The rand: A global opportunity

Global rather than SA forces have taken the rand and the JSE higher. There is still much scope for improved SA fundamentals to add further strength to the rand and the economy

The rand has regained all the ground lost since December 2015 when President Zuma shocked the markets. How much of this recovery can be attributed to South African specifics (better news about the political state of SA) and how much can be attributed to global forces (less risk priced into emerging market currencies bonds and equities of which SA is so much a part of)? The answer is that to date almost all of the improved outcomes registered on the JSE and in the exchange value of the rand is the result of less global, rather than SA, risk.

The positive conclusion to draw from this is that were SA itself to be better appreciated in the capital markets on its own improved merits, there would be further upside for the rand – and for the SA economy that can only escape its current malaise with a stronger rand and the lower inflation and interest rates that will follow.

We show below that the rand has recovered in line with emerging market equities, represented by the benchmark MSCI EM. This index and the JSE indices are now also more valuable than they were in early December 2015. The JSE All Share Index (ALSI) in rands is also now ahead of its December value. MSCI EM is up about 20% from its recent lows of mid-January 2016 while the rand has gained about 15% since then. The JSE, when valued in US dollars, has performed even better than the average emerging market equity market, having gained about 25% since its lows of 18 January.

 

The higher SA-specific risks attached to the value of the rand in December are shown by the performance of the rand against other emerging market currencies since. As may be seen below, the rand has yet to recover its value of early December when measured against the Brazilian and Turkish currencies that have also strengthened against the US dollar over the period. On a trade weighted basis, the rand has lost about 4% since December.

A model of the daily value of the USD/ZAR that uses the USD/AUD and the emerging market bond risk spreads as predictors, with a very good statistical fit since 2012, indicates that without the Zuma intervention, the USD/ZAR might now have cost closer to R13 than the R14.7 it traded at yesterday (18 April), given the recovery in commodity currencies and the narrowing emerging market spreads.

That the recovery of the rand and the JSE has more to do with emerging markets rather than SA forces is shown below. Risk spreads attached to emerging market bonds and RSA dollar-denominated bonds have declined in recent months. However the difference between higher emerging market spreads over US Treasury yields and RSA spreads has narrowed. The wider this difference, the better the relative rating of SA bonds: the SA rating was at its relative high in late 2014 and has deteriorated since, though it is little changed from its rating of early December 2015.

A comparison of risk spreads attached to Brazilian and SA debt made below, shows how Brazilian credit has benefitted both absolutely and relatively to SA from the prospect that its President will be forced out of office. It should also be recognised that both Brazilian and SA debt are currently trading as high yield bonds. Investment grade bonds offer up to about 2.7% p.a more than five year US Treasuries.

When we turn to the bond market itself, we see that the yield on RSA 10 year rand-denominated bonds has fallen below 9% p.a but is still above the yields offered in early December. The spread between 10 year RSA rand rates and US 10 year Treasury Bond yields however remain above 7% p.a. This is a further indication that SA-specific risks priced into the bond markets remain highly elevated. They reveal that the rand is still expected to weaken by about 7% p.a against the US dollar – implying consistently high rates of inflation in SA over the next 10 years.

There remains every opportunity for SA to prove that the markets are wrong about the inflation and exchange rate outlook, with policies that convince the world that we will not be printing money to fund government spending and that our policies will be investor friendly. Of more importance, a stronger rand and lower interest rates would help lift GDP growth rates, to the further surprise of the markets and the credit rating agencies.

 

A Marie Antoinette moment – let them eat more expensive bread

The Treasury has just increased the duty on imported wheat by 34%, from R911 to R1 224 per tonne. Some 60% of SA’s demands for wheat are met from abroad. Accordingly the price of bread is predicted to increase by some 10%.

This is another bitter blow for the poor of SA, some 34% of the population, according to the World Bank. One might have thought that such a step that will benefit a few farmers at the expense of a huge number of impoverished consumers of bread, makes no sense at all. But apparently the Treasury had no choice in the matter at all, being bound by an agreed automatic wheat price formula, and was forced to act when threatened by High Court action taken by Grain SA. But the responsibility for the formula is that of the government and the formula may well be adjusted in the months to come, altogether too late to relieve poverty.

And were the farmers wise to exercise their rights at a time like this? They may well end up with lower duties or better still for the economy – no duties at all on a staple most of which is imported.

In the figures below we compare in rands the global (US dollar Chicago-based price of wheat) and local prices of wheat, having converted bushels to tonnes* and dollars to rands at current exchange rates. The local price is the price quoted on SAFEX for wheat, delivered in three months. The difference in the price of wheat, global and local, is the extra that South Africans pay for their wheat, a mixture of duties and shipping costs.

SA is not self-sufficient in wheat, hence the local price of wheat takes its cue from the cost of imports. Not that self-sufficiency in food or grains is a useful goal for policy because it must mean higher prices for wheat and other staples for which the SA climate and soils are not helpful. And higher prices for staples then lead to higher wages to compensate for higher costs of living that make all producers in SA less competitive with imported alternatives. Higher prices for wheat (or rice or sugar or barley or rye) mean less land planted to maize and so higher prices for maize, in which SA is normally more than self-sufficient for all the right reasons and where local prices usually take their cue from prices on global markets, less rather than plus transport costs to world markets. The current drought in SA and its expected impact on domestic supplies, has lifted maize prices towards import price parity – another, but unavoidable, blow to consumers. Also less land now under wheat, barley or rye is given to pasture and grazing that might otherwise have held down the price of meat.

A competitive economy is one that exploits its comparative advantages to export more and import more. It does not protect some producers at the expense of all consumers, nor those producers who could hold their own in both global and domestic markets without protection. A competitive economy also will not lack the means to import food, both the basic stuff and the more exotic varieties at globally determined prices. South Africa needs more, not less, competition to help reduce poverty and stimulate faster growth. Raising barriers to trade not only harms the poor today but it also undermines their prospects of escaping poverty over the longer run.

*For more on how to convert bushels to tonnes: https://www.agric.gov.ab.ca/app19/calc/crop/bushel2tonne.jsp

The rand: A welcome question of specifics

Is the recovery of the rand for global or SA reasons? Whatever the explanation, it is surely very welcome.

A recovery of the SA economy needs a stronger rand. A stronger rand will mean less inflation to come and lower interest rates. Unfortunately a weaker rand leads interest rates in the opposite direction making it just about impossible for the business cycle to turn higher. A combination of higher prices on the shelves and the petrol station forecourts following rand weakness, depresses household spending. And the higher interest rates that follow add to the inability of households to spend more – and to borrow more. Household spending, which accounts for over 60% of all spending, leads the economy in both directions. Without a recovery in the propensity of households to spend more, the best the SA economy can hope to do over the next 24 months would be to avoid recession.

The foreign exchange value of the rand responds to both global forces – that is global risk appetites that drive emerging markets and currencies lower or higher (including the rand) – and SA-specific risks that encourage capital flows to and from SA.

An obvious example of SA-specific risks driving the rand weaker and interest rates higher was provided by President Jacob Zuma in December. The week of Zuma interventions in the Treasury saw the rand sharply weaken and sent long term interest sharply higher. These interventions added about R2 to the cost of a US dollar – according to our model of the rand – and about 100bps or more to the cost of raising long-dated government debt.

Our model of “fair value” for the USD/ZAR relies on two forces, the USD/AUD and the emerging market risk spread. Had Zuma not acted as he did, the US dollar might well have cost no more than R14 in early December 2015. With the recent recovery in the USD/AUD and emerging market bonds, the current fair value for the rand would be closer to R13 than R14. This suggests that the Zuma danger to the rand has not left the currency or bond markets. And that the welcome recovery of the rand is mostly attributable to global rather than SA forces. We attempt below to isolate the impact of global from SA-specific risks on the exchange value of the rand and show that the recovery of the rand is mostly global rather than SA specific.

If indeed the recovery of the rand is mostly attributable to global rather than SA forces, there is the possibility that a revived respect for SA’s fiscal conservatism – demonstrated in the Pravin Gordhan Budget for 2016-17 – can still prove more helpful to the SA bond market and the rand, global forces permitting.

In the figure below we compare the performance of the rand to other currencies including a basket of emerging market currencies. The rand weakened against all currencies in 2015 – including other emerging market currencies. Furthermore the significant recovery of the rand in 2016 is in line with that of other commodity and emerging market currencies. This suggests again that global rather than SA forces explain the recent rand recovery.

A similar impression of predominant global forces is provided by the bond market. The spread between RSA 10 year bond yields and US Treasury Bond Yields of similar duration have stabilised at more than 7% p.a. having widened dramatically in December 2015. These spreads are significantly wider than they were in early 2015. This spread may be regarded as a measure of SA specific risk, or more particularly as a measure of expected rand weakness. The rand has weakened – and is expected to weaken further. An alternative measure of SA specific risk is provided by the CDS spread paid to insure SA US dollar denominated debt against default. This spread has moved very much in in line with the interest rate spread.

The recent narrowing of this insurance premium has however also been accompanied by a narrowing of the more general emerging market CDS spread, reflecting global forces at work. The gap between the higher emerging market CDS spread and the lower RSA spread narrowed sharply in December 2015, indicating a deterioration in SA’s relative credit standing. This relative standing has not improved much in 2016, as may be seen by a difference in spreads of only about 120bps. Note that the wider this spread, the better SA’s relative standing in the global credit markets.

The spread between RSA rand yields and their US Treasury yields of similar duration are by definition also the average rate at which the rand is expected to depreciate over the next 10 years. The fact is that the rand has weakened and is expected to weaken further – despite the wider interest carry in favour of the rand.

Given these expectations of rand weakness it is not surprising and entirely consistent that inflation compensation provided by the RSA bond market being the difference between an inflation linked yield and a nominal yield. This is a very good measure of inflation expected and has also risen and remains above 7% p.a.

The Reserve Bank pays particular attention to inflationary expectations, believing that these expectations can drive inflation higher. But without an improvement in the outlook for the rand, it is hard to imagine any decline in inflation expected. It is also very hard to imagine how higher short term interest rates can have any predictable influence on the spot or expected value of the rand and therefore on inflation to come. As we have emphasised the risks that drive the rand are global events or SA political developments, for which short term interest rates in SA are largely irrelevant.

The only predictable influence of higher short term interest rates in SA is still slower growth in household spending. Less growth without any predictably less inflation is not a trade off the Reserve Bank should be imposing on the SA economy, even though but may well continue to do so. The only hope for a cyclical recovery is a stronger rand – whatever its cause, global or South African.

A revolutionary proposal to transform the prospects of the SA economy – eliminate company tax

There seems little hope of permanently raising GDP growth rates. Persistently slow growth in SA threatens fiscal sustainability. It also threatens social stability. It prolongs the agony of widespread poverty. Something radical is called for to stimulate growth – and by radical I do not mean potentially disastrous expropriation of wealth or the introduction of a National Minimum Wage that, even if it relieves the poverty of those who manage to keep their jobs, will leave many more out of work and even more dependent on informal (illegal) employment and welfare provided by taxpayers.

The radical proposal to transform the prospects of the SA economy is to completely eliminate corporate income tax and replace it with a mixture of additional payroll and wealth taxes. Zero rating company earnings would provide a large boost for saving, capital expenditure, employment and the GDP growth rate. The sums involved are not trivial: corporate income tax yields about R200bn per annum or close to 20% of all government revenues.

The significant amount of tax saved adds to the case for eliminating the tax. Companies would save and invest in plant machinery and people much of the extra R200bn they would save in taxes. It would be a boost to the competitiveness of SA companies and could lead to lower prices. It would attract foreign capital because required returns – after taxes – directly investing in SA based enterprises, would be much reduced. It would make SA a haven for the establishment of head offices. Taxable income from global companies newly established in SA would be transferred in rather than out – as was a major concern of Davis Tax Committee.

Zero taxes for companies would eliminate all the distortions created when companies are taxed additionally and separately from their owners. Taxes on all income distributed by companies would be taxed at the income tax rates that apply to their owners, as is the case with any partnership. All the shareholders in SA companies would become what is known in the US as Master Limited Partners, enjoying the advantages of limited liability for debts but taxed as individuals or institutions at the same tax rates.

Dividends would be taxed as would rental or interest income when received, at the same rate applied to all income. There would be no double taxation of company income and dividends as there would be no relief for interest or any other expense incurred by the company. There would be no deduction for depreciation or amortisation. How much to allow as a deduction from earnings would be company business alone, as would be the decision to retain or pay out cash, with due regard for economic depreciation and the economic income of the company.

The company could be required to collect a withholding tax on all dividends and interest or rent paid out by a company to its capital providers at say a 25% rate, to secure a consistent predictable flow of revenue to the SA Revenue Service (SARS). Owners would credit such payments in their tax returns. Pension and retirement funds as agents of owners and capital providers should be made subject to the same withholding tax. Individuals and their retirement plans, including all their collective investment schemes, would be dealt with in exactly the same way when taxed on income received, including taxes on realised capital gains that should be treated as income.

This would eliminate the major distortion caused by taxing individual savings plans at a much higher rate than that of the collective investment schemes. Personal income tax incentives to contribute to savings plans would not be prejudiced by zero company tax nor would direct subsidies to companies. Yet subsidies are much more transparent to the taxpayer than income tax concessions – a further advantage of zero company tax.

There is in fact no good economic reason to tax the income of companies separately from the income of their owners. Taxing companies probably happened originally because it was administratively very easy to do so. That a tax is convenient to collect, rather than is easy to impose the collection duties on a company collecting tax on behalf of SARS, does not make for a good tax – one that treats all taxpayers equally – and does as little harm to the workings of the economy as is possible.

Dividends and the tax collected on dividends is very likely to increase significantly as company earnings rose – especially if dividends and interest and rent paid to pension and retirement funds were to be included in the tax net as they should be – taxed at say a 25% rate.

A social security tax at a low starting rate could help make up for the losses of company income tax. As indicated in the Budget Review, total payrolls in SA are of the order of R2 300 billion. 5% of this is over R120bn. In the first instance this is paid by employers, but in the long run the payroll tax likely to be paid, in effect, by employees as a wage or salary sacrifice. South African assets in the form of homes, pension funds shares etc. are of the order of R10 000 bllion. Assets in the form of homes are already taxed at market value by municipalities. Wealth in the form of shares in businesses and pension funds etc. could be taxed at the same rate. A 2% wealth tax could bring in as much as the corporate income tax, about R200bn.

With the elimination of company income tax, wealth in the form of shares in businesses, incorporated and not incorporated, would get an immediate boost, an extra inflation-protected R200bn a year in extra earnings – capitalised at a more friendly rate of say 4% – because of the business friendly tax reforms. The R200bn permanently saved by business owners in taxes might be worth 25 times R200bn or more than R5 000 billion to its owners. In other words, more than enough to compensate pension funds and their like for higher taxes on their income.

A wealth tax would also have a popular redistribution flavour to it. But a combination of a wealth tax and an elimination of company taxes would do more than redistribute wealth. It would help create wealth and income and transform the prospects of the SA economy.

 

 

*The views expressed in this column are those of the author and may not necessarily represent those of Investec Wealth & Investment