally employed in gold mining.

The solution to the general lack of formal employment opportunities appears as far away as ever. Strike action not only leads to higher real wages and reduced employment opportunities, but still greater incentives to substitute reliable machinery for more expensive and unreliable labour that makes continuous production very difficult to achieve. The unpredictable impact of strikes on production is perhaps as much an incentive to reduce complements of relatively unskilled workers as are higher real costs of their employment.

To encourage employment in the gold mining industry and everywhere else, it would be very helpful if workers were willing to share in the risks of production, as the illegal miners appear willing to do: that is to accept less by way of guaranteed pay and more by way of rewards linked to performance and profits. In other words, for workers to become, to a greater degree, owners of the enterprises they engage with. If pay went up and down with the gold price, the gold mining industry would surely be willing to bear the risks of hiring more workers.

Global interest rates: The lowdown on Europe

Long term interest rates have kept surprisingly low – and the source of this surprise is the threat of deflation in Europe. The ECB will have to do what it takes to avert this threat.

We have long been of the view that the key to the short term behaviour of global equity markets is the direction of long dated US Treasury yields. Until fairly recently it may have been said that the actions of the US Fed were decisive for the direction of these interest rates. The Fed, via its Quantitative Easing (QE) programme had become a very large holder of US Treasuries and mortgage backed securities.

 

These exchanges of Fed cash (in the form of Fed deposits) for bond and mortgage backed securities were undertaken with the specific intention of not only protecting the financial system, but of holding down mortgage rates to assist the recovery of the US housing market and so of household wealth. At the peak of these operations US$80bn of these securities were being added to the asset side of the Fed balance sheet each month and simultaneously to the cash balances kept by US banks.

The slow but more or less steady recovery of the US economy allowed the Fed to suggest in May 2013 that it would be tapering such injections of cash into the system and that by late 2014 it would hope to end QE. It has since followed through on this prospect. Monthly net purchases of these securities in the market have been tapered and the security purchase programme will be over soon. This announcement of a likely end to the Fed support of the fixed interest market led however to the “taper tantrum” of May 2013. Long bond yields rose significantly and equity values declined. Volatility, in the form of daily moves in equity markets, increased and emerging equity and bond markets – regarded as more risky than developed markets – were particularly affected.

Then, despite the Fed taper in 2014, the trend in long term interest rates reversed direction, markets calmed down and share markets recovered. Indeed, market volatilities as measured by the Volatility Index, the VIX (the so-called “fear index”), had fallen back to pre financial crisis levels by mid 2014 and the US equity markets has moved back to record high levels.

The danger of the VIX at such low levels was that volatility could spike higher and share markets accordingly retreat (given that they were regarded by many observers as, at worst, fairly valued by the standards of the past, as represented by conventional Price/earnings multiples).

It could be demonstrated by reference to past episodes of low volatility and demanding valuations that such a combination of low volatility and generously valued equities would need more than good earnings growth to provide good returns. In the past it appeared that only lower long term interest could overcome well valued equities and low volatility. Moreover, it was widely assumed that long term interest rates in the US, very low by the standards of the past, could only be expected to increase. The upwardly sloping US treasury yield curve indicated very clearly such expectations of higher interest rates to come and incidentally still does so.

To the surprise of the bond market and despite the Fed taper, long term interest rates in the US fell rather than rose in July and August 2014. It was lower interest rates in Europe, especially in Germany, that led global rates lower in July. Not only did German Bund yields fall, with US and other rates falling in sympathy, but the spread between lower European and US rates actually widened, surely adding to the appeal of US Treasuries. The Spanish government now pays less for 10 year money than Uncle Sam.

The Fed therefore is no longer the lead steer of the bond market herd. The danger of deflation in Europe is that it leads interest rates lower. And this deflation is all the more likely given quantitative tightening in Europe to date, rather than easing. Unlike the Fed or the Bank of Japan, the assets and liabilities of the ECB have been falling significantly rather than increasing. That the supply of European bank credit and broader measures of money has been falling is consistent with a lack of demand for ECB deposits.

These broad trends will have to be reversed if European deflation is to be avoided. The ECB will have to do what it takes to increase the supply of money and bank credit. QE action is called for and can be expected to continue to hold down global bond yields. Euro deflation trumps the risk of higher interest rates.

The figures below fully illustrate this story of falling interest rates, declining volatilities and higher share prices. We also show how the US dollar has strengthened in response to this improved spread in favour of the US and how developed and emerging equity markets (including the JSE) when are running together, when measured in US dollar terms.

Banks and shadow banking: Out of the shadows

Should we be frightened of our banks and their shadows or should we rather learn how to deal with banking failure?

Shadow banks rather than non-bank financial intermediaries

A new description – shadow banks – has entered the financial lexicon. The term is, as we may infer, is not used in a positive context. Rather it is to alert the public to the potential dangers in shadow banks, as opposed to the presumably better regulated banks proper.

This is a use of language consistent with one of the dictionary definitions of the word:

A dominant or pervasive threat, influence, or atmosphere, especially one causing gloom, fear, doubt, or the like: They lived under the shadow of war.

Or perhaps alluding to shadowy, defined as:

1. full of shadows; dark; shady
2. resembling a shadow in faintness; vague
3. illusory or imaginary
4. mysterious or secretive: a shadowy underworld figure

 Source:  www.Dictionary.com

An older, less pejorative description of this class of financial institution or lender would have been non-bank financial intermediary or perhaps near-bank financial intermediary to describe those firms that closely resembled banks in their lending activities. Examples are mortgage lenders (once called building societies), insurance companies, pension funds, money market funds and unit trusts, all of which would have fall under the modern description, shadow banks.

 

As we show below, drawing on the March 2014 Financial Stability Report of the SA Reserve Bank, the share of SA banks in the total business of Financial Intermediation in SA has declined over the past few years while the share of other financial intermediaries (including money market funds and unit trusts) has risen consistently, also in part at the expense of pension and retirement funds

 

Source; SA Reserve Bank Financial Stability Report, March 2014

The role of financial intermediaries is to facilitate the capital providing and raising activities of economic actors, domestic and foreign. They stand between (intermediate) the providers of capital in the economic system, be they households or firms, and those raising funds, to cover (temporary) financial deficits, that is, other households and firms and government agencies needing finance. They also compete for financial custom with those providers and users of finance who might bypass the financial intermediaries completely and deal directly with each other.

Such activities may be described as disintermediation when, for example, a firm previously dependent on bank finance bypasses the banks and issues its own debt or equity in the financial markets. The subscribers to such issues may however well be other financial intermediaries, for example pension funds, in which case  it is the banks that will have been disintermediated.

 

Why banks are different from all other financial intermediaries

What then makes banks different in principle from other financial intermediaries? It may be in the detailed manner in which they are regulated, as we indicate above. But pension and retirement funds are also subject to particular regulations and regulators designed to protect providers of capital to them as are the managers of money market funds or unit trusts.

Banks are different not because they borrow and lend (or, more generally, raise and provide capital); they are different fundamentally because an important part of their function is to provide, via some of the deposit liabilities they raise, an alternative to the cash provided by the central bank that can be used for transactions, in the older terminology, as a much more convenient medium of exchange . In so doing, they provide an essential service to the economy, providing a payment system without which the modern economy would founder.

 

The danger with banks, narrowly confined to those few institutions that provide the payments mechanism, is that a large bank failure would bring down the payments mechanism with it. This is a danger to the broader economy almost too ghastly to contemplate. It is a danger that makes a large transaction clearing bank, on which all other financial institutions depend, not only to hold their cash, but more importantly, to help make payments, too big to fail. If such a bank were in danger of failing and unable to recapitalise itself in the market place, it would be obliged to call on the taxpayer for additional capital and the central bank for cash as a lender of last resort. A call that the central bank and the government could not, in good sense, resist. Shareholders given such a rescue should then lose all they have invested in the bank while depositors might be saved while bank creditors generally may or may not be obliged to accept a haircut. A possible haircut would help bank creditors exercise essential disciplines over banks as borrowers. The moral hazard of too big to fail and therefore too big to have to worry about default could be overcome without jeopardising the payments system with a predictable well recognised set of bankruptcy procedures for banks.

 

Clearly, facilitating payments by transferring deposits on demand of their depositors, is not all that banks do. Not all their funding is by way of deposits that may be transferred or withdrawn on demand. Term deposits as well as ordinary debt may be more important on their balance sheets than current accounts or transaction balances.

 

Banks, narrowly defined as the providers of a payments system, largely originated by offering an alternative medium of exchange to that of transferring gold or silver and the notes issued by a central banks to settle obligations. The owners of banks came to realise that they did not have to maintain anything like a 100% backing in gold or notes or deposits with the central banks for the deposits that could be withdrawn without notice, to survive profitably.

 

Fractional reserve banking was seen to be possible and profitable. In other words, the interest spread between the cost of raising deposits, with demand deposits paying the lowest interest or no interest at all, helped the banks make profits on the spread between their borrowing costs and interest income and so helped pay for the costs of maintaining the payments mechanism – a form of cross subsidy. It may be surmised that had the banks had to levy fees to cover all the costs, including a return on capital, of providing the payments mechanism, bank deposits might have proved less attractive and the growth of retail banks accordingly more inhibited than it was.

 

Banks in SA have become more dependent on net interest income in recent years, rising from about 5% to 10% of net income, while operating expenses have grown by about the same percentage. Return on equity has declined but remains a respectable 15% p.a.

Source; SA Reserve Bank Financial Stability Report, March 2014

 

The inevitable risks in fractional reserve banking and leveraged banks

Such fractional reserves however do pose a risk to the shareholders of banks as well as to their depositors. There might be a run on the bank that could cause the bank to fail, making the shares they owned in the bank valueless. Clearly, the interest earning assets it typically held could not be cashed in as easily as its deposit liabilities. Banking failures led to responses by regulators – firstly in the form of a compulsory cash to deposit ratio demanded of banks and in the form of deposit insurance designed to protect the smaller depositor. This was introduced in the US in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression and the banking failures associated with it.

Compared to most other financial institutions, including the so-called shadow banks, banks proper have always been among the most highly leveraged of business enterprises.. Their debts include all deposits, current and time deposits, equivalent to 90% or more of their assets, leaving little room for errors in the loans made.

The protection provided to depositors in the form of required cash or liquid asset reserves could not insure any bank or financial institution against the bad loans that could wipe out shareholders equity and cause a bank to go out of business.  Hence the regulatory focus in recent years, not so much on cash adequacy, but on equity capital adequacy. The Basel rules promoted by the central bankers’ central bank, the Bank for International Settlements located in Basel, Switzerland, have imposed higher equity capital ratios of banks.

Understandably, the SA Reserve Bank as the regulator of the SA banks has given attention in its Financial Stability Report to the capital adequacy as well as the operating character of the banks under their supervision. The results of this analysis indicate that by international standards, the four large SA banks are well capitalised and well managed. As the table below shows, a capital to asset ratio of nearly 15% provides a return on banking shareholders’ equity of close to 15%, even though the return on total assets held by the banks is only 1.1%. Without high degrees of leverage SA banks might not be profitable enough to be willing to cross-subsidise the payments mechanism. If so other providers of a payments mechanism would then have to be found.

Funding such alternative providers with fees charged might not seem an attractive alternative to the current banking system that facilitates payments, partly through the interest spread, but with the danger than banks can fail. Dealing with the possibility of failure may well prove a better approach than imposing capital and cash requirements of banks that make them unable to easily stay in business.

There are no guarantees against banking failure

 

There is no guarantee that regulated bank capital, adequate for normal times and not so demanding as to threaten the profitability of banks and their survival as business enterprises, would be sufficient to support the banks in abnormal times. The global financial crisis of 2008 took place in most unusual circumstances, that is when the an average house price in the US declined by as much as 30% from peak to trough. Such declines meant that much of the mortgage lending of US banks had to be written off. Even a capital adequacy ratio of 15% might not protect a banking system, with a typically large dependence on mortgage lending, against failure, should the security in house prices collapse as they did in the US. SA banks have held up to 50% of all their assets in the form of nominally secure mortgage loans. They too would not have survived a collapse in house prices of similar magnitude.

 

Is it possible to insulate the payments mechanism from other banking activity? And what would it cost the holders of transaction balances?

 

It may be possible, given modern technology, to separate the payments system from  bank lending and borrowing. The payments system could be conceivably managed by the specialised equivalents of a credit card company that would compete for non interest bearing transactions balances on a fee only basis. The transfer mechanism could well be a smart phone or some equivalent device.

 

The proviso would have to be 100% reserve backing for these balances held for clients to transfer. These reserves that would fully cover the liability would have to take the form of a cash deposit with the central bank or notes held in the ATMs.  A deposit with a private bank would not be sufficient to the purpose- the other private bank, unlike a central bank can also fail and so bring down the payments system. If such a separation of banking from payments was enforced by regulation, large banks might not then be too big to fail any more than any other financial intermediary or indeed any other business enterprise might be regarded as too big to fail. But the unsubsidised transaction fees that would have to be levied to cover the costs of such an independent  payments system, fully protected against failure, that would include an appropriate return on shareholders capital invested in such payment companies, might prove more onerous than the costs of maintaining transaction balances with the banks today that provide a bundle of services, including facilitating transactions.

 

It is striking how expensive it is to transfer cash through the specialised agencies that provide a pure money transfer service. A fee of 5% or more of the value of such a transaction is not unusual. The case for bundling banking services, even should banks need to be recapitalised should they fail in unusual circumstances, may well be a price worth paying. In other words what is required for financial stability and a low cost payments service is a predictable rescue service for the few large banks that manage the payments system.

 

 

 

 

 

Volatility: The calm before the storm or is the balmy weather to continue?

Share markets have calmed down, as have most other financial markets. The S&P 500 Index is as relaxed as it was before the Global Financial Crisis broke in September 2008. Daily moves in share prices are confined to an unusually narrow range and the cost of an option on the market (insurance against volatility) has fallen accordingly, as we show below.

A similar benign pattern of modest daily moves can be observed of the JSE Top 40 Index as is also shown.
The volatility priced into an option on the S&P 500 is the Volatility Index (VIX), which is actively traded on the Chicago Board of Exchange. This index is sometimes described as the Fear Index. The more fear or uncertainty about the state of the world, the more investors struggle to make sense of it all, the more prices move in both directions. The theoretical equivalent of the VIX calculated for the JSE is the SAVI. In a global capital market where uncertainty about the future is a common denominator, the VIX and the SAVI move closely together. Force one winds in New York City translate into force one winds on the JSE.

Both the VIX and the SAVI may be understood as forward looking measures of volatility used to price options, but they appear to track actual volatility – measured as the standard deviation (SD) about average daily price moves – very closely. We compare the VIX this year to the 30 day rolling moving average of the SD of the S&P 500 below. Both measures of volatility have declined this year, indicating that investors generally have a much more sanguine view of the future prospects of the companies they invest in.

The stability of the global financial system appears well secured by QE in the US, while the Draghi pronouncement “to do what it takes” to shore up European sovereign credit has soothed the sometimes savage breast of Mr and Ms Market.

So far so very good. Lower volatility (less fear of the future and so less of a risk premium demanded of financial assets hence higher present values attached to expected earnings) has been accompanied, as it almost always is, by higher share values.

 

The relationship between share prices generally and volatility is consistently strong: when volatility is up, share prices move down and vice versa. The correlation of both the daily level of the VIX and the S&P 500 and percentage changes in both series since 2005 remains very high, of the order of (-0.60) or higher when levels are correlated and even higher (-0.74) when daily changes are correlated.

The good news about financial markets today is that volatilities are low and fear of some economic crisis apparently largely absent. The down side is literally that – if volatility is already so low can it go lower? and if not, can we expect share prices to go much higher? The answer is still perhaps so if the fear stays away. The markets may well continue to grind mostly higher as they have been doing recently. But the chances of a global event that would again frighten shareholders and their agents cannot ever be ignored.

It appears that markets are much more inclined to crash lower on bad news that may mean a change in the world as we know it, than to crash higher on good news. Good news seems to dribble in slowly, bad news can come crashing down on your head overnight. Let us hope that the flow of economic news continues to be mostly encouraging and volatility stays low and share prices grind higher.

Point of View: A growth, not a savings problem

SA has a growth in income problem – not a lack of savings problem. The lack of growth and its consequences are plain to see. The apparent shortage of savings (the difference between domestic savings and capital formation) shows up in the current account deficit of the balance of payments and in the equivalent inflows of foreign savings.

The bigger the current account deficit, the larger the inflows of foreign savings. Without the access to foreign savings, the current account deficit would be much smaller, spending on all goods and services including plant and equipment would have to be cut back even further and the economy would be growing even slower. Faster growth would mean higher returns for savings and help attract more foreign savings and keep more of domestic savings productively applied back home. Slower growth undermines the case for investing in SA. It will mean a weaker rand and more inflation and perhaps higher interest rates to undermine growth prospects further.

Faster growth and the extra profits that come with it would also be retained by SA businesses, so adding to domestic savings. Of the gross savings rate of SA, equivalent to only about 14% of GDP, more than 100% is undertaken by corporations that retain earnings and cash flow. We would like them to plough back their earnings and cash flow (after paying taxes) into additional plant and equipment and larger work forces, rather than paying dividends, buying back shares or repaying debts. They would do more of this good stuff if they were more confident about the growth prospects.

The problem for any economy is not a lack of capital (savings by another name), but a want of good returns on it. Raise the returns and the capital will be freely available. The focus of attention of South Africans should not be on a lack of capital, or its reflection in the current account deficit, but on how to promote faster growth that will help raise the return on capital to attract more of it from all sources, domestic and foreign.

Deidre N. McCloskey in her book Bourgeois Dignity – Why economics cannot explain the modern world (Chicago University Press 2012) makes the crucial points in the following highly individual and entertaining way:

“There are many tales told about the prehistory of thrift. The central tales are Marxist or Weberian or now growth-theory-ish. They are mistaken. Accumulation has not been the heart of modern economic growth, or of the change from medieval to the early-modern economy, or from the early modern to the fully modern economy. It has been a necessary medium, but rather easily supplied…The substance has been innovation. If you personally wish to grow a little rich, by all means be thrifty, and thereby accumulate for retirement. But a much better bet is to have a good idea and be the first to invest in it. And if you wish your society to be rich you should urge an acceptance of creative destruction and an honouring of wealth if obtained honestly by innovation. You should not urge thrift, not much……………You should work for your society to be free, and thereby open to new ideas, and thereby educable and ingenious. You should try and persuade people to admire properly balanced bourgeois virtues without worshiping them. Your society will thereby become very, very rich. American society nowadays is notably unthrifty. The fact is much lamented by modern puritans, left and right. Yet because the United States accepts innovation and because it honors Warren Buffett it will continue to be rich, in frozen pizzas and in artistic creativity and in scope for the average person.” (pp 166-167)

South Africans are also notably unthrifty, understandably so, given the transformation of the middle class who achieve this status with little by way of household capital. Get a good job and the financial system will arrange for a house and a car on credit, as it should. The problem now is not too much credit, but rather too few jobs and the income that comes with employment and so the capacity to borrow.

But South African business has been notably innovative – hence the excellent returns on capital invested and rising share prices. The current account deficit, that is the consumption propensities of South Africans, has been financed to an important degree by reducing our stake in our excellent businesses (many of which have become plays on the global economy) thanks to SA’s improved status in the world and relative freedom from capital controls. Most important, while South Africans have reduced their stake in JSE-listed businesses, partly in exchange for shares in companies listed elsewhere, the remaining stake is worth a lot more than it was. The share of the cake may have declined, but the cake is a much bigger one, thanks to innovative management who are appreciated by fund managers abroad.

For SA to grow faster, the innovative power of business must be released and encouraged rather than discouraged by government interventions. Business should be treated with respect rather than the hostility that seems to be the inclination of a bureaucracy that lacks appreciation of the essential bourgeois virtues that McCloskey celebrates.

Go to the supermarket thou sluggard- consider their ways and be wise

In mysterious (super) markets we should trust to serve our economic interest – not regulators of prices

A typical supermarket carries many thousands of separate items on its shelves. It may also offer a variety of other services at its tills or counters, including payment or transaction services. The operating profit margins on these different items or services will vary greatly and may even vary from day to day as buyers take advantage of opportunities to buy low and sell high. Their suppliers may also offer discounts for prompt payment or bulk orders or their payment terms may be extended to help add profit margins.

The shopper couldn’t possibly hope to know such details nor should they care to know. All they might be aware of is the price of some KVI (known value item), for example a jar of coffee or a box of tea. And the supermarket will try and make sure that the KVIs are priced competitively. If the tomatoes are a profitable line at the vegetable counter they may well help cross subsidise the cooking oil, but nobody other than the shop managers needs to be well aware of this.

What will matter to the shopper, a matter of which the shopkeeper will be well aware, is not the price of any one item on the menu, but of the cost of a trolley load of groceries and the cost in time and transport of collecting it. Shareholders and managers care whether the selling price of the average shopping trolley or basket will more than cover the average costs of delivering the trolley load – rents and employment costs included. Most important is that these prices on average are high enough to provide a satisfactory return on the capital invested in the chain of shops and distribution centres and trucks needed to keep the shelves well stocked and so the customers coming through the doors. Margins may go down and true profits go up, to the ultimate advantage to both customers and shareholders.

If the realised return on capital is above risk adjusted returns, shoppers and non-shoppers can be assured that the essential service of supplying and delivering goods and services to households will continue to be provided at prices they prove willing to pay for. Indeed, the more profitable the enterprise, the more likely the retail offering will be extended to more locations, with fuller stocked shelves in ever greater variety.

Consumers generally can be assured that the cure for high or “exploitative” prices and margins is high prices themselves. High prices that lead to above normal or required returns on capital encourage more supply, that in due course will reduce prices. In other words, consumers can rely on market forces to supply goods and services and to restrain pricing power.

The owners of profitable firms are well incentivised to expand their offerings. Unprofitable firms who are unable to charge enough (sometimes inconveniently for their loyal customers) will go out of business. Perhaps as consumers we should worry more about unsustainably low prices than unsustainably high prices. High prices bring more goods with greater variety; low prices will mean reduced supplies and less variety and quality.

In the presumed absence of competition, we rely on regulators to determine prices on a cost plus basis; hopefully not too high a return that might mean very high prices not vulnerable to competitive forces. There is a danger that regulation of some prices in an essentially bundled offering may fail to recognize the overarching role played in the economy by return on capital and the important tendency for excess returns to be competed away.

The threats to SA consumers of additional regulation that come to mind are the potential assaults on the menu of charges made by furniture retailers who supply furniture bundled with credit, delivery costs and perhaps personal insurance. Or on the suppliers of chickens bundled with brine, the proportion of which is regulated. Or the services of cell phone companies, who among the services they provide, include connections to other cell phone companies, that are now subject to a lower regulated charge.

The itemised insurance or delivery charges levied by a furniture retailer may look exorbitantly high, seemingly well above observable costs. A regulator may then demand lower charges for them. But such lower charges may well mean a higher price for the separately itemised furniture item. The insurance charges may well have cross subsidised the price of the furniture item. Then lower charges for insurance will mean higher explicit prices for the furniture itself, if the cost of capital is to be recovered. Similarly, by reducing the cell phone interconnection charge – the cost of a bundled pre paid contract – perhaps the subsidized cell phone itself may well will go up. And if it costs less to bulk up a chicken with brine than with mealie meal, the price of chicken will surely reflect this as the chicken producers compete with each other to make extra sales.

Provided furniture retailers, cell phone companies or chicken producers compete with each other, we need not concern ourselves with the charges of the individual items, than we need to concern ourselves with the gross profit margins of all the separate items provided by a supermarket. We can rely on competition rather than regulation to constrain prices and to secure essential supplies.

An easy to recognise feature of regulated markets is insufficient supply and non-price rationing – that is long queues for service or forced sacrifices of quality and variety. Think of the waiting lists for “free housing” or medical services at public hospitals in SA or of power load shedding due to the lack of regulated generating capacity.

The essential problem is that it is hard to understand and appreciate the hidden hand of market forces. It seems easier to think that prices are some simple mark up on costs. The problem is compounded in that students of economics are more easily and taught how markets fail than how they work in what appears to be mysterious ways. History tells us that governments (that is government officials) are much more easily prone to failure to supply essential goods and services than market forces driven by profit seeking companies.

The price regulator is bound to be some university-trained economist. The successful entrepreneur does not need to understand theoretical economics at all – only how to buy low and sell high and the more they succeed the better off we will all be. More important than price competition will be innovation, new products / services or improved methods of production that are introduced to the economy by enterprising companies and risk loving individuals. These companies and individuals will have high prospective margins very much in mind but in turn will be subject to emulation and margin pressure. Regulation can only serve to stifle, not promote, innovation.

Property yields: Expected total returns from property or shares matters much more than initial yield

Growth can more than make up for lower initial yields – something apparently not well understood in property circles

Reference will often be made to some acquisition or other being earnings “accretive”. Clearly an acquisition would hardly be made if it did not promise at least to add to earnings per share (EPS) and thus to the value of each share in issue. It may be thought, naively, that the simplest way for a listed company to accrete EPS would be to issue shares trading at a particular superior price/earnings (PE) multiple in exchange for another company trading at a lower PE ratio.

If it were so easy to add wealth by issuing relatively highly rated shares to buy lower rated shares, no recorded differences in PE multiples could survive such an obvious arbitrage. All earnings would then command the same price which obviously has not turned out to be the case.

The reason for the observed differences in PE multiples or earnings yields (the inverse of the PE ratio), or for matter dividend yields, is that an asset, particularly the bundle of assets and liabilities that make up a company, has a life of more than one year. A company may have an indeterminately long life given that company assets may be replaced or added to. Assets with economic lives of more than one year will be valued on their earnings and dividend growth prospects as well as their initial or first year yields.

The more growth in earnings expected over the life of an asset, the more investors will be prepared to pay for the asset. The faster the expected growth in benefits for shareholders, the higher the price paid per share and the lower the first year yield.

High initial yielding assets will be expected to have short lives and / or limited earnings, when compared to lower yielding assets or companies. If the market has correctly priced two assets in a similar sector of the economy and facing similar risks to their earnings potential, their expected returns will be the same, even though the initial earnings or dividend yields may be very different. Buying the company with a low PE ratio that is expected to grow its profits slowly, while selling a part of what is expected to be a fast growing company with a higher PE will not necessarily add value to the shareholders diluting their share of profits. What is gained in the form of the relatively low price paid for the asset will likely be lost in the form of the slower growth in earnings from the cheap asset – cheap for that reason.

Unless the assets bought can be transformed by better management or the value of the combined asset pool enhanced by economies of larger scale – the fabled synergies that may or may not justify an acquisition – two plus two cannot be worth more than four. Adding low PE assets to high PE assets must reduce the combined PE in line with a weighted average of the established assets and the newly acquired assets with different growth prospects.

There is a well known equation in the financial literature used to make this point, the so calledGordon growth model (see explanation at the end of this piece). This equation simplifies the standard Present Value (discounted cash flow) valuation model applied to any stream of expected operating profits that is discounted back to its present value by applying an appropriate risk adjusted discount rate to the flow of expected profits.

Parsing property returns

The model provides yet another example of the no free lunch principle in life. High yields imply short economic lives and vice versa – though one might think otherwise when listening to the managers of SA listed property companies and their shareholders who appear concerned, above all, to avoid yield dilution when acquiring assets. They appear fearful of buying assets that currently yield less than the current yield on their listed portfolio regardless of what may be differently better growth prospects.

Such observations are however made against a backdrop of extraordinarily good returns from listed SA property. Since May 2004 listed property has returned an average 20.7% a year, while the JSE All Share Index provided an annual average return, calculated monthly, of 18.14%. The All Government Bond Index, the ALBI, has generated an average total return, capital gains/losses plus dividend or interest income, of 8.86% a year over the same period.

 

Property returns were on average less risky than shares, with a standard deviation (SD) of returns of 15.85% a year compared to a SD of share returns of 18.14%. Lower bond market returns were significantly less variable over this extended period than shares or property, with a SD of 5.16. The money market would have yielded about 7.34% a year over the same period, with still less variablity.

The chart below shows how the initial dividend yields have come down since 2008 in company with lower long term interest rates and declining growth in dividends paid. It may also be noticed that recently, while bond yields have moved higher, the initial dividend yield has moved in the other direction, meaning a recent rerating of the Property Index and improved recent returns from property compared to bonds.

The initial JSE Property Index dividend yield averaged 7.54% since 2004 compared to an average 2.75% for the JSE. The growth in JSE dividends has averaged 16.22% a year (despite the global financial crisis) compared to the steady average growth of 7.67% a year in dividends paid by the listed property companies.

 

Faster growth in dividends from all JSE equities has clearly compensated investors for initially lower dividend yields, when compared to property investors who started with much higher initial yields but were subject to slower growth in dividends received. The result has been similarly excellent total returns.

When we add the initial dividend yield to the growth in dividends realized, we get what may be regarded as an internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR for the JSE over the period 2004-2014 was an average 18.98% a year, while the IRR for SA Listed Property was 15.22%. However these realised returns from holding property rather than shares were significantly less variable in the light of the collapse in JSE ALSI dividends in 2009. The SD for the IRR of the property sector was 5.34 compared to 19.29 for listed shares. Clearly the income streams from property, if not as much their valuations (and total returns) have proved more consistent than JSE equities in general and such predictability of dividend streams must have helped to enhance their appeal.

Within the property sector itself, we tested the proposition that the highest yielding property companies can be expected to generate the highest returns. The method used was to rank all the components of the Index by their initial yield every month and to calculate and compare returns over the next 12 months. No such consistently positive relationship between initial yield and subsequent returns from the individual property companies was found. In fact, initial company yields have had no statistical power to explain differences in the returns realised by the different listed companies.

This result was consistent with the theory that what should matter for investors in property, is the combination of initial yield plus growth in dividends. Initial yield alone or apparent concerns about yield dilution should not be a focus of attention. What matters is the combination of initial yield and subsequent growth.

 

The Gordon growth model

The Gordon growth model makes the simplifying assumption that the expected growth in operating profits, earnings and dividends is a constant, permanent one. Thus the price(present value) to dividend ratio can be expressed as P/D= 1/(r-g) where r is the required risk adjusted return or cost of capital equivalent to the discount rate and g the permanent growth rate. The equation can be converted to an equivalent PE by assuming a constant ratio of earnings to dividends.

This equation can then be reformulated to infer the permanent dividend or earnings growth rate implicit in current share prices and dividend yields. That is the cost of capital r, is the sum of the interest rate available from a low risk long dated government bond , say of 8% p.a plus an appropriate risk premium. That is, an equity risk premium of an average 4 or 5 per cent per annum, to be added to the bond yield to give the required return. That is r is equal to say 8 (government bond yield) +5 (risk Premium) =13% p.a. Depending on the above or below average risks, the company faces this average risk premium can be added to or subtracted from.

The initial certain first year dividend yield (for example 3% a year) can then be subtracted from the 13% required long run return in our example to give the implied (permanent) growth in dividends necessary if the required return is to be realised over time. In this example g, the annual growth in dividends would have to be at a 10% annual rate to justify an initial yield of 3%. Clearly, the higher the initial yield the lower the expected growth rate in g required to satisfy r, the risk adjusted required returns. Vice- versa – low initial yields will be associated with higher expected growth rates in dividends or earnings.

 

Equities: Crossing the 50 000 barrier for the JSE

Democracy has been very good for SA shareholders

The JSE crossed a milestone yesterday, with the All Share Index closing above 50 000 for the first time. It first closed above 5000 in April 1994, just before SA became a fully-fledged democracy. Over the same period, dividends per Index Share have grown from R117.89 in April 1994 to R1373.25 today, and that is at an average rate of 13.68% a year. Earnings per share have increased at a compound 13.18% a year rate, implying something of a modest and surely deserved rerating for the Index over the years.

 

The move from 5 000 to 50 000 is equivalent to an average annual compound return of 14.41%. Inflation averaged 6.32% a year over the period. Real JSE returns therefore have averaged over 8% over the period, a more than adequate reward for the risks shareholders have had to bear. The best month for the JSE since 1994, compared to a year before, was in April 2006, when the annual return was a positive 54%, while the worst decline in annual returns was realised in February 2009, when the ALSI Index had lost 43%.

That the Index has been able to increase about 10 times since then is no accident – it is the result of excellent performances by the managers of the companies that make up the JSE, not only in the form of higher levels of earnings and dividends delivered to shareholders, but also in much improved returns on the capital provided by share and debt holders.

The progress of South African companies in increasing their efficiency and value is depicted graphically in the chart below. Until 1994, the year that SA became a full democracy, the average South African company was earning a real return on the cash invested by companies- the return in the form of real cash out compared to real cash in (cash flow return on operating assets, or CFROI) at or below 6%, which is the global average for non-financial firms. Thus South African companies were generally destroying shareholder value before 1994, especially when considering how much higher the real cost of capital would have been in those highly uncertain times. But since 1994, the median CFROI has sloped upwards and remained well above 6%.

Today’s median listed South African company is reporting a very healthy CFROI of 10%. And as can also be seen in the figure, the performance of the top and bottom quintiles of SA companies has also sloped upwards, indicating more value creation for the best firms and less value destruction for the worst. At present, some 20% of South African companies are generating economic returns on capital above 15%, which is world-class profitability.

(It is worth noting that if a company generates a 10% inflation-adjusted return on capital, it generates enough cash to grow its assets at 10% in real terms.)

How does SA compare to other countries?

We show in the chart below the inflation-adjusted economic returns on capital of listed non-financial companies in a number of different countries during the past decade (Matthews, Bryant and David Holland, “Global Industry CFROI Performance Handbook, Credit Suisse HOLT”, February 2013). In what may come as a surprise to many, the figure reveals that South African companies have been generating the highest median economic returns in the world, better than Australia’s and those of the US and the UK. This is an accomplishment to take pride in, one that demonstrates that listed South African companies are well managed and competitive.

Most important to recognize and appreciate is that SA’s democracy gave SA companies the opportunity to engage globally in the years after 1994, in ways that politics made impossible before. JSE listed companies have been able to realise the economies of scale and specialisation that access to global markets in good services and capital makes possible. SA shareholders have every reason to be grateful for SA democracy, which helped produce such unexpectedly good returns on capital.

Avoiding the mind games

The MPC voted to keep interest rates on hold. Without a recovery in growth rates, interest rates will stay on hold – absent the dangerous mind games of January 2014 that led to an ill-timed rise in the repo rate.

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank yesterday indicated that its outlook for SA inflation over the next few years has improved marginally. To quote the statement:

“The Bank’s forecast of headline inflation changed marginally since the previous meeting. Inflation is expected to average 6,2 per cent in 2014, compared with 6,3 per cent previously, with the peak of 6,5 per cent (previously 6,6 per cent) expected in the fourth quarter. The forecast average inflation for 2015 remained unchanged at 5,8 per cent. The forecast horizon has been extended and inflation is expected to average 5,5 per cent in 2016, and 5,4 per cent in the final quarter of that year. Inflation is still expected to remain outside the target band from the second quarter of 2014 until the second quarter of 2015.”

It also reported that inflation expectations are unchanged:

“The Reuters survey of inflation expectations of economic analysts conducted in May is more or less unchanged since the previous survey. Inflation is expected to average 6,3 per cent in the second quarter, and 6,2 per cent in the final two quarters of this year, before returning to within the target at an average of 5,8 per cent in the first quarter of 2015. Annual inflation is expected to average 6,2 per cent in 2014, and 5,6 per cent and 5,4 per cent in the subsequent two years respectively, somewhat lower than the Bank’s forecast.”

The growth outlook for the economy, according to the MPC by strong contrast has “deteriorated markedly” :

“The domestic economic growth outlook has deteriorated markedly, with the reversal of a number of the tentative positive signs observed at the beginning of the year. The Bank’s forecast for economic growth for 2014 has been revised down from 2,6 per cent at the previous meeting to 2,1 per cent, implying a further widening of the negative output gap. The forecast for 2015 remains unchanged at 3,1 per cent, and growth in 2016 is expected to average 3,4 per cent. However, the risks to these forecasts are increasingly to the downside against the renewed possibility of electricity load-shedding, among other factors.”

With this backdrop one might have thought that the decision not to raise short term interest rates would have been a formality. But not so for two members of the MPC – compared to the three at the meeting before – who actually voted for a further increase in rates. What can be on their minds?

It can’t be a belief that higher interest rates can do much to slow down inflation. The Investec Securities simulation for the Reserve Bank model of inflation and growth indicates that an increase of 25bps in the repo rate will only reduce its expected inflation by roughly 8bps and this would take seven quarters to take full effect. In other words, not much help on the inflation front at considerable further risk to the state of the economy – and moreover in the knowledge that an unpredictable exchange rate (that the model treats as an independent influence, about which assumptions rather than predictions are made when running the model).

The hard pressed SA economy had some good luck in the form of a stronger rand and a bumper maize harvest, which will help to hold down inflation in the months ahead. One gains an impression that had the rains not come when they did, the case for raising rates might have had more support.

That monetary policy is hostage to such obvious supply side shocks as drought and global risk aversion is not a comfortable thought. The reality is that inflation n SA has very little to do with the demand side of the economy (as the Reserve Bank acknowledges fully) and everything to do with factors over which interest rates have little influence: exchange rates and the harvest as well as the pace of administered price increases, which is the province of the regulators and the tax collectors.

At least this time round, at the media briefing and Q&A, the Governor was asked some leading questions about supply side effects and the influence of interest rates. She was even asked if the hike in rates in January (with hindsight surely a mistake) did any harm to the economy. There was little mea culpa in the response and a resort in the response to the non-testable theory that had the Bank not raised rates then second round effects – higher inflationary expectations – would have taken inflation higher. In fact there is no evidence that inflation expectations lead inflation rather than the other way round. And, as the MPC indicated, inflation expectations remain unchanged and the great constant in the economic environment.

This Q&A unfortunately indicates the danger in monetary policy: that members of the MPC come to believe that in order to preserve their inflation fighting credentials, and because the markets may expect them to raise interest rates, then that is what they have to do. This is regardless of the predicted outcomes for inflation and, more importantly, for growth.

The trouble with such monetary policy reactions is that they can never be tested or refuted. The economic caravan always moves on even as the dogs bark. Who can say with certainy what might have happened if the Bank had acted differently? Such mind games do not serve the SA economy well. Interest rates in SA should have been lower, not higher, given the state of the economy over the past 12 months The time for a cyclical upswing in interest rates is when the economy can justify it – not before. And there is clearly no justification for higher interest rates given the growth outlook.

Hard Number Index: Modest momentum

The economy in April maintained a very modest forward momentum – but the outlook is deteriorating, not improving.

Early data releases for vehicle sales and notes in circulation indicate that the economy in April 2014 maintained the modest forward momentum of the previous month. Our updated Hard Number Index (HNI), as we show below, is largely unchanged from the month before and reveals a similar outlook for still slower, but positive, growth rates in the months ahead.

The Index is based upon 2010 values. Index values above 100 indicate forward momentum. As we show, according to the HNI, the economy began a period of positive growth in 2004 that has continued since, but for a brief move backwards after the Global Financial Crisis broke in 2008 when the rand weakened and interest rates rose.

In the figure below we compare the HNI to the Reserve Bank’s coinciding business cycle indicator, also with a 2010 base, that has only been updated to January 2014 (with a value of 118). The Reserve Bank’s Indicator was still pointing higher in January 2014 while the HNI had turned lower in Q3 2013. The HNI has generally been a good timely leading indicator for the broader business cycle.

The performance of unit vehicle sales and the note issue is shown below. The outcomes are better than the raw numbers on a seasonally adjusted basis. But for Easter coming later this year than in 2013, such seasonal adjustments, as well as the raw numbers, need to be treated with caution.

If current trends persist, vehicle sales are heading lower, from a smoothed rate of 52 000 units per month, to about 50 000 units, equivalent to an annual rate of 600 000 units by April 2015. The local industry sold 647 217 units in 2013. Trends in the note issue suggest that the cash cycle may bottom out in Q4 2014. If this turns out to be the case, this modest recovery would be very welcome.

Hopefully for the state of the economy, the recent strength in the rand and a significantly lower maize price will have reduced the Reserve Bank’s forecast inflation rate as well as reduced the danger to the economy of higher short term interest rates that would undermine the prospects of any cyclical recovery.

The Reserve Bank fortunately (in a close call) did not raise interest rates in March when the rand was much weaker and long term interest rates significantly higher. It is therefore difficult to see how the Monetary Policy Committee could argue this week for anything but maintaining interest rates at their current levels for a while longer.

Value on the JSE – A contrarian case for SA economy plays

22 April 2014

Based on valuation metrics and given that the impact of higher interest rates is already factored into the valuations of the SA Industrials and Interest rate sensitive counters, the downside for these SA economy-dependent stocks appears more limited than other key JSE sectors.

These are not the best of times for the SA economy, but not the worst of times for the JSE

The outlook for the SA economy is unsatisfactory. The rate of growth is slowing down and the Reserve Bank seems intent on raising interest rates that will slow growth further. This outlook does not portend well for those businesses that serve the SA economy. Investors on the JSE however can take comfort from the fact that the SA share market has become more dependent on the performance of the global economy. If we break down the earnings of the JSE All Share Index, over 60% is generated from revenues outside SA, while 70% of the daily movements on the JSE can be attributed to these global influences.

Should investors prefer global to local plays?

The issue for investors on the JSE therefore is how to allocate their exposure between the listed global and SA plays. Clearly, the worse the SA economy is expected to perform, the stronger the case for preferring the global over the SA plays.

The SA bond and money markets can be confidently presumed to have factored in at least a further 100bp increase in the key SA Reserve Bank repo rate over the next 12 months, with the expectation of more to come over the following 12 months. The stock market will also have taken this into account.

These forecasts currently weigh upon the valuations accorded the SA economy plays, especially those companies for whom the direction of interest rates has proved influential in the past, which can be identified as interest rate sensitive, such as banks, credit retailers and property companies. Yet we can also be confident that the forecasts and assumptions that have influenced the market place will be altered over time with the news flow and that the market will move accordingly.

What if interest rates turn out to be lower than currently forecast?

Should interest rates in SA increase by significantly less than currently expected, it would likely mean unexpectedly high and superior risk adjusted returns from investing in the SA economy plays on the JSE. The opposite impact would be registered should SA interest rates turn out to be even higher than currently expected. We regard the danger of upside interest rate surprises as significantly less than downside surprises for reasons to be explained.

The exchange value of the rand will determine the outcomes for inflation and interest rates

The path to lower than expected interest rates in SA would have to be opened up by a stronger rand. The path to higher than expected rates would have to follow a still weaker rand. A consistently stronger rand improves the outlook for inflation and would avoid any need to raise interest rates and vice versa. Chris Holdsworth1 has successfully replicated the inflation model of the Reserve Bank for Investec Securities and suggests that a rand weaker than R10.70 to the US dollar would lead to higher interest rates, designed to bring inflation back within the headline inflation target range of 3% to 6%. This target band for inflation is currently under threat following the rand weakness of the past 12 months – hence the expectation of higher short term rates. A rand consistently stronger than this R10.70 would keep short rates on hold.

The Holdsworth replication of the Reserve Bank econometric model gives a good sense of some of the dilemmas faced by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank. The most important of these is that inflation has risen, and may rise further, even though the economy is operating at well below its potential, for want of domestic spending.

Raising interest rates would depress demand further, with little impact on the inflation rate itself. Holdsworth calculates, using the Reserve Bank econometric model, that a 50bp increase in the key short term interest rates typically leads to only a 16bp reduction in the inflation rate, seven quarters out. Therefore, should the rand breach R11.30 against the US dollar, the Reserve Bank would have to raise rates by 100bp or more to hope to get inflation below 6% by the end of 2015.

The possible influence of the SA output gap on the market outcomes

Such an increase in rates would have a highly predictable impact on spending and the so called output gap as estimated by the model. The output gap is the difference between the potential growth of the economy, estimated at 3-3.5% per annum by the Reserve Bank, and actual growth, which is currently well below this. This gap, as shown in the chart below, is currently very wide and will increase further with higher interest rates. Note too that the current GDP output gap is now at historically high levels, indicating that the economy is operating below its growth potential, for want of sufficient spending by households in particular.

1Chris Holdsworth, Quantitative Strategy, Investec Securities Proprietary Limited, Second Quarter 2014, April 2014.

 

 

A still weaker level of demand and the still fewer jobs associated with higher interest rates would be an unacceptable price for the economy to pay and the Reserve Bank might be persuaded that higher interest rates are not appropriate given the trade offs in the form of slower growth. Furthermore, as we show in our next chart, there is evidence that higher short term interest rates may be associated with a weaker rand, so the outlook for inflation, despite the lower levels of domestic spending, could deteriorate rather than improve with higher rates. Yet the market still expects the Reserve Bank to think and act otherwise. Our view is that should the output gap threaten to widen further, the Reserve Bank might think again about raising interest rates even if its inflation forecasts have not declined.

Questioning the structure of the Reserve Bank econometric model

One of our issues with the structure of the Reserve Bank econometric model is the assumption, incorporated in the multi equation model, that higher inflation leads to increases in wage inflation and in disposable incomes, adding impetus to household spending and helping to close the output gap.

This presumed relationship – more inflation and so temporarily faster and perhaps unsustainable growth – however relies on a demand side explanation of inflation. In other words, high rates of inflation reveal a state of excess demand in the economy that needs to be restrained. This, as we have indicated, is very far from an explanation of current inflation in SA.

The model also assumes that inflation expectations can be self-fulfilling and lead to higher prices even though demand pressures may be weak. There is no evidence of this. Inflation in SA leads inflation expectations, which remain very stable at about 6%. There is no statistically significant feedback loop from inflation expected to inflation.

Higher consumer prices can alternatively be attributed to reduced, or more expensive, supplies of goods and services, the result of the weaker rand as well as for electricity and other administratively set prices. Such supply side driven increases reduce rather than add to real disposable incomes and spending power, especially when formal employment is in decline or growing very slowly. A weak rand is bad news for the purchasing power of SA households. It becomes even worse news for them when accompanied by higher interest rates. Furthermore, households account for over 60% of all spending and the incentive private firms have to add to their plant and equipment – which accounts for another 15% of GDP – is derived from the spending actions of households. A return to SA GDP growth rates of a mere 3.5% pa will have to be accompanied by an increase in household consumption growth rates.

A combination of a stable rand with stable interest rates is essential for this important purpose. A lift in exports, labour relations permitting, could help stimulate more GDP growth, but would have to be followed up by a recovery in household spending growth rates.

The further dilemma for the monetary authorities is that, even if the output gap were to widen further, it is quite possible that the inflation outlook could worsen rather than improve. It would worsen if the rand were to weaken further and the so-called pass through effect of the weaker rand pick up strength. There is no predictable relationship between SA interest rate moves and the value of the rand, as Holdsworth has again confirmed (see the chart below).

The Reserve Bank – will it undergo an economic reality check?

Changes in short term interest rates may therefore help hit or miss inflation targets even as changes in interest rates have the opposite impact on the growth in domestic spending and output. This leaves the Reserve Bank with uncomfortable trade offs between inflation and growth, which may encourage the MPC to take little or no action on interest rates, as has been its inclination recently.

The MPC may recognise the inadvisability of raising interest rates in current circumstances, having seen how the rand weakened further as interest rates rose in January and strengthened after the March meeting of the MPC when the rates were left on hold.

Global forces will drive the rand and the SA markets

The inflation rate outcomes for SA will be determined mostly by the direction taken by the rand, independent of SA interest rate settings. The global forces that influence the exchange value of the rand are the state of emerging market bond and equity markets. This pattern is highly consistent. These developments in emerging bond, equity and currency markets, in turn reflect the appetite for risk by global investors and the outlook for the global and emerging market economies. The better the outlook for emerging market economies, the more upside for commodity prices, emerging market equities and their currencies.

These helpful trends for emerging markets and currencies, led by lower long term interest rates in the US were a notable feature of the markets in March 2014, when the MSCI Emerging Market Index gained nearly 3% in the month. In January 2014, the Index lost nearly 7% of its value, before adding over 3% in February followed by another strong month in March 2014.

As we show below, these trends were especially helpful to the SA economy plays on the JSE in March 2014. In Q1 2014, we calculate that our grouping of SA Industrials and, to a degree, overlapping SA Interest Rate Plays in March, provided returns of over 9%, the Global Consumer Plays generated negative returns of about 1% and the Commodity Price Plays returned 1.5%. Were the rand to surprise on the upside again, a similar pattern of outperformance by SA economy plays is likely.

The forces that could drive emerging markets higher

Over the next six months, investors in emerging markets, including the JSE, should hope for minimal pressure from US and other developed market interest rates, especially from long bond yields. They should hope that Fed governor Janet Yellen and ECB president Mario Draghi continue to emphasise deflation rather than inflation until the prospect of stronger global growth is fully confirmed. This dovish approach seems a likely one and its realisation will be to the advantage of emerging market economies and the companies dependent on them. Over the longer term, faster growth in developed economies will bring higher interest rates, as demand for global capital improves and when faster growth in emerging markets can compensate for the higher costs of finance that should follow.

Breaking up the JSE by dependence on global or domestic economic forces

The large listed companies that dominate the JSE can be broken down by the degrees of dependence on global or domestic economic forces as indicated in the figure above. There are the Commodity Price Plays, made up of resource companies that depend on the US dollar prices of metals and minerals. This category of JSE-listed companies best excludes the gold mining companies that dance to the sometimes very different rhythms of the gold price. The Commodity Price Plays include the large diversified mining companies Anglo American (AGL), BHP Billiton (BIL) and Sasol (SOL), as well as the platinum, iron ore and coal mining companies.

Then there are the SA Interest Rate Plays: the banks, the credit retailers, property companies etc whose valuations are dependent on the direction of SA interest rates. They include the major banks like Standard Bank (SBK) and insurers like Sanlam (SLM).

A further category of SA economy plays are the less interest rate-exposed SA Industrials, including the cash retailers.

The other important category of Industrial companies listed on the JSE are those clear plays on the global economy. These include Naspers (NPN), Aspen (APN), Richemont (CFR), SABMiller (SAB), British American Tobacco (BTI) and MTN, whose fortunes and valuation depend mostly on the profitability of their activities outside SA. We describe them them as Global Consumer Plays or as industrial hedges since they are hedged against the SA economy and the rand.

About 60% of the JSE All Share Index weighted by SA shareholders (the SWIX) is accounted for by a mere 10 companies, of whom only three companies may be described as heavily exposed to the SA economy: Standard Bank and Sanlam, both interest rate sensitive companies; and Sasol, a resource company, which generates much of its revenues and costs in SA but whose revenue is closely linked to the global US dollar price of oil.

2In this breakdown of the JSE we have combine the individual stocks into their various categories as follows:

Interest Rate Plays:
ABL, ASA, DSY, FSR, GRT, INL, INP, NED, RMH, SBK, SLM, BVT, IPL, MMI, MSM, PIK, SHP, TFG, TRU, WHL,

Commodity Plays:
AGL, AMS, ARI, BIL, IMP, LON, SOL, ACL, KIO

Industrial Hedges / Global Consumer Plays:
BTI, APN, SAB, NPN, SHF, CFR

S A Industrials:
BVT, IPL, SHP, TBS, VOD, BAW, LHC, AVI, SPP NPK

The case for SA economy plays – at current prices

The key question we now address is whether or not the JSE, taken as a whole, can be thought to offer the prospect of good returns for investors, at current valuations. The further issue is the valuation currently attached to the SA economy plays. Can they be considered demandingly valued at current valuations that incorporate the expectation that SA interest rates will rise over the next 24 months? Clearly there is upside for this class of shares should interest rates not rise as expected.

Yet a consideration of the downside risks to this class of shares needs consideration, as well as upside risks. Risks to the JSE All Share and SWIX Indexes, positive or negative, will impact to a lesser or greater degree on any subset of the market, including the SA economy plays.

Holdsworth shows that the JSE All Share Index is currently priced within the norms established since 1995. Cyclically adjusted or normalised earnings suggest an even less demanding rating for the market than do reported earnings. This is because the earnings from the Resource companies listed on the JSE are currently in only partial recovery mode from a deep, cyclical decline in normal earnings.

It would seem accurate to conclude that, by the standards of the recent past, the JSE was not demandingly valued at March 2014 month end, relative to trailing earnings (provided earnings from the Resource companies do in fact return to their cyclically adjusted norms). Clearly, such valuations also depend on the current state of emerging markets generally.

In our valuation models, we allow for an emerging market influence on the US dollar value of the JSE All Share Index and Financial & Industrial Index, in addition to factoring in the level of JSE earnings in US dollars and the interest rate spread between SA and the US. These valuation models, which have provided a good long run explanation of market value, suggest that the All Share Index is between 10 and 20% above the valuation predicted by the model.

Using a similar approach to valuing the S&P 500 indicates, by contrast, a high degree of undervaluation, 20% or so. This suggests that the better value for shareholders is for now still to be found in developed rather than emerging equity markets.

These currently stretched valuations of the JSE have been encouraged by the above long term average growth (of 10% pa) in Financial and Industrial rand earnings in recent years. This recent strong and predictable growth has been augmented by the exceptionally good earnings growth reported by the Global Consumer Plays. The SA Plays have also performed very well on the earnings front, especially in recent years.

Looking at Price/earnings ratios

In the figure below, we show the very different ratings enjoyed by these sub-sectors of the JSE. Global Consumer Plays now enjoy a much improved and exalted price/earnings rating compared to the other sectors.

While Naspers accounts for the largest share, 12.5% of the Top 40 companies included in the SWIX, its share of the Global Consumer Play sub-category is as high as 29%. Almost all of the value of Naspers can be attributed to its large shareholding in Tencent, a Hong Kong listed internet company. Without Naspers, which has recently traded at 65 times reported earnings, the Global Consumer Plays, taken together at SWIX weightings, would enjoy a still demanding 19 times earnings rating compared to the more demanding 24 times multiple when Naspers is included.

While the earnings performance of the SA Industrials has compared well with those of the Global Consumer Plays, these SA economy-dependent companies realise a significantly lower rating in the market. The Global Consumer Plays must be considered as growth companies while the group made up of SA Industrials and SA Interest Rate Plays can be considered as value stocks with much less demanding valuations.

Holdsworth has estimated that the trend earnings growth is 14% pa for the Commodity Price Plays, 9% p.a for the SA Interest rate plays, 15% pa for the Global Consumer Plays, 11% pa for the SA Industrials. The volatility of these earnings growth trends has been lowest for the SA Industrials at 17%, compared to 19% for the Global Consumer Plays, 23% for the SA Interest rate plays, 61% for the Commodity Price Plays and an extraordinarily high 158% for the Gold Mining Companies. Part of the case for the SA Industrials is thus their lower risk character. If these growth trends in earnings are sustained, current valuations of the SA economy plays cannot be regarded as demanding.

It may be argued therefore that, based on valuation metrics and given that the impact of higher interest rates is already factored into the valuations of the SA Industrials and Interest rate sensitive counters, the downside for these SA economy-dependent stocks is more limited than that of the Resource stocks or the Global Consumer Plays.

The upside is that the rand will be stronger than expected and interest rates lower than expected. All these sectors of the JSE will benefit from stronger global growth and strength in emerging market equities and commodity markets that would accompany any renewed appetite for bearing risks in emerging markets. But the SA economy plays as a group stand to benefit most from a strong rand and all that will follow a stronger rand, especially lower interest rates.

The SA balance of payments – a conundrum inside a mystery

The SA economy is vulnerable to large swings in foreign portfolio flows into and out of our debt and equity markets. It should be appreciated that the funds are attracted in part because they can be withdrawn at short notice, in what have proven to be liquid and, to a degree, resilient markets.

Furthermore the SA economy, given a lack of domestic savings (the result of a bias towards consumption spending to which government policies of redistribution and transformation contribute) cannot hope to sustain even modest growth without significant inflows of foreign savings, at the rate of 5% of GDP.

The difference between low savings, at about 14% of GDP, and higher rates of capital expenditure, running at about 19% of GDP is equal to the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. South Africans, to maintain their standard of living, must hope that, on balance, capital continues to flow towards South Africa – for which we have to give up an increasing net flow of interest and dividend payments abroad. As a result of capital attracted over the years these payments now account for over half of the current account deficit.

These shocks may have little to do with South African events and much more to do with global events, for example global financial crises or decisions of the US Fed that impact on markets and yields in a global capital market, of which SA and other emerging markets are an integrated component of. Another factor may be the exchange controls that still apply to domestic portfolios. That the share of these portfolios held offshore may not exceed specified limits – 25 or 30 per cent – may mean that relatively favourable offshore market moves (perhaps the result of rand weakness) may require the partial repatriation of SA portfolios held abroad.

It needs to be appreciated that for every foreign seller or buyer of a listed security (unlike a new issue), there will be an equal and opposite domestic investor, attracted (or repelled), by lower (higher) prices and higher (lower) yields led by these foreign flows. These variable prices and yields act as one of the absorbers of the shocks that result in more or less foreign capital flowing in or out of the rand.

The other important shock absorber is the variability of the exchange value of the rand. A weaker rand may well lead to thoughts of a rand recovery, encouraging capital inflows while a stronger rand may well lead to the opposite.

We show, in the figures below, the link between these foreign net bond and equity market portfolio flows over a rolling 30 day period and the 30 day percentage move in the rand/US dollar since 2005. Rand weakness is represented by a positive number. The correlation between these two series is a negative (-0.40) over the period 2013-2014. Since early 2013, the worst 30 day period saw net outflows R1.382bn and the most favourable, net inflows of R759m. The best 30 day period for the rand saw it gain 12.5% and the worst was a depreciation of 5.6%.

Clearly these capital flows play a statistically significant impact on the value of the rand, though as clearly there are other forces acting on the currency market over any 30 day period. Foreign capital flowed out heavily towards the end of 2013 and then again in January 2014, enough to cause significant rand weakness. These flows have sinced turned positive and helped the rand to recover.

Ideally, capital flows to and from SA would be more predictable and the rand less volatile, to the benefit of SA based business enterprises. It would also make inflation and the direction of short and long term interest rates much more predictable, further reducing the risk of running an SA-based business. But there seems little chance of this, given the continued dependence of the economy on foreign capital and the shocks, both positive and negative, domestic and foreign, that will continue to affect flows of capital and the terms on which capital is made available.

The Reserve Bank has published its latest Financial Stability Report (FSR) (March 2014). Among its understandable concerns is this dependence of the SA economy on flows of portfolio capital into and out of the equity and bond markets.

The FSR shows how these flows in and out of the rand and shows how these flows were closely linked to much larger flows out of emerging markets generally:

The report states that “non-resident investors in South Africa were net sellers of R69 billion worth of domestic bonds and equities between October 2013 and March 2014. Over this period, a large part of of equity sales was concentrated in the mining and media sectors. Since the beginning of 2014, equity outflows from the banking sector have accounted for the largest proportion of equity outflows…………

The report goes on to state rather “…It would appear, however, that not all sale proceeds from the sell-off were transferred abroad”

This statement that indicates that not all the flow into and out of the rand from abroad can be accounted for by the statisticians and the banks that supply the record of foreign trade and financial transactions. The balance of payments accounts, that should sum to zero theoretically, are in reality balanced by what is often a very large item, known as Unrecorded Transactions. This line item was particularly large in Q4 2013, of R30.6bn, compared to recorded capital flows of R5.3bn. We show some of the the key balance of payments statistics below and the importance of unrecorded transactions in the scheme of things.

The reality is that the the SA balance of payments is somewhat mysterious; and so conclusions about the role of capital flows in the economy must be treated with some caution. The capital flows themselves may be under- or overestimated, as may exports or imports or even interest and dividend payments.

What however is fully known and recorded is what happens to the rand and security prices. Presumably the exchange rate and security prices act to equalise the supply and demand for the rand and securities denominated in rands on a continuous basis.

The important conclusion to draw is to let the markets act as the shock absorber, and for the monetary policy authorities to set their interest rates with the state of the domestic economy in mind. Monetary policy should aim at minimising the gap between actual and potential output. Interest rate stability and predictability is within the remit of monetary policy and should be an aim of policy. The influence of unpredictable exchange rates, led by unpredictable capital flows, on the rand and on inflation, are best ignored.

The improved return on capital invested by SA business

By Brian Kantor and David Holland

Why it is good economic news even though the new darling of the left, Thomas Piketty, thinks that high returns on capital raise income inequalities and thus should not be encouraged.

A success story – improved returns on capital realised by JSE listed companies

If a company can generate a return on capital that beats the opportunity cost of the capital it employs, it will create shareholder value. The market will reward the successful company with a value that exceeds the cash invested in the company.

The inflation-adjusted cash flow return on operating assets, CFROI®, for listed South African firms has improved consistently and impressively since the 1990s. Using CFROI® we have been able to demonstrate that political freedom has proved fruitful for SA businesses and their shareholders.

The economic return on capital has improved spectacularly over time, with today’s median firm reporting a very healthy CFROI of 10%. Until 1994, the average South African company was sporting a CFROI at or below the global average of 6%. South African companies were generally destroying shareholder value before 1994, especially when considering how much higher the real cost of capital would have been in those highly uncertain times.

Since 1994, the median CFROI has sloped upwards and remained above 6%. The new South Africa has been a value-creating South Africa! Note that at the peak of the commodity super cycle in 2007-8, the median CFROI was a stunning 12%. The top and bottom quintiles have also sloped upwards, indicating greater value creation for the best firms and less value destruction for the worst firms. Presently, 20% of South African firms are generating economic returns on capital above 15%, which is world-class profitability.

The benefits of efficient business and excellent returns on capital can be widely shared in inclusive share ownership, through pension and retirement plans as well as perhaps via a sovereign shareholding fund that can be built up to fund genuine poverty relief and opportunities for the poor. Broad-based empowerment in the form of employee- and community-based share options can be used to turn outsiders into insiders.

Such attempts to broaden the ownership of productive capital perhaps accord well with the recently revived critics of capitalism, following Piketty, who have found new reasons to question the advantages to society of high returns on capital. It is argued that such high returns on capital may well increase inequalities of income because they go mainly to the wealthy. Even should such high returns raise the rate at which national income is increasing, it makes such outcomes a mixed blessing, especially for those who have come to regard income equality as an important goal of economic policy.

Some facts about the distribution of SA incomes, taxes and government expenditure.

Let us give a South African nuance to this debate. Any discussion of the causes and consequences of economic growth and the distribution of benefits always has a distinctly racial bias in that white South Africans, on average, enjoy significantly higher incomes than black South Africans.

The distribution of wealth in South Africa is even more unevenly distributed in favour of white South Africans, given the much higher past incomes and the savings realised from them. The middle and higher income classes, those who are likely to become important sources of savings and contributors to pension and other funds, are increasingly made up of black South Africans. The times are changing and dramatically so, Loane Sharp, labour market analyst writing for Adcorp, indicates:

“Changes in the labour market after the end of apartheid have worked spectacularly well for blacks. Since 1995, on a like-for-like basis adjusting for skills, qualifications and work experience, blacks’ wages have been rising at 15% per annum whereas whites’ wages have been rising at just 4% per annum. Average wages for blacks and whites should converge as early as 2021 though, admittedly, average wages for entire race groups belie vast variations between individuals. The number of high-earning blacks – that is, those earning more than the average white – has increased from 180,000 in 2000 to 1.5 million today, with more than 40% of these employed in the public service, which has been used to great advantage, much like the predecessor apartheid state, to promote the welfare of a particular racial group.” (Source: Adcorp Employment Survey.)

According to the UCT Unilever Institute, the black middle class went from 1.7 million in 2004 to 4.2 million in 2012 to 5.4 million in 2014. The white middle class has been roughly stagnant: 2.8 million in 2004 to 3.0 million in 2014 (Source: UCT Unilever Institute). The number of high-earning blacks (i.e. those earning more than the average white) went from 120,000 in 2001 to 1.9 million in 2014 – 77% of these were in the private sector (Source: Adcorp).

The income differences within the different racial groups have probably widened with the rapid growth in the black middle class and the transformation of the public service that now provides much less protection for low-skilled whites. Most important, the unemployment rates indicate that a regrettably low percentage of the potential black labour force is not working in the formal sector and therefore not earning or reporting any income.

The income statistics and the GINI coefficient that measures income inequalities in SA do not indicate the important role the SA government plays in ameliorating poverty and therefore supporting consumption expenditure. The distribution of expenditure, including the benefits of expenditure by government agencies, especially if divided by racial categories, will look very different to the distribution of income or wealth. Of all government expenditure, equivalent to 33% of GDP, some 60% is classified as social services, that is spending by government on health, education and protection services. Much of these budgets are allocated to the improved employment benefits of the black middle class who work for government, supplying so-called social services. But measuring the quality of delivery is much more difficult than measuring how much is spent on them.

Yet of this expenditure on welfare, spending that constitutes 60% of all government expenditure, some 15% or nearly 5% of GDP, consists of cash supplied on a means tested basis to the identified poor. That is cash paid monthly as old age pensions, child support grants or disability grants. These payments have been growing strongly over the years, keeping up fully with inflation, and have provided an important form of poverty relief.

The taxpayers who have paid for this relief (and other government expenditure) are to an important degree income tax payers. Of all government revenues, which amount to about 30% of GDP, some 55% come from taxes on income and profits of businesses. Registered companies are budgeted to contribute nearly 35% of these income and profit taxes, or nearly 20% of all government revenue, in this financial year 2014-15. Of the personal income taxpayers, the highest income earners, those expected to earn over R750,000, will pay over 40% of all the income tax collected, while earning about 24% of all personal incomes – which include all reported income, interest, dividends and rents generated from assets.

These relatively high income earners constitute only 4.6% of all the 15.254 million potential income tax payers on the books of the SA Revenue Service (SARS). Of these registered for income tax purposes, some 8.835 million will fall below the income tax threshold of R70,000 income per annum and so will not contribute income tax. These low income earners will generate only 11.5% of all expected reported incomes in fiscal year 2014/15. (Source: Budget Review 2014, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Table 4.2).

These statistics from SARS confirm how unevenly distributed income is in South Africa and also how much redistribution of income is taking place via income taxes as well as via the distribution of government expenditure, which is biased in favour of the poor.

Higher income South Africans, it should be recognised, will be consuming and paying for almost exclusively private education, health care and will also employ privately supplied security services. The relationship between taxes paid and benefits received is not at all as balanced as it may be in the developed world where the biases in spending are often in favour of the middle class, who make up a large proportion of the electorate. To stay competitive in the global market for skills, this relatively unfavourable balance of taxes paid for benefits received by the high income earners and income tax payers has to be made up in the form of higher pre-tax salaries – purchasing power adjusted – compared to employment benefits and government services available for scarce skills in the developed world.

The scope for raising income or wealth tax rates would seem very limited – given the mobility of skilled South Africans and their capital. Higher tax rates, at some point, would inevitably mean lower tax revenues. The government appears well aware of this trade off, given that the Budget plan for the next three years is to maintain hitherto very stable ratios to GDP of government expenditure (33%) and government revenues (30%). Clearly the limits to government expenditure and redistribution of incomes will be set by the rate of economic growth. Redistribution with growth, to which efficient use of capital will play an important part, would seem the only realistic option.

Economic reality means tradeoffs, not least for economic policy

That growth in SA historically has occurred unfairly, with unusual degrees of income and wealth differences, is a fact of economic life that even SA governments, whose best intention is to reduce income and wealth inequalities, would have to take account of. Policies designed to achieve greater equality of economic outcomes may restrict growth rates and thus growth in government revenues that support redistribution of income and wealth. These are developments that would make achieving a greater degree of equality of economic outcomes and (what is not the same thing at all) realising less absolute poverty, that much harder to achieve.

South Africans have only to look north to Zimbabwe to recognise how the aggressive redistribution of wealth (without compensation) can destroy wealth creation and economic growth. While perhaps achieving greater equality it has also resulted in significantly greater poverty.

The consequences of income redistribution and transformation in SA: more consumption spending and lower savings.

The transformation of the income levels and prospects of the black middle class in SA as well as the income and welfare support provided for poor South Africans has had the effect of raising consumption spending as a share of GDP and reducing the gross savings rate. Gross savings, of which more than 100% are now made by the corporate sector from cash retained and invested by them, have fallen from around 25% of GDP in the early 1980s to current levels of about 14%. Fortunately the rate of capital formation, encouraged by high returns on capital has held up much better to the advantage of economic growth and tax revenues.

But the difference between domestic capital formation and savings has to be made up by infusions of foreign capital. By definition the difference between national gross savings and capital formation is the current account deficit on the balance of payments (see below).

South Africans have had to rely on foreign capital to an important degree, in order to maintain their consumption expenditure, much influenced as it has been by the transformation of the economy, in the form of the rise of the new middle class and the redistribution of income and government expenditure towards the poor. Foreign investors, essentially attracted by high returns, have become very important shareholders in JSE-listed corporations and rand-denominated government debt. Some 40% of SA government debt denominated in rands is now held by foreign investors. South Africans have been significant net sellers of SA equity and debt and foreigners net buyers over recent years.

Raising consumption expenditure rates has been no free lunch for South African wealth owners. They have had to gradually give up a share of their wealth and income from capital invested in JSE -listed companies, mostly held in the form of pension and retirement funds managed for them, to foreign share and debt holders. Of the current account deficit, which is running at about 6% of GDP, an increasing proportion, now equivalent to about half or 3% of GDP, is accounted for by net payments of interest and dividends abroad.

High returns on capital have made higher levels of real expenditure by lower income South Africans and previously disadvantaged black South Africans not only possible, but relatively painless for the wealthy share and debt holders who have gained directly from a rising share and debt market. The tax outcomes, and strongly rising government revenues, have not destroyed this growth process.

The implications for South Africa seem clear enough: to encourage economic growth so as to be able to redistribute more income and wealth to the poor. Any bias in favour of redistribution without growth would be destructive of wealth and incomes. Local and foreign investors, upon whom we depend to maintain our current levels of income and expenditure, don’t like uncertainty and much prefer transparency in government and corporate policy.

If global risk appetite is diminished, then shareholders in all countries will suffer. But those with the least uncertainty when it comes to corporate governance, government policy, inflation, and tax policy will be perceived as safe and suffer less. There are immense benefits to aligning policy with uncertainty reduction. A lower real cost of capital will increase market values, and make marginal investments more attractive. This fuels growth and reinvestment, which create more jobs and tax revenue. Typically, a 1% change in the cost of capital or required returns for investors means a 20% change in equity valuation! This is the old fashioned goal: less risk, more growth should be the aim of economic policy, rather than the chimera of enough income equality.

Pat on the back but much work needs to be done

South African companies should continue to focus on generating world beating returns on capital while government focuses on minimising uncertainty for them. In particular the government should remove the constraints on employment growth in South Africa and encourage labour intensive entrepreneurs to compete with the labour-shy formal business. More competitive labour markets (and the lower labour costs that would come with it) might allow smaller businesses, with less easy access to capital markets, to compete more effectively with formal business, if only they were allowed to do so.

Most important is that South Africans should recognise what should be obvious to all but the ideologically blind. When it comes to delivery, SA business has proved successful and our society should be building on this success. Business to business relationships in SA – subject to competitive forces – work well. By contrast, positive government to business relationships have been profoundly compromised and government delivery of services, despite an abundance of resources provided mostly by taxpayers, has been gravely inadequate.

If we can beat the world in managing businesses for return on capital, we can complete the job in building a South Africa where all prosper. South Africa is its own worst enemy by not according successful business enterprise the respect it deserves from policy makers.

The successes of business can be widely shared beyond current shareholders in the form of higher incomes and in revenues for the state, as well as increased employment. Growth with distribution is a worthy goal for policy and high returns on capital can contribute to this.

David Holland is Senior Adviser, HOLT and adviser to Credit Suisse. The views expressed are his own and not necessarily those of HOLT or Credit Suisse