Month: February 2021

Higher commodity prices could bring about higher global inflation. That would not necessarily be bad news for South Africa.

There is a hint of inflation in the frigid northern air. It’s being reflected in the long-end of the bond markets, the part of the yield curve that is vulnerable to signals of high inflation and the higher interest rates and lower bond values that follow. The compensation offered for bearing the risk that inflation may surprise on the upside is reflected in the spread between nominal and inflation-linked bond yields. These spreads have been widening in the US, and in low inflation countries like Germany and Japan.

This spread for 10-year bonds in the US was as little as 0.80% at the height of the Covid-19 crisis, was 1.63% at the end of September, and at the time of writing is at 2.14%. It has averaged 1.97% since 2010. The spread has widened because investors have forced the real yield lower, to -1.03%, further than they have pushed the nominal yield higher now, to 1.15%. This is still well below the post 2010 daily average of 2.25% (see figure below).

Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 11 February 2021

Investors are paying up to insure themselves against higher inflation by buying inflation linkers and forcing real yields ever more negative. Clearly, the nominal yields continue to be repressed by Fed Bond buying (currently at a $120 billion monthly rate). One might think it’s easier to fight the Fed with inflation linkers, than via higher long bond yields, to which the currently low mortgage rates and a buoyant housing market are linked.

The Fed is insistent that it is not even thinking yet of tapering its bond purchases. The Treasury, now led by Janet Yellen, previously in charge of the Fed, insists that a new stimulus package of US$1.9 trillion is still needed for a US recovery.

Metal and commodity prices, grains and oil are all rising sharply off depressed levels. Industrial metals are 45% up on the lows of last year, while a broader commodity price index that includes oil is up 51% off its lows of 2020.

Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 11 February 2021

These higher input prices will not automatically lead to higher prices at the factory gate or at the supermarket. Manufacturers and retailers might prefer to pass on higher input costs. But they know better than to ignore the state of demand for their goods and services. They can only charge what their markets will bear, which will depend on demand that in turn will reflect policy settings.

Higher inflation rates cannot be sustained without consistent support from the demand side of the economy. Yet supply side-driven price shocks that depress spending on other goods and services can become inflationary, if accommodated by consistently easier monetary and fiscal policy. In the 1970s, it was not the oil price shocks that were inflationary. They were a severe tax on consumers and producers in the oil importing economies, which in turn depressed demand for all other goods and services. It was the easy monetary policy designed to counter these depressing effects that led to continuous increases in most prices. That was until Fed chief Paul Volker decided otherwise and was able to shut down demand with high interest rates and a contraction in money supply growth that reversed the inflation trends for some 40 years.

The financial markets will be alert to the prospects that demand for goods and services will prove excessive and inflationary in the years to come – and that they may not be dialed back quickly enough to hold back inflation.

There is consolation for South Africa should global inflation accelerate. It will be accompanied by higher metal prices and perhaps bring a stronger rand to dampen our own inflation. It may also help reduce the large South Africa risk premium that so weakens the incentive to undertake capital expenditure as well as the value of South African business. Our inflation-linked 10-year bonds now yield a real 4.13%, a near record 5.15 percentage points more than US inflation linkers of the same duration. Any reduction in South African risk would thus be welcome.

Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment, 11 February 2021

January 27, 2021

There is some very good news to cheer South Africans up. They are a lot wealthier than they were when the lockdowns were announced in March. And wealthier than they were on January 1^st 2020. If their wealth has been diversified through the JSE, the average shareholder will be 70% better off than they were in March. And 13% up on their portfolios of the 1^st January 2020. The All Bond Index has returned 31% since March and 9% since January 2020. Those with shares off-shore would also have done well, but not as well. They would be up 59% if they held an MSCI EM benchmark tracker or 46% if they had tracked the S&P 500 March. That foreign holiday plan sadly disrupted in March would now be about 16% cheaper in USD. Since the ZAR/USD bottom of April the mighty ZAR has also done a lot better than the average EM currency.

To what should South African wealth owners attribute their much improved financial condition? The usual global suspects can be interrogated. A weaker dollar in a more risk on environment and so buoyant EM stock markets, to which the JSE is umbilically attached, is a large part of the explanation. A rising S&P 500 is a tide that lifts all boats, though some higher than others, as we have seen of the JSE and the ZAR.

But there are more than global risk-on forces at work. SA specific risks, as measured in global bond markets, have declined, notably so since October. They have also have declined relatively, by more than the risks attached to Brazil, Mexico and Russia bonds of the same duration. In April, at the height of market turbulence, the yield on RSA USD denominated 5y bonds had risen to over 7% p.a. And the risk spread, the extra yield over US Treasuries, was about 6.5% p.a. These bonds now offer 3.1% p.a. and an extra 2.7% p.a. over US T Bonds, less than half their levels in March 2020 with much of the improvement also registered after October. Insuring RSA Yankee bonds against default now costs but 1.1% p.a. more than it would cost to insure the average of Brazilian, Mexican and Russian debt. This extra insurance premium to cover SA default SA was 1.5% in October.

The reasons for lower SA risks are not at all as obvious as the benefits. By reducing risk and helping to add to the wealth of South Africans they encourage more spending needed to encourage output and employment. Lower risks moreover reduce the returns required of business adding to their capital stock in SA, so much more of which is needed to permanently raise output employment and incomes. And tax revenues rise with income.

Such improved prospects will be completely reversed by an additional wealth tax. It will not be expected to be a once off event. It will mean more SA risk and demand higher returns on the cash firms invest, meaning still less capex. It will reduce the value of SA companies so that they can meet such higher required risk adjusted returns for investors and immediately reduce the rewards for saving and the value of pensions. It will encourage the export of the savings of tax paying wealth owners and the emigration of skilled taxpayers. Tighter controls on capital flows would inevitably have to follow that would undermine the depth of our capital markets. Have those who advise wealth tax increases estimated how much collateral damage will be done to tax revenues over the longer run?

The sensible way to fund an unavoidable increase in government spending is to call further on the R160b of Treasury cash held at the Reserve Bank. And to raise a temporary overdraft from the Reserve Bank to supplement this cash balance, should this become at all necessary.  Adding more money to the wealth portfolios of South Africans, including to their deposits at the banks, created this way, would further stimulate spending, income growth and tax revenues. It would be growth enhancing and therefore risk reducing.

The failure to secure a large supply of vaccines to help South Africa to reach herd immunity quickly, reveals a vacuity in thinking about the cost to the economy.

The fiasco over the supply of vaccines reveals fully the vacuity of South Africa’s approach to Covid-19. The deposit of R283m to secure a supply of vaccines was not budgeted for because we didn’t have the money for it – even though money for much else was found in the adjusted Budget.

In this context, I observe that the Treasury deposits at the Reserve Bank amounted to R160bn in October, boosted by loans from the IMF and other agencies with anti-pandemic action front of their minds. Has anyone in the Treasury or government attempted to calculate how much additional income will be lost for want of the vaccine – and how much tax revenue the Treasury will not be able to collect?

It will be many times more than the R20bn to be spent on the vaccine. Bear in mind too, that R7bn of this is to be funded by members of medical schemes, which in effect makes it a tax increase or expropriation by any other name, unhelpful given the state of the economy.

Yet a supply of additional money could have been made available by the Reserve Bank, in the same way that money is being created on a large scale by central banks all over the world to fund the extra spending that the lockdowns have made imperative. And the Bank could still do so, to help the Treasury fund the vaccine and the money cost of rolling it out. The idea of raising taxes to fund the extra spending when the economy is under such pressure makes little sense. A higher tax rate or taxing specific incomes will slow the economy even further and might lead to lower tax revenues of all kinds.

Moreover, there is little prospect of more inflation to come. Should inflation emerge at some point, a reversion to normal funding arrangements would be called for. The danger then is that central banks like our Reserve Bank might not act soon enough and inflation picks up. But it is a danger that pales into insignificance when compared with the present danger posed by the pandemic.

Governments around the world know enough economics to know that spending more to help employ workers (and machines) who would otherwise be idle was a costless exercise – costless in the true opportunity cost sense. But South Africa seemingly cannot bring itself to think through the problem this way. The upshot is that South Africa lacks the essential self-confidence to do what would be right now.

The monetary and financial market statistics tell us how unready the economy is to sustain any recovery of output and employment. The supply of extra Reserve Bank money in the form of notes and deposits by banks with the Reserve Bank, what is described as the money base or M0, rose by 8% in 2020. There was a flurry of extra such money in March and July 2020, since reversed. In the US, the money base is up by 43% (See figure 1).

Figure 1: Annual growth in central bank money, SA and US

Source: SA Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Investec Wealth & Investment

The SA banking system is hunkering down, not gearing up. Bank deposits have been growing at about an 8% rate, while lending to the private sector is up a mere 3%. The banks are building balance sheet strength, raising deposits and are cautious about lending more. They are relying less on repurchase agreements made with the Reserve Bank and other lenders, reserving more against potential bad debts while not paying dividends and hence adding to their reserves of equity capital. All of these act to depress growth.

Figure 2: SA bank deposits and lending (R million)

Source: SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth & Investment

Figure 3: SA banks – adding to equity capital

Source: SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth & Investment

The financial metrics continue to paint a grim picture of the prospects for the SA economy. Long-term interest rates remain above 9%, even as inflation is expected to average 5% over the next 10 years. This makes capital expensive for potential investors who are therefore less likely to add to their plant and equipment. The difference between borrowing long and short remains wide, implying sharp increases in short-term interest rates to come and expensive funding for the government (that is taxpayers) at the long end. The risk of South Africa defaulting on its US dollar debt demands that we pay an extra 2.3% more a year than the US government for dollars over five years.

Figure 4: Key financial metrics in 2020-21

Source: Bloomberg and Invested Wealth & Investment

Poorly judged parsimony and monetary conservatism have brought SA great harm in the fight against Covid-19. They have made the prospects for a recovery in GDP and government revenue appear bleak. It is not too late to change course. We should be funding the extra unavoidable spending on the vaccine and its roll out by drawing on the cash reserves of the government or by raising an overdraft form the Reserve Bank.